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ABSTRACT

Two main objectives of the securities offering regulation are to protect investors from
frauds and to facilitate capital formation. Balancing these two objectives is a difficult task
particularly for the private placement regulation. The primary focus of this study is to
assess whether the current private placement regulations of the United States and South
Korea are properly balancing these two objectives.
First, this study broadly reviews securities offering regulations and the historical
developments of the private placement regulations of the United States and South Korea,
and compares the current regulations of both countries. For the U.S. private placement
regulation, this study particularly focuses on Rule 506 of Regulation D under the Securities
Act. Subsequently, this study gives critical assessments on the current private placement
regulations of both countries, focusing on three essential factors defining the private
placement, (i) investor qualifications, (ii) manner of offerings, and (iii) information
requirements. This study shows that there are substantial differences between regulatory
approaches of two countries in connection with these factors. It further emphasizes that
neither the U.S. nor Korean private placement regulation balances regulatory objectives—
posing investors at a greater risk in the private placement. Based on these discussions, this
study proposes several policy considerations to achieve an enhanced balance between
investor protection and capital formation in the private placement regulations in the United
States and South Korea.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
Startups and small businesses play an important role in the growth of the national
economy. These companies are believed to be the driving force for job creation and
innovation. 1 Thus, it is one of the most common policy goals across the countries to
support small businesses in their success so that they can create jobs and to lead economic
growth. In this respect, the ability for small businesses to obtain financing in their early
stages of business is particularly important. Small businesses traditionally relied on two
sources to fund capital—borrowing and equity financing. However, credit sources (e.g.,
bank loans) are often restricted to small businesses because “lending to small businesses is
generally considered riskier and more costly than lending to larger firms” due to factors
such as high failure rate, “informational opacity,” and high loan-monitoring costs.2 The
availability of credit for small businesses is also significantly affected by financial market
conditions. For example, in the wake of the financial crisis in 2008, U.S. banks tightened
business lending standards, and this affected credit availability of small firms more
negatively than that of larger firms.3
The lack of ability to gain access to credit sources leads small businesses to the

1

See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Directorate for Science,
Technology and Industry, Young SMEs, growth and job creation (2014) (reporting that “small and medium
sized enterprises (SMEs) employ on average 65% of the workforce and account for 75% of total job creation”
in 18 countries), available at https://www.oecd.org/sti/young-SME-growth-and-job-creation.pdf.
2

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on the Availability of
Credit to Small Businesses (Sept. 2012) at 1, available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/otherreports/files/sbfreport2012.pdf.
3

Id. at 4 (“By 2012, credit flows to larger businesses had essentially returned to their pre-recession
levels, while credit flows to small businesses, though improved, remained well below those levels.”).

1

securities market to raise capital by selling their equity to investors. The securities laws
provide two different ways for businesses to raise capital in the securities market—
registered securities offerings and exempted securities offerings.4 A registered securities
offering has some advantages over other types of securities offerings because it allows an
issuer to make offers of securities to the public without the limitation of the amount to be
raised or the method to communicate with potential investors. However, to protect
investors from fraudulent securities offerings, securities laws impose rigorous
requirements for small companies to comply.5 In addition, time and expense, accompanied
by a registered offering, also make it impractical for small businesses to follow this path.6
To help small businesses seek to raise capital with less burden, securities laws provide
another path to finance external capital without registration process—exempted offerings.
Among several types of exempted offerings, the private placement is the most commonly
used method for capital raising in both the United States and South Korea.7 The dominance
of the private placement can be explained by the fact that the private placement is arguably
the least regulated compared to registered offerings and other exempted offerings.
Elimination of regulatory protections is based on the premise that investors in the private
placement market can adequately protect their interest without protections afforded in other
4

See infra Chapter II.A.3-4, B.2-3.

5

See Stuart R. Cohen and Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s Continuing Failure to
Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U.J.L. & BUS. 1, 7-10 (2007).
6

Id. at 7 (“Pursuing the clear regulatory path - a registered public securities offering - is not feasible
for most small companies. The time, delay and expense of a registered securities offering are simply beyond
the reach or practical levels for small companies.”).
7

In the U.S. securities market, most of the issuers rely on Rule 506 of Regulation D to qualify for
private placement. The U.S. SEC analysis of the market for unregistered securities offerings shows that Rule
506 offerings account for 99.2% of the capital raised through Regulation D during the period 2009-2014.
See Scott Bauguess, Rachita Gullapalli, and Vladimir Ivanov, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Div. of Econ. &
Risk Analysis, Capital Raising in the U.S.: An Analysis of the Market for Unregistered Securities Offerings,
2009-2014, at 12 (Oct. 29, 2015).

2

securities offerings. However, investor protection would be at risk if the private placement
scheme does not support such premise. In this respect, this study questions whether or not
the current private placement regulations of the United States and South Korea properly
balance two policy objectives of securities laws—investor protection and capital formation.
In South Korea, despite the rapidly changing capital market environment and
corresponding regulatory reforms, the private placement regulation has been alienated from
such changes and maintains the relatively old regulatory system. It has not attracted much
scholarly attention either. In contrast, the United States has consistently made regulatory
reforms and related discussions regarding the private placement regulation. Thus, with
respect to reforming private placement regulation in Korea, it would be meaningful to
carefully look back at the regulatory framework and its development in the U.S. private
placement market. However, it should be noted that the U.S. private placement regulations
have been subjected to much criticism. 8 In particular, the recent JOBS Act and the
subsequent SEC rules which eliminate the ban on general solicitation in the private offering
fueled concerns for investor protection.9 Accordingly, this study will review the private
placement regulations of both countries with a critical eye and suggest better balanced
approaches to regulate the private placement market.

8

See generally infra Chapter IV.

9

Jump Start Our Business Startup Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012); Eliminating
the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings,
at 26, Securities Act Release No. 9415 (July 10, 2013). For criticism on SEC Rule 506(c) of Regulation D
which eliminated the ban on general solicitation, see Chapter IV.B.1.4.2.

3

B. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
Although this study broadly overviews the securities offering regimes and private
placement regulations of the United States and South Korea, it defines the boundary of
discussions to evaluate the current private placement regulations of the two countries.
First, this study focuses on three key factors defining the private placement (i.e.,
investor qualifications, manner of offering, information requirements). Thus, for example,
this study does not address secondary market issues such as the resale limitation, one of
the most important aspect of the private placement regulation.10
Second, in comparing the private placement regulations of the Unites States and South
Korea, this study focuses on Rule 506 of Regulation D,11 which is a safe harbor for the
private offering exemption of Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.12 An issuer
can also claim the private offering exemption under Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act
without relying on Rule 506.13 However, Rule 506 would be useful to compare specific
conditions and requirements of the private placement regulations of the two countries.
Third, this study reviews the current private placement regulation from the perspective

10

In recent years, the U.S. securities market witnessed the emergence of the private secondary market
platforms such as SecondMarket and SharesPost that enable investors of the private placements to transfer
their shares in such a marketplace. However, these platforms raised the concern for growing “unregulated
markets for unregistered securities.” See generally Marina Petrova, Capital Formation for Internet
Companies: Why Facebook Stayed Private for So Long and What That Means for Investors, 12 J. BUS. &
SEC. L. 305, 317-22 (2012); Adam C. Pritchard, Facebook, the JOBS Act, and Abolishing IPOs: A two-tier
market system would go a long way toward promoting capital formation and curtailing speculation, 35
REGULATION 12 (2012).
11

17 C.F.R. § 230.506.

12

15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).

13

In addition, offerings in reliance on Rule 504 of Regulation D are also “private” for the most part.
See Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, The “Seed Capital” Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 7644,
1999 WL 95490, *5 (Feb. 25, 1999) (stating that “[w]e believe that the vast majority of current Rule 504
offerings are private”).

4

of operating companies. In both the United States and South Korea, the private placement
regulation has a general application, regardless of whether or not an issuer of securities is
an operating company. In fact, the amount of capital raised by the private funds in the
private placement market far exceeds the amount raised by non-fund issuers.14 However,
this study particularly focuses on whether or not the private placement regulation provides
small businesses with effective means to access the capital market.

C. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
This study consists of six chapters. Chapter II overviews the securities offering
regimes of the United States and South Korea. After the review of the current regulations
of both countries governing securities offerings, it compares key differences in terms of
registered offerings, exempted offerings, and regulatory authority. To help compare two
regulatory systems, a summarization table is provided at the end of each section of this
chapter.
Chapter III focuses on the private placement regulations of two countries. For the
U.S. private placement regulation, this chapter discusses in detail administrative and
judicial interpretations on Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, and history and
contents of Rule 506 of Regulation D (including its predecessor, Rule 146). For the Korean
private placement regulation, it reviews how private placements are determined and what
requirements should be satisfied to qualify for the private placement.
Chapter IV reviews and assesses the current private placement regulation of the

14

Bauguess et al., supra note 7, at 19-20 (Oct. 29, 2015) (reporting that operating companies raised
$133 billions during the period 2009-2014, compared to $1,160 billions raised by private funds (including
hedge funds, other investment funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds) during the same period).

5

United States and South Korea, focused on three key factors which characterize the private
placement, (i) investor qualifications, (ii) manner of offerings, and (iii) information
requirements. This chapter shows that there are significant differences in the private
placement regimes of the two countries. It also indicates problems of the current private
placement regulations in terms of policy goals of investor protection and capital formation.
Based on the discussions in Chapter IV, Chapter V proposes some policy considerations to
achieve an enhanced balance between investor protection and capital formation in the
private placement regulations of the United States and South Korea. Chapter VI concludes
with a brief summary.
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CHAPTER II. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

FOR

SECURITIES OFFERINGS

IN

THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH KOREA

A. UNITED STATES
1. INTRODUCTION
As a prelude to discussions on the private placement regulation, this part outlines the
U.S. regulatory systems surrounding securities offerings in the primary markets. For this
purpose, this part begins with a review of the U.S. securities regulation which can be
characterized as a dual regime of the federal and state regulations. Subsequently, this part
briefly overviews the registered offering regulation under the federal securities laws,
focusing on the restrictions on an issuer’s communication activities and potential liabilities
for misrepresentations in connection with the offering. Lastly, it reviews alternative
offering schemes on which issuers may rely in lieu of burdensome registered offerings to
satisfy capital needs. Special attention will be given for exempt offerings established by
SEC rules, including Rule 147, Regulation A, Regulation D and the relatively new
Regulation Crowdfunding.

2. FRAMEWORK OF THE U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION
2.1. FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION
2.1.1. SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 (THE “SECURITIES ACT”)

7

The Securities Act was the first federal statute to govern securities transactions in the
primary market.1 The purpose of the Securities Act is to protect investors from fraud in
the securities offerings by providing investors with adequate and true information about
the offering prior to an investment decision.2 To achieve this purpose, the Securities Act
requires, absent an exemption, an issuer to register the contemplated offering with the SEC.
It also provides civil and criminal liabilities for the misstatement or omission of material
information in the offer or sale of securities.3

2.1.2. SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (THE “EXCHANGE ACT”)
The Exchange Act aims to facilitate the secondary trading of securities by requiring
certain types of issuers to provide investors with the current information on the issuer and
its securities and by preventing any person from employing fraudulent schemes in
connection with the purchase or sale of the securities.4 The Exchange Act established the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) and authorized it to
enforce the federal securities laws.5 The Act also requires the market professionals and
self-regulatory organizations (SROs) (e.g., broker-dealers, exchanges, clearing agencies,

1

Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, ch. 38, title I, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa).
2

S. Rep. No. 73-47, at 1 (1933) (“The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest
business. The basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning securities to be offered for
sale in interstate and foreign commerce and providing protection against fraud and misrepresentation.”).
3

See infra II.A.3.

4

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, ch. 404, title I, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp).
5

15 U.S.C. § 78d.
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securities association) to register with the SEC. Finally, the Act requires disclosure of
material information relating to proxy solicitations and tender offers.6
2.1.3. OTHER STATUTES
Other federal statutes governing securities transactions include the Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, Investment Company Act of 1940 and Investment Adviser Act of 1940. In
2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted to enhance corporate responsibility, financial
disclosures and the independence of outside auditors.7 It also created the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee the audits of public companies and
broker-dealers. In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, Congress enacted the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) in 2010.8
Among measures to reform the financial regulatory system of the United States, the DoddFrank Act provides various provisions relating to investor protection and the SEC
regulation.9 Lastly, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) was signed into
law on April 5, 2012.10 To assist the funding of small businesses in the capital market, the
JOBS Act eased regulatory burden relating to securities offerings, including special rules
for “emerging growth companies,” a new crowdfunding exemption, an increase of limit of

6

Id. § 78n.

7

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.

8

Dodd-Frank and Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376.
9

Most of the provisions were legislated under the Title IX of the Dodd-Frank Act, known as the
“Investor Protections and Improvements to the Regulation of Securities.” Dodd-Frank Act, Title IX, 124
Stat. 1376, 1822-41.
10

Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 122 Stat. 306.
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capital raise for Regulation A offerings, and the elimination of the general solicitation ban
in certain offerings under Regulation D.

2.1.4. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC)
The U.S. Congress empowered the SEC with a broad authority to administer the
federal securities laws. As stated in its mission statement, the basic responsibility of the
SEC is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate
capital formation.”11 To achieve its mission, the SEC oversees the securities market and
its key participants, brings enforcement actions against securities law violators, issues and
amends rules, interprets federal securities laws and grants no-action letters, and works with
SROs and federal, state and foreign authorities. 12

The SEC is headed by five

Commissioners including one Chairman who have five-year terms and are appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 13 The agency is currently
organized into five divisions, twenty three offices, and eleven regional offices.14

2.2. STATE SECURITIES REGULATION
In the early 1900s, most states enacted securities laws, commonly referred to as “blue
sky” laws.15 While state securities laws vary from state to state, they typically regulate
11

U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ABOUT: WHAT WE DO, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml.

12

Id.

13

To ensure independence of the SEC, no more than three Commissioners can be members of the same
political party. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a).
14

U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, DIVISIONS: All Divisions and Offices, https://www.sec.gov/divisions.

shtml.
15

The first blue sky law was adopted by Kansas in 1911 and 47 of the 48 states (except Nevada) adopted
the state securities laws prior to promulgation of the Securities Act of 1933. Paul G, Mahoney, The Origins

10

securities offerings and securities professionals and provide civil and criminal liabilities to
prevent frauds in connection with securities transactions. In contrast to the full disclosure
philosophy of the federal securities laws, many state laws took the form of the “merit
regulation” meaning that state securities administrators had broad authority to determine
whether a proposed offering of securities is “fair, just and equitable.”16 Merit regulation,
however, was replaced by disclosure-based regulation in many states during the 1980s and
the early 1990s. 17 To enhance the uniformity of state securities laws, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated the
Uniform Securities Act (USA) which was adopted by 40 states.18
Since each state preserved its regulatory authority, even after the passage of the
federal securities law,19 issuers and securities professionals had to comply with both federal
and state regulation. To relieve a dual compliance burden, Congress enacted the National
Securities Market Improvement Act (NSMIA) in 1996. 20 The NSMIA authorized the
federal securities laws to preempt state blue sky laws with respect to certain securities
offerings and regulations of broker-dealers and investment advisers.21 In particular, the

of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses, 46 J.L. & ECON. 229, 229 (2003). For brief
explanation for the unclear origin of the term “blue sky,” see Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Origin of
the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 359 n.59 (1991).
16

JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. ET AL, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 76-77 (13th ed. 2015);
see also Mahoney, supra note 15, at 231-32.
17

Coffee, supra note 16, at 77.

18

Though the first model statute was promulgated in 1930, major adoption by states was followed by
the enactment of the Uniform Securities Act of 1958 which was revised in 1985 and 2002. See UNIFORM
SECURITIES ACT WEBSITE: SUMMARY, http://www.uniformsecuritiesact.org/summary.html.
19

For example, Section 18 of the Securities Act, when originally adopted in 1933, provided that
“[n]othing in this title shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission . . . of any State . . . over any
securities or any person.” Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, title I, § 18, 48 Stat. 74, 85.
20

National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416.

21

See generally Coffee, supra note 16, at 77-78.
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NSMIA amended Section 18 of the Securities Act to exempt from state registration
requirements “covered securities” which include, for example, securities listed on national
securities exchanges and securities offered in connection with certain exempt offerings
(e.g., securities issued under SEC Rule 506).22 As a result, application of state registration
requirements is limited to relatively small size offerings.23 However, it should be noted
that federal preemption under Section 18 of the Securities Act does not prohibit a state’s
authority to investigate and bring enforcement actions against fraud in connection with
those offerings.24

3. REGISTERED OFFERINGS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT
3.1. OPERATION OF SECTION 5 OF THE SECURITIES ACT
Section 5 of the Securities Act regulates how and when securities should be offered
and sold to the public.25 The term “offer” is broadly defined in the Act26 and has been so
construed to include direct and indirect selling efforts of an issuer.27 Section 5 prohibits or
restricts the sales activities of an issuer or other offering participants (e.g., underwriters)

22

15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)-(b). The preemption, with respect to Rule 506 exempt offerings, does not prohibit
a state from imposing certain minimal notice filing requirements. Id. § 77r(b)(4)(E).
23

Coffee, supra note 16, at 78.

24

15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1).

25

Id. § 77e.

26

Id. § 77b(a)(3) (“The term “offer to sell”, “offer for sale”, or “offer” includes every attempt or offer
to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.”).
27

E.g., Publication of Information Prior to or After the Effective Date of a Registration Statement,
Securities Act Release No. 3844, 1957 WL 3605, at *2 (Oct. 8, 1957) (stating that “the publication of
information and statements, and publicity efforts, generally, made in advance of a proposed financing . . .
may in fact contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in the issuer or in the
securities of an issuer”).
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by jurisdictional means (e.g., telephone, mail) in three critical stages: a pre-filing period, a
waiting period and a post-effective period.
3.1.1. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES (“GUN-JUMPING” PROVISIONS)
a. Pre-filing period
Before an issuer files a registration statement with the SEC, any oral or written
communication as to the securities offering is prohibited.28 Neither the sale or delivery of
a security is allowed during this period.29
b. Waiting period
Once a registration statement is filed, the issuer has to wait for the SEC to declare it
is effective after its staff’s review.30 During this waiting period, an offer of the securities
can be initiated, but written communications can be made only by means of a “prospectus”
(e.g., preliminary prospectus) satisfying the requirements of Section 10 of the Act. 31
Neither sale or delivery of a security is allowed during this period.32
c. Post-effective period
After the registration statement becomes effective, the sale or delivery of a security is
allowed if it is preceded or accompanied by a final prospectus pursuant to Section 10(a) of

28

15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).

29

Id. § 77e(a).

30

Id. § 77h.

31

Id. § 77e(b)(1).

32

Id. § 77e(a). The term “prospectus” means any written communication to offer any security or
confirm the sale of any security. Id. § 77b(a)(10).
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the Securities Act.33 Though the Section 5(b)(2) restriction relating to use of a prospectus
is applicable during the post-effective period, any sales literature (so-called “free writing”)
can be delivered if it is accompanied (or preceded) by a final prospectus.34

3.1.2. GUN-JUMPING EXCEPTIONS
In 2005, the SEC dramatically renovated the public offering process to “eliminate
unnecessary and outmoded restrictions on offerings” and “provide more timely investment
information to investors.”35 By exercising its general exemptive authority under Section
28 of the Securities Act, the SEC significantly loosened restrictions on communications
during the pre-filing and waiting period maintained by Section 5 of the Securities Act.36
Permitted communications varies depending on categories of issuers.37 The 2005 reform
also eliminated “the link between delivery of the final prospectus and the delivery of a
written confirmation of sale” based on the recognition of “access equals delivery.”38

33

Id. § 77e(b)(2).

34

The term “prospectus” excludes from the definition “a communication sent or given after the effective
date of the registration statement” (other than Section 10(b) prospectus) if such communication is
accompanied or preceded by Section 10(a) prospectus. Id. § 77b(a)(10)(a).
35

Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, at 1 (July 19, 2005).

36

Gun-jumping exemptions newly adopted or amended in the 2005 reform include: (1) regularly
released factual or forward-looking information (Rules 168, 169); (2) communications more than 30 days
prior to filing a registration statement (Rule 163A); (3) pre-filing communication by the Well Known
Seasoned Issuers (WKSIs) (Rule 163); (4) use of “free writing prospectus” after filing a registration statement
(Rules 164, 433); (5) expansion of information contained in the public notice of the offering (“identifying
statement”) after filing a registration statement (Rule 134, amended); (6) expansion of permitted use of
research reports (Rules 137-139, amended).
37

Categories of issuers are Well-Known Seasoned Issuers (WKSIs), seasoned issuers, unseasoned
Exchange Act reporting issuers, and non-reporting issuers.
38

17 C.F.R. §§ 230.172, 173. See also Securities Offering reform, supra note 35, at 241-256.
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In 2012, the JOBS Act further relaxed gun-jumping provisions to facilitate initial
public offerings (IPOs) of business start-ups.39 It newly defined the “emerging growth
company” (EGC)40 and allowed an EGC (and any person acting on its behalf) to “test the
waters” during the pre-filing or waiting period to gauge an interest of potential investors
that are qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) or accredited institutional investors in the IPO
of an EGC.41 The JOBS Act also excluded from the term “offer” under Section 2(a)(3) of
the Securities Act research reports published by broker-dealers before and after the IPO of
an EGC.42 Thus, even securities firms participating in a contemplating IPO may issue a
research report.

3.2. ENFORCEMENT AGAINST VIOLATIONS OF THE SECURITIES LAWS
3.2.1. CIVIL LIABILITY
In addition to the “catch-all” provisions of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the
Exchange Act, the Securities Act provides investors in registered offerings with civil
remedies which relax a plaintiff’s burden to prove certain traditional elements (e.g.,
scienter, reliance, loss causation). First, Section 11 of the Act permits innocent purchasers
of registered securities to recover damages from responsible offering participants (e.g.,
issuer and other persons who signed in the registration statement, directors, underwriters,
experts) for material misrepresentations or omissions which existed at the time when a
39

Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 122 Stat. 306.

40

An emerging growth company is defined as “an issuer that had total annual gross revenues of less
than $1,000,000,000 . . . during its most recently completed fiscal year.” JOBS Act, § 101(a), 122 Stat. 306,
307 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(19)).
41

JOBS Act, § 105(c), 122 Stat. 306, 311 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77e(d)).

42

JOBS Act, § 105(a), 122 Stat. 306, 310-11 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3)).
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registration statement becomes effective.43 In general, defendants are jointly and severally
liable for damages unless they can establish due diligence or other defense.44
Under Section 12(a)(1) of the Act, a purchaser of the security also may rescind the
contract or recover damages from statutory “sellers” by showing gun-jumping or other
violations of Section 5 of the Act.45 Section 12(a)(2) grants to purchasers a private right
of action against statutory “sellers” for material misrepresentations or omissions in a
prospectus or oral communication.46 Despite the breadth of the term “prospectus,” Section
12(a)(2) liability is limited to public offerings by issuers or controlling shareholders.47
To enforce such liability, actions must be brought within one year after the discovery
of the untrue statement or the omission (or after the violation of section 5 in case of Section
12(a)(1) liability).48 Actions cannot be filed three years after the security was “bona fide
offered” to the public (or after the sale in case of Section 12(a)(2) liability).49
On the other hand, liability under Section 17(a) provides a broad means to enforce
against fraudulent transactions in the offer or sale of securities.50 However, Section 17(a)

43

15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).

44

Id. U.S.C. § 77k(b)-(g). Non-managing underwriters and outside directors are not subject to joint
and several liability. An underwriter who does not knowingly receive special compensation from an issuer
is not liable for damages exceeding the total price of its underwriting. Id. § 77k(e). Unless knowingly having
committed a violation, outside directors are liable only for the portion of damages proportionate to of his
responsibility. Id. U.S.C. §§ 77k(f)(2), 78u-4(f)(2).
45

Id. U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1). In addition to a “person who passes title,” Section 12(a)(1) liability extends
to a “person who successfully solicits the purchase” for his own or the securities owner’s financial interests.
Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 623 (1988).
46

15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). The SEC promulgated Rule 159A in the 2005 Public Offering Reform, which
provides that for Section 12(a)(2) liability purpose, a “seller” includes “the issuer of the securities sold to a
person as part of the initial distribution of such securities” regardless of the underwriting method (e.g., firm
commitment). 17 C.F.R. § 230.159A(a).
47

Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995); see infra Chapter III.A.5.1.

48

15 U.S.C. § 77m.

49

Id. § 77m.

50

Id. § 77q(a).
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liability does not give private claimants an express right of action. Instead, such liability
can be enforced by the SEC or the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).

3.2.2. THE SEC ENFORCEMENT
Though violations of federal securities laws can be enforced by the DOJ and state
securities regulators, many enforcement actions are left in the hands of the SEC. Congress
grants the SEC broad powers necessary to investigate and enforce securities law violations.
In a formal investigation process, the SEC may issue a subpoena for witness testimony or
production of documents.51 The SEC can issue a refusal or stop order to prevent or suspend
a securities offering based on a defective registration statement.52 The SEC also may issue
or obtain from a federal district court an asset freeze order to prevent securities
professionals or public companies from dissipating their assets. 53

To enjoin from

committing future violations, the SEC can issue a cease-and-desist order 54 or seek a
injunction from a federal district court. 55 The SEC also seek in a federal court “any
equitable relief” including disgorgement of ill-gotten profits.56 In any cease and desist
proceeding, the SEC can disgorge ill-gotten gains from, or impose civil monetary penalties

51

E.g., id. § 77s(c).

52

Id. § 77h(b), (d).

53

E.g., id. §§ 77h-1(c), 78u-3(c).

54

E.g., id. § 77h-1(a), (c).

55

E.g., id. § 77t(b).

56

Id. § 78u(d)(5).
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on any violator, or bar certain violators from serving as an officer or director of any
reporting company.57 Such remedies can be sought in judicial proceedings as well.58

4. EXEMPTION FROM SECTION 5 OF THE SECURITIES ACT
4.1. INTRODUCTION
A registered offering poses a significant burden on the issuer, including costs directly
or indirectly associated with registration, 59 potential liabilities, ongoing disclosure
obligations, and exposure of business information to competitors. Thus, stepping into a
registered offering is virtually inconceivable for most startups and small businesses.
Federal securities laws have developed alternative avenues for such issuers to seek capital
in the securities markets. Sections 3 and 4 of the Securities Act exempt certain securities
and transactions from a full-blown registration process. In particular, many transaction
exemptions have been specified by SEC rules. This section, after briefly exploring
exempted securities, discusses exempt offerings available to issuers under SEC rules.

57

E.g., id. § 77h-1(e)-(g).

58

E.g., 77t(d), (e).

59

Costs associated with a registered offering include not only underwriter fees, but also “Commission
registration fees and FINRA filing fees, legal and accounting fees and expenses, transfer agent and registrar
fees, costs associated with periodic reporting requirements and other regulatory requirements and various
other fees.” On average, underwriter fees amount to 7% for IPOs and 5% for seasoned equity offerings. It
was also reported that “regulatory compliance costs of IPOs average $2.5 million initially, followed by an
average ongoing cost of $1.5 million per year.” In particular, an issuer’s burden on “registration, legal and
accounting-related fees” is significantly higher in lower offering size. See Amendments for Small and
Additional Issues Exemptions under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741
(March 25, 2015) [hereinafter Regulation A+ Adopting Release], at 256-57.
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4.2. EXEMPTED SECURITIES
Section 3(a) of the Securities Act exempts certain class of securities from registration
under the Act. Those securities are designated under Sections 3(a)(2) through 3(a)(8) and
3(a)(13), including government securities, certain short-term notes (e.g., commercial
papers), and securities issued by non-profit organizations.60 Exemption for those securities
is based on the belief that “governmental regulation would be improper or superfluous” in
those securities in light of “the intrinsic nature of the issuer or the character of the security
itself.”61 Though those securities are permanently exempted from “registration” in every
aspect, 62 exemption does not extend to “liability” under antifraud provisions such as
Sections 12(a)(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act.63

4.3. TRANSACTION EXEMPTIONS
The Securities Act also exempts certain transactions of securities from registration.
Unlike exempted securities, transaction exemptions apply only to a specific “transaction”
and a previous or subsequent transaction (e.g., resale of securities issued in the exempted
transaction) should be “treated separately.”64 In recent years, transaction exemptions have
faced significant changes as part of regulatory efforts to facilitate capital funding of small
businesses and modernize existing regulations.

This section reviews transaction

60

15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2)-(8), (13).

61

7 J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 § 1:8 (2016).

62

Id. (stating that “these exemptive provisions eliminate the need to determine whether the exempted
securities are being distributed or traded or whether the person selling them is an issuer, an affiliate of the
issuer, a nonaffiliated, or a broker-dealer.”).
63

Id. §§ 77l(a)(2), 77q(c).

64

7 Hicks, supra note 61, § 1:8.
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exemptions recognized under SEC rules, especially focusing on major exempt offerings
available to issuers in the U.S. primary market.

4.3.1. EXEMPTIVE AUTHORITY
While the Securities Act enumerates transaction exemptions under Sections 3 and 4
of the Act, it also gives the SEC authority to create new exemptions. Section 3(b)(1) of the
Securities Act authorizes the SEC to carve out exempt offerings up to $5 million for small
issuers.65 The SEC adopted Rule 504 and the former Rule 505 and Regulation A under
this provision. In 1996, Congress granted the SEC the general exemptive authority under
Section 28 of the Securities Act in anticipation of flexibility of the SEC rulemaking and
expansion of Section 3(b) exemptions.66 The SEC, however, has not actively exercised the
general exemptive authority.67

4.3.2. EXEMPT OFFERINGS AVAILABLE TO ISSUERS UNDER SEC RULES

a. Intrastate offerings
Section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act exempts local financing made entirely within a
single state from federal registration when offers and sales of the securities by an in-state

65

15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1).

66

National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 105(a), 110 Stat. 3416,
3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3); H.R. Rep. No. 104-622, at 38 (1996) (“The Committee also intends
that the Commission, at an early date, raise the ceilings on various exemptions adopted pursuant to Section
3(b) of the Securities Act . . . from $5,000,000 to not less than $10,000,000 . . .”).
67

The SEC recently adopted new Rule 147A intrastate offering exemption by exercising general
exemptive authority under Section 28 of the Act. See infra II.A.4.3.2.a. Prior to the adoption of Rule 147A,
the SEC relied on Section 28 to adopt the exemptions under Rules 800 through 802 in 1999 and also
“transaction exemption for resales of most standardized options” in 2002. 7 Hicks, supra note 61, § 1:9 n.3.
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issuer is made solely to in-state residents.68 Thus, an intrastate offering under Section
3(a)(11) is primarily regulated by the state where the offering is made.69 To clarify the
availability of the Section 3(a)(11) exemption, the SEC adopted a non-exclusive safe
harbor rule in 1974.70 Rule 147 provided specific conditions for the exemption such as
integration, the nature of an issuer, the residence of offerees and purchasers, resale
limitations, and precautions by an issuer (e.g., placing restrictive legends).71
In October 2016, the SEC amended Rule 147 to modernize the existing intrastate
exemption and also adopted new Rule 147A to provide an additional means of capital
raising for local businesses. 72 In amending Rule 147, the SEC updated outmoded
provisions and aligned Rule 147 conditions with those of other SEC exemptions.73 Though
Rule 147A is substantively the same as Rule 147,74 it eliminated two restrictions under

68

15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11).

69

Section 18 of the Securities Act expressly excludes a security offered or sold under Section 3(a)(11)
from “covered securities” to which federal preemption over state regulation applies. Id. U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(E).
70

Notice of Adoption of Rule 147 under the Securities Act of 1933-“Part of an Issue,” “Person Resident,”
and “Doing Business within” for Purposes of Section 3(a)(11) of That Act, Securities Act Release No. 5450
(Jan. 7, 1974).
71

17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1974).

72

Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No.
10238 (Oct. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Regional Securities Offerings Reform].
73

Among other things, changes made by amended Rule 147 include: (A) replacing the previous
“principal office” requirement with a “principal place of business” requirement (Rule 147(c)(1)); (B)
replacing previous conjunctive requirements (an issuer should meet all four requirements) with distinctive
requirements (an issuer can meet one of four requirements) as to in-state “doing business” requirements (Rule
147(c)(2)); (C) adopting a new “reasonable belief” standard as to determination of residency of offerees and
purchasers (Rule 147(d)); (D) shortening the period for resale limitation to out-of-state residents from nine
months to six months from the date of the sale (Rule 147(e)); (E) aligning integration provisions with Rule
251(c) of Regulation A (Rule 147(g)).
74

In the proposing release, the SEC intended to replace the existing Rule 147 with a new intrastate
offering exemption (current Rule 147A). However, the SEC decided to retain an amended Rule 147 and
create Rule 147A partly because many state crowdfunding provisions are conditioned upon compliance with
Section 3(a)(11) and SEC Rule 147 safe harbor, and abolishing the existing Rule 147 would make current
state law exemptions unavailable until each state takes legislative or rulemaking actions to accommodate
federal rule changes. Regional Securities Offerings Reform, supra note 72, at 11-16.
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Rule 147 which originated from Section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act.75 Unlike Rule 147,
an issuer relying on Rule 147A does not have to be incorporated or organized in a state
where an intrastate offering is made.76 Further, Rule 147A allows offers to be made to outof-state residents if all purchasers are in-state residents and other conditions are met.77
b. Regulation A offerings
Regulation A was designed to provide non-reporting U.S. and Canadian issuers with
a viable solution to raise moderate capital from the investing public through a “miniregistration” process that resembles a full registration process but lowers an issuer’s burden.
Regulation A is the oldest Section 3(b) exemption and has been revised since the
adoption.78 Among other changes, a significant reform was made in July 1992 as part of
small business initiatives.79 Even after the reform, however, Regulation A was rarely used
compared to other exempt offerings such as Regulation D offerings.80 Among other factors,

75

Since the SEC adopted new Rule 147A by exercising its general exemptive authority under Section
28 of the Securities Act, Rule 147A, unlike to Rule 147, is not subject to Section 3(a)(11).
76

17 C.F.R. § 230.147A(c).

77

Id. § 230.147A(b)-(d), (f), (h).

78

Regulation A was first codified in 1936 (Rules 200 through 210) as a collection of the previously
issued Commission’s rules which exempt a particular class of securities from registration pursuant to Section
3(b) of the Securities Act (other than exemptions relating to undivided fractional interests in oil and gas rights
which was codified as “Regulations B”). 7 Hicks, supra note 61, § 6:2; 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.200-210 (1938).
The annual offering limit of Regulation A was $100,000 in its adoption and was raised to $300,000 in
1945, $500,000 in 1970, $1.5 million in 1978, and $5 million in 1992. Proposed Rule Amendments for Small
and Additional Issues Exemptions under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 9497,
at 7 n.16, (Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Regulation A+ Proposing Release].
79

Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6949 (July 30, 1992). The 1992 amendments:
(1) increased annual offering limit to $ 5 million, (2) permitted the use of a simplified question and answer
disclosure document, (3) allowed an issuer to test the waters prior to filing the offering statement, (4)
extended the application of the safe harbor provisions for forward-looking statements to Regulation A, (5)
adopted the rule governing substantial and good faith compliance with Regulation A, (6) eliminated the
special $100,000 exemption under Rule 257 of Regulation A. 7 Hicks, supra note 61, § 6:4.
80

Regulation A+ Proposing Release, supra note 78, at 11 (reporting 19 qualified Regulation A offerings
for a total amount of approximately $73 million between 2009 and 2012, in comparison with 27,500
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the low offering threshold and the time and cost associated with compliance of state blue
sky laws were recognized as major obstacles to the use of Regulation A offerings.81 Title
IV of the JOBS Act responded to such concerns by adding new paragraphs (2)-(5) under
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act and directing the SEC to adopt new exemptions for
offerings up to $50 million by its rules and regulations. 82 Finally, the SEC adopted
amended Regulation A (generally referred to as “Regulation A+”) in March 2015.83
Regulation A+ categorizes Section 3(b)(2) exempt offerings into two tiers: Tier 1
allows annual offerings of up to $20 million and Tier 2 allows offerings up to $50 million
for eligible securities (asset-backed securities are excluded). 84 Despite the different
offering sizes, Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings are similarly structured for the application of the
exemptions: Issuers in Tier 1 and Tier 2 offerings must file with the SEC an offering
statement to be reviewed and qualified by the SEC staff.85 Though issuers in both offerings
are subject to gun-jumping restrictions, similar to Section 5 of the Securities Act,86 they
may involve in “test-the-waters” communications prior to qualification of the offering

Regulation D offerings of up to $5 million for a total amount of approximately $25 billion during the same
period).
81

See 7 Hicks, supra note 61, § 6:117. See also U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Securities Regulation:
Factors That May Affect Trends in Regulation A Offerings, GAO-12-839 (July, 2012).
82

Jumpstart Our Business Startup Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, Title IV, § 401(a), 122 Stat. 306,
323-25 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)-(5)).
83

Regulation A+ Adopting Release, supra note 59.

84

17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a). An issuer may offer and sell securities on behalf of selling securityholders
under Regulation A. However, sales by selling securityholders that are “affiliates” of the issuer are limited
to 30% of the annual offering limit ($6 million for Tier 1, $15 million for Tier 2). In addition, the amount of
securities that selling securityholders (including “non-affiliates” of the issuer) can sell at the time of an
issuer’s first Regulation A offering and within the following 12 months cannot exceed 30% of the aggregate
offering price of a particular offering.
85

Id. §§ 230.251(d), 252(e).

86

Id. § 230.251(d).
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statement.87 Securities acquired in Regulation A offerings are not “restricted securities”
under Rule 144 and purchasers of the securities may resell without restriction.88 In addition,
civil liability under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act applies to any person who offers
or sells securities in connection with a Tier 1 or Tier 2 offering.89
In light of a substantial increase in the offering amount, however, Regulation A+
requires heightened regulatory requirements for Tier 2 offerings: First, purchasers that are
not accredited investors are subject to 10% investment limitation for Tier 2 offerings.90
Second, Tier 2 issuers must include audited financial statements in their offering statements
and annual reports.91 After having filed a qualified Tier 2 offering statement, issuers are
also required to file electronically annual, semiannual, current reports and other documents
with the SEC. 92 In the view of an enhanced investor protection in a Tier 2 offering,
Regulation A+ exempts a security offered or sold in a Tier 2 offering from registration or
qualification under state blue sky laws.93

87

Id. § 230.255.

88

Id. § 230.144(a)(3).

89

15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(D).

90

17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(2)(C). In a Tier 2 offering for securities that are not listed on a registered
national securities exchange upon qualification, non-accredited investors may not purchase the securities in
excess of 10% of the greater of annual income or net worth (for non-natural persons, annual revenue or net
assets).
91

17 C.F.R. §§ 239.90 (Part F/S (c) of Form 1-A), 239.91 (Part II. Item 7 of Form 1-K).

92

Id. § 230.257(b). Unlike a Tier 2 offering, an issuer in a Tier 1 offering is required only to file an
“exit report” (Form 1-Z) within 30 days after the termination or completion of the offering. Id. § 230.257(a).
93

Section 401(b) of the JOBS Act amended Section 18 of the Securities Act for “covered securities” to
include a security that is offered or sold (1) on a national securities exchange or (2) to a qualified purchaser.
Jumpstart Our Business Startup Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, Title IV, § 401(b), 122 Stat. 306, 325
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D)). SEC Rule 256 defines the term “qualified purchaser” as “any person
to whom securities are offered or sold pursuant to a Tier 2 offering.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.256.
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c. Regulation D offerings
(1) Overview of Regulation D
Regulation D was promulgated in 1982 in an effort to simplify then-existing
exemption rules and regulations and “achieve uniformity between federal and state
exemptions.” 94 Regulation D, when it was first adopted, consisted of six preliminary
notes95 and Rules 501-506.96 Rule 501 defines the terms and Rule 502 provides general
conditions to be met when claiming a specific exemption. Rule 503 requires an issuer to
file with the SEC a notice on sales using Form D no later than 15 days after the first sale.
Rules 504, 505 and 506 which replaced the now defunct Rules 240, 242 and 146
respectively provide issuers with three limited offering exemptions from registration under
the Securities Act. As discussed below, however, Rule 505 was recently repealed.97 Rules
507 and 508 were newly added to Regulation D in 1989.98 Rule 507 prevents an issuer
found to have violated a filing requirement of Rule 503 from relying on Regulation D.99
Rule 508 protects issuers from the risk to lose the exemption due to insignificant deviations
from a term, condition or requirement of Regulation D.100

94

Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and
Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 1982 WL 35662 (Mar. 8, 1982) [hereinafter Regulation D Adopting
Release].
95

Preliminary Notes was designated as Rule 500 in 2012. Technical Amendment to Net Worth
Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 9287A (Mar. 23, 2012).
96

17 C.F.R. § 230.501-506 (1982).

97

See infra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.

98

Regulation D; Accredited Investor and Filing Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 6825, 1989
WL 256789 (March 14, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Amendment of Regulation D].
99
100

17 C.F.R. § 230.507.
Id. § 230.508.
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Three exemptions of Regulation D were adopted under different statutory provisions.
Rules 504 and 505 were adopted under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act. Section 3(b)
authorizes the SEC to exempt securities offerings not exceeding $5 million by its rules and
regulations.101 Prior to the repeal of Rule 505, Rules 504 and 505 authorized exempt
offerings up to $1 million and $5 million respectively. Issuers are generally not allowed
to engage in a general solicitation. On the other hand, Rule 506 relates to Section 4(a)(2)
of the Securities Act which exempts “transactions not involving any public offering” from
registration under the Act.102 Rule 506 intends to provide a “non-exclusive” safe harbor
for application of Section 4(a)(2) exemption.103 Failure to comply with requirements under
Rule 506(b) does not preclude an issuer from claiming the private offering exemption under
Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act.104 Unlike Rules 504 and 505, there is no offering
limit under Rule 506. General solicitation has been prohibited under Rule 506(b), but a
new exemption under Rule 506(c) removed such a ban in 2013 in the offering in which all
purchasers of the securities are accredited investors and issuers take reasonable steps to
verify that status.
(2) Major amendments of Regulation D
Regulation D has been amended since its adoption in 1982.

The first major

amendments were made in 1988.105 Among other changes, the amendments expanded the

101

15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1982) (redesignated as 77c(b)(1) in 2012).

102

Id. § 77d(2) (1982) (redesignated as 77d(a)(2) in 2012).

103

Rule 506(a) provides that “[o]ffers and sales of securities by an issuer that satisfy the conditions
in . . . this section shall be deemed to be transactions not involving any public offering within the meaning
of section 4(2) of the Act.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a) (1982).
104

17 C.F.R. § 230.500(c).

105

Regulation D Revisions, Securities Act Release No. 6758, 1988 WL 237022 (March 3, 1988).
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“accredited investor” definition and raised the offering limit under Rule 504 from $500,000
to $1 million. Subsequent amendments in 1989 created new Rules 507 and 508 under
Regulation D and excluded a filing of Form D from a condition to the exemptions.106 In
1992, the SEC liberalized Rule 504 offerings as part of small business initiatives to
facilitate capital formation and reduce compliance costs under federal securities laws.107
The amendments eliminated restrictions of general solicitation and resale of securities from
the Rule 504 exemption. However, the SEC, through the amendment of Regulation D in
1999, limited the circumstances in which general solicitation and resale are permitted under
Rule 504 to curb abuses of Rule 504 offerings found in the OTC markets.108 In 2008,
Regulation D was amended to mandate the filing of a Form D via the SEC’s online filing
system (EDGAR).109
Recent amendments of Regulation D have been led by the Dodd-Frank Act and the
JOBS Act. In December 2011, the SEC amended Rule 501 to exclude a person’s primary
residence from net worth of an accredited natural person pursuant to Section 413(a) of the
Dodd-Frank Act.110 Rule 506 was also amended in 2013 pursuant to Section 926 of the
Dodd-Frank Act to disqualify certain felons and other bad actors in connection with Rule
506 offerings.111 In July 2013, the SEC amended Regulation D to establish a new Rule

106

1989 Amendment of Regulation D, supra note 95.

107

Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 6949, 1992 WL 188930 (July 30, 1992).

108

Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, The “Seed Capital” Exemption, Securities Act Release No.
7644, 1999 WL 95490 (Feb. 25, 1999).
109

Electronic Filing and Revision of Form D, Securities Act Release No. 8891 (Feb. 6, 2008).

110

Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 9287 (Dec. 21, 2011);
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, Title IV, § 413(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010).
111

Disqualification of Felons and Other “Bad Actors” from Rule 506 Offerings, Securities Act Release
No. 9414 (July 10, 2013); Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, Title IX, § 926, 124 Stat. 1376, 1851 (2010).
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506(c) exemption pursuant to Section 201(a) of the JOBS Act that permitted general
solicitation under Rule 506.112 In October 2016, the SEC amended Rule 504 to increase
the offering limit from $1 million to $5 million, which makes Rule 504 identical to Rule
505 in the offering size.113 In light of the increase of offering limit in Rule 504 and past
under-use of Rule 505 offerings, the SEC decided to repeal Rule 505.114 Thus, Regulation
D currently provides only two type of exemptions: Rule 504 and Rule 506.
(3) Rule 504 offerings
Since Rule 506 is fully discussed in Chapters III and IV, only Rule 504 is explained
in this Section. Rule 504 allows an issuer to raise capital up to $5 million in multi-state
offerings during a 12-month period, without registration. Since a security offered and sold
pursuant to Rule 504 is not a “covered security” under Section 18(b) of the Securities Act,
an issuer must comply with state blue sky laws. An exempt offering pursuant to Rule 504
is not eligible to a reporting company, an investment company or a blank check
company.115 An issuer seeking an offering under Rule 504 is also subject to a “bad actor”
disqualification under Rule 506(d) of Regulation D.116 To qualify as a Rule 504 exemption,
an issuer must satisfy certain conditions: First, if sales made within six months before or
after the current Rule 504 offering consist of “part of the Rule 504 offering,” such sales

112

Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and
Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415 (July 10, 2013); JOBS Act, Title II, § 201(a)(1), 122
Stat. 306, 313-14 (2012).
113

Regional Securities Offerings Reform, supra note 72, at 70-85.

114

The SEC reported that during the period of 2009-2015, there were only 1,542 Rule 505 offerings,
showing shark contrast to 70,793 Rule 506(b) offerings of $5 million or less during the same period. Id. at
84 n321.
115

17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a).

116

Id. § 230.504(b)(3).

28

also must satisfy all the terms and conditions of the Rule 504 exemption;117 Second, an
offering in reliance on Rule 504 is not permitted to use any form of general solicitation or
general advertising;118 Third, securities acquired in the Rule 504 offering are “restricted
securities”119 and cannot be resold unless registered or otherwise exempted.120 However,
the general solicitation ban and limitations on resale do not apply to certain Rule 504
offerings.121
d. Crowdfunding offerings
Crowdfunding is a method to fund a particular project (e.g., arts, charities, non-profit
ventures) from a large number of people.122 Unlike donation or charity crowdfunding,
crowdfunding triggers securities laws when it is used to solicit money from the crowd in
exchange for a piece of equity to support startups or early stage ventures, typically using
social media or the Internet (so-called “equity crowdfunding”).123 Under the pre-JOBS Act
regime, equity crowdfunding was illegal unless it was registered with the SEC.124 In most
cases, registration is impractical for businesses seeking crowdfunding in light of size of
funding or business stage. The JOBS Act embraced equity crowdfunding within the
framework of federal securities laws to facilitate crowdfunding by startups and small

117

Id. §§ 230.504(b)(1), 502(a).

118

Id. §§ 230.504(b)(1), 502(c).

119

Id. § 230.144(a)(3)(ii).

120

Id. §§ 230.504(b)(1), 502(d).

121

Id. § 230.504(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

122

Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws-Why
the Specially Tailored Exemption Must be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735,
1736-37 (2012).
123

Id.

124

15 U.S.C. 77e(c).

29

businesses. Section 302 of Title III authorizes a new crowdfunding exemption by adding
Section 4(a)(6) and Section 4A under the Securities Act.125 The SEC adopted Regulation
Crowdfunding to implement the crowdfunding exemption in October 2015 and approved
Funding Portal Rules proposed by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
in January 2016.126
In summary, the crowdfunding exemption is eligible only to the U.S. non-reporting,
operating companies. 127 Issuers seeking crowdfunding offerings are also subject to
disqualification provisions.128 Eligible issuers can raise capital up to $ 1million in a 12month period.129 An investor is also subject to annual investment limit on crowdfunding
and may not invest in excess of certain financial thresholds calculated on the basis of a
person’s income or net worth.130 Securities issued in an exempt crowdfunding offering
generally may not be resold within one year from the date of issuance.131
Regarding disclosure requirements, issuers must file the offering statement (Form C)
with the SEC and provide it to investors and an SEC-registered intermediary (either a

125

JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, Title III, § 302, 122 Stat. 306, 315-21 (2012).

126

Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9974 (Oct. 30, 2015); Notice of Amendment No. 1 and
Order Granting Accelerated Approval to a Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, to
Adopt the Funding Portal Rules and Related Forms and Rule 4518, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
76970 (January 22, 2016).
127

17 C.F.R. § 227.100(b).

128

Id. § 227.503.

129

Id. § 227.100(a)(1).

130

Id. § 227.100(a)(2). The aggregate amount of investment in crowdfunding during 12-month period
may not exceed:
(i) The greater of $2,000 or 5 percent of the lesser of the investor’s annual income or net worth
if either the investor’s annual income or net worth is less than $1000,000; or
(ii) 10 percent of the lesser of the investor’s annual income or net worth, not to exceed an amount
sold of $100,000, if both the investor’s annual income and net worth are equal to or more
than $100,000.
131

Id. §§ 227.501.
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broker-dealer or a funding portal) prior to the commencement of the offering. 132 The
intermediary also must make information available on its platform for a minimum of 21
days prior to an offering.133 Concerning financial information, financial statements of the
issuer must be accompanied by information from the recent tax return filing or a review or
audit report of an independent public accountant, depending on the target offering
amounts.134 Prior to the completion of the offering, issuers are also required to file with
the SEC and provide to investors and the intermediary information regarding any material
changes, addition or updates to previously disclosed information, and updates of progress
in meeting the target offering amount.135 An issuer also must file with the SEC and post
on its website an annual report no later than 120 days after the end of the fiscal year.136
However, a security offered and sold pursuant to crowdfunding exemption is a “covered
security” under Section 18(b) of the Securities Act and, thus, is exempted from state
registration.137
In view of the potential risk of crowdfunding, Regulation Crowdfunding provides
additional safeguards for investor protection.

First, the transaction must take place

exclusively through the platform operated by either a broker-dealer or a funding portal.138

132

Id. §§ 227.201, 203.

133

Id. § 227.303(a)(2).

134

Id. § 227.201(t).

135

Id. § 227.203(a).

136

Id. § 227.202.

137

15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(C).

138

17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(3). A funding portal is a broker acting as an intermediary in exempt
crowdfunding offerings and must register with the SEC pursuant to Rule 400 under Regulation Crowdfunding.
A funding portal is prohibited from (1) making investment advice or recommendations; (2) soliciting
purchases, sales or offers to buy the securities; (3) compensating employees or other persons for solicitation
or based on the sale of securities; (4) handling investor funds or securities. Id. § 227.300(a)(2).
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Second, as preventive measures to deter fraud, an intermediary must have a reasonable
basis for believing that an issuer complies with regulatory requirements and keeps accurate
records of the shareholders, and, also, must deny an issuer’s access to its platform if it
reasonably believes that the issuer is subject to disqualification under Rule 503 or shows
the potential for fraud.139 Third, an intermediary is required to provide investors with
educational materials through its platform or in connection with establishing an account
for an investor.

140

Lastly, the JOBS imposes an issuer liability for material

misrepresentation or omission which is similar to Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.141
In connection with such liability, the term “issuer” is broadly defined to include persons
involved in the offering.142

139

Id. § 227.301.

140

Id. § 227.302.

141

Jumpstart Our Business Startup Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, Title III, § 302, 122 Stat. 306,
318-19 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)).
142

The term “issuer” includes “any person who is a director or partner of the issuer, and the principal
executive officer or officers, principal financial officer, and controller or principal accounting officer of the
issuer . . . and any person who offers or sells the security in such offering. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c)(3).
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TABLE 1. EXEMPT OFFERINGS UNDER SEC RULES
Intrastate Offering
Regulation A
Rule
Rule
Tier 1
Tier 2
147
147A
Securities Act
§3(a)(11)
§28
§3(b)(2) §3(b)(2)
Offering limit (annual)
$20M
$50M
Eligible issuers
Non-reporting co.
in-state
in-state
Y
issuers
issuers
Foreign co.
N (exception: Canada)
(must be
(need not be
Reporting co.
N
incorporated incorporated
Investment co.
N
in an offering in an offering
Blank check co.
N
state)
state)
Y
Disqualifications
Eligible purchasers
Accredited inv.(AI)
Y
in-state
Sophisticated inv.
Y
residents
Unsophisticated inv.
Y
Investment limit
Y
Manner of offering
General solicitation
Multistate offering
Testing the waters

in-state
solicitation

allowed

allowed

banned
-

allowed
allowed

Intermediary

-

-

Disclosure
SEC review

-

Y

SEC filing for the
offering
Periodic reporting
Offering materials
to investors
Financial
information

-

Rule
506(c)
§4(b)

Y
Y
N
N
N

Regulation
Crowdfunding
§4(a)(6)
$1M
Y
N
N
N
N
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y

Y (up to 35)
N
-

N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y

banned1)

banned

allowed

allowed

-

allowed
generally
required2)

allowed
-

-

required
N

offering statement
Form D
Form C
(Form 1-A) (confidential
(no later than 15 days after the first sale)
submission is allowed)

-

Y

-

Regulation D
Rule
Rule
504
506(b)
§3(b)(1)
§4(a)(2)
$5M
-

Y
must be
audited

-

need not be
audited

-

Y

Y

(to non-AIs)
must be
audited

-

Y

-

audited,
reviewed or
evidenced
by tax info.3)

Integration period
Prior to the offering
Following the offering

Resale limitation
Civil Liability under
Securities Act

Covered security

6 months
(out-of- state residents)

§12(a)(1)
§12(a)(2)
N

6 months

6 months
6 months

not restricted

min 6M1)

§12(a)(1)
§12(a)(2)

§12(a)(1)
§12(a)(2)
N

N

Y

6 months

min 6 months
§12(a)(1)
Y

Y

1 year
§12(a)(1)
§4A(c)
Y

1) Restrictions on general solicitation and resale do not apply if offers and sales of securities are made pursuant to one of exceptions
enumerated in subparagraph (i)-(iii) of Rule 504(b)(1).
2) Under the Rule 506(b) offering prohibiting a general solicitation, broker-dealers are generally employed to establish a preexisting
and substantive relationship with prospective offerees.
3) Requirements depend on the target offering amounts (financial statements must be audited for the offering of more than $50,000,
and reviewed for the offering of more than $100,000 but not more than $500,000).
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B. SOUTH KOREA
1. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF KOREAN CAPITAL MARKET
To achieve a better understanding of the securities regulation of South Korea, this
section briefly explores the regulatory framework governing the Korean capital market.
For this purpose, this section first explains how the Korean legislative system is organized
compared with the U.S. system. This section also gives an overview of Korean securities
laws and certain organizations which play important roles in enforcing the securities laws.

1.1. LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM
In Korea, legislative power is vested in the National Assembly. The Korean
Constitution empowers the National Assembly to pass a bill proposed by members of the
National Assembly or by the government. 143 When the Act is newly legislated, the
President issues the Enforcement Decree to specify matters delegated by the Act. 144
Likewise, the Prime Minister or the head of each Executive Ministry issues the Ordinances
to stipulate matters delegated by the Act and the Enforcement Decree. 145 Finally, the
executive agencies issue administrative rules to set forth matters delegated by the Acts,
Presidential Decrees, and Ordinances.146

143

DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] [hereinafter CONSTITUTION] Art. 40, 52.

144

Constitution Art. 75 (“The President may issue Presidential Decrees concerning matters delegated
to him by Act with the scope specifically defined and also matters necessary to enforce Acts.”). The
Presidential Decree appears as the “Enforcement Decree” in the actual legislation (e.g., Enforcement
Decree of the Commercial Act).
145

Constitution Art. 95. The ordinance appears as the “Enforcement Rule” in the actual legislation.

146

In the Korean legal system, “statutes” include Acts, Presidential Decrees, Ordinances of the Prime
Minister or the head of the Executive Ministry, and certain administrative rules.
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The Korean legislative system has some distinct features compared to the U.S. system.
First, the government has the power to propose a bill before the National Assembly. Most
of the bills which entailed sweeping regulatory reforms were, in fact, drafted by the
executive branch in the past.147 Second, Korea has accepted the “principle of statutory
reservation” as a general principle of law. This principle requires that essential terms of an
administrative action be reserved in the statute that is passed by the National Assembly,
especially when it limits the people’s liberty or rights. 148 It is unconstitutional for the
National Assembly to delegate its legislative power to the executive branch without
specifying the extent that one can infer what is prohibited from the statute. Thus, the
Korean legal system appears to be at odds with the U.S. legal system which recognizes
broad delegation of the legislative power and a broad rulemaking authority of government
agencies. Third, the legislative power of local governments is restricted by statutes enacted
by the National Assembly and the executive branch.149 Unlike the U.S. legal system where
states may regulate subject matters that the federal government regulates in local aspects
unless they are exclusively federal, Korean local governments may not regulate, even in
local aspects, most affairs which the executive branch performs unless otherwise permitted

147

In comparison to a bill proposed by members of the National Assembly, a bill proposed by the
government must go through complicated procedures (e.g., a consultation between authorities related to a
proposed bill, a special government and ruling party consultative meeting, public notice, review by the
Regulatory Reform Committee, resolution in the Vice-Ministers’ meeting and the State Council, and
signing by the President) before the bill is presented to the National Assembly.
148

Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 1998Hun-Ba70, May 27, 1999, (11-1 KCCR 633, 642).

149

Constitution Art. 117(1) (“Local governments shall deal with administrative matters pertaining to
the welfare of local residents, manage properties, and may enact provisions relating to local autonomy, within
the limit of Acts and subordinate statutes.”); Jibangjachibeob [Local Autonomy Act], Act. No. 14197, May
29, 2016 [hereinafter Local Autonomy Act], Art. 22 (“Local governments may establish municipal ordinances
concerning their affairs within the scope of statutes”).
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to do so by the Acts.150

1.2. SECURITIES LAWS
Prior to the adoption of the current regulatory regime, the securities market was
regulated by several statutes governing different securities businesses. In April 2005, in
order to improve the capital market regulations and to strengthen the competitiveness of
the securities industry, the government launched a task force team to reform the capital
market regulation. By the end of 2006, the government proposed a mega-bill that
consolidated six old statutes151 and consisted of 449 articles.152 The National Assembly
passed the bill in August 3, 2007153 and the Financial Investment Services and Capital
Market Act (FSCMA) went into effect on February 4, 2009.154
The FSCMA changed the old regulatory framework in several respects.155 First, the
FSCMA expanded the reach of the securities laws by broadening the term “securities.” The
term newly includes certain investment instruments (e.g., investment contract) that were

150

Local Autonomy Act, Art. 11. Affairs that local governments may not perform unless it is prescribed
to do so by other Acts include diplomacy, national defense, administration of justice, national tax, finance
policy, and so on.
151

The six statutes include the Securities and Exchange Act, the Futures Trading Act, the Merchant
Banks Act, the Act on Business of Operating Indirect Investment and Assets, the Trust Business Act, and the
Korea Securities and Futures Exchange Act.
152

For the legislation history of the Act, see generally BYUN, JEHO ET AL., JABONSIJANGBEOB [CAPITAL
MARKET ACT] at 3-15 (1st ed. 2009).
153

Jabonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeobe gwanhan beobyul [Financial Investment Services and Capital
Market Act], Act. No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, amended by Act. No. 14458, Dec. 28, 2016 [hereinafter Capital
Market Act].
154

After the passage of the FSCMA, the government had to promulgate the Enforcement Decree, the
Enforcement Rule, and administrative rules to implement the Act. Further, existing investment
intermediaries were required to renew their business licenses before the new FSCMA went in effect.
155

See generally Joon Park, Consolidation and Reform of Financial Market Regulation in Korea:
Financial Investment Services and Capital Market Act, 6 NTU L. REV. 91 (2011).
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not previously recognized as a security.156 Second, the FSCMA categorizes activities of
the investment intermediaries into six core-businesses 157 and discriminates a level of
regulation (e.g., licensing requirements, business conducts, financial responsibilities) to the
“business” that they perform, not the “entity.” This was intended to remove the regulatory
arbitrage among different forms of intermediaries that substantially conduct the same
functions.158 The Act also expanded the scope of core businesses that intermediaries could
perform within the same entity.159 Third, the FSCMA adopted an investor classification
system to enhance flexibility in the application of regulatory measures. The Act divides
investors into “professional investors” and “ordinary investors,” and exempts
intermediaries and other persons from obligations to comply in respect of investor
protection when they deal solely with the professional investors.160 Fourth, the FSCMA
requires issuers to file a registration statement with the FSC for certain transactions that

156

The FSCMA defines the term “financial investment instruments” to distinguish form non-investment
financial products such as bank deposits or savings or insurance contracts. See Capital Market Act, Art. 3(1).
Financial investment instruments are divided into two categories: “securities” and “derivatives.” Id. Art. 3(2).
The “securities” are divided into six categories. One category is “investment contract securities” which are
defined as “instruments bearing the indication of a contractual right under which a specific investor is entitled
to the profits earned, or liable for losses sustained, depending upon the results of a joint venture in which the
investor makes an investment jointly with another person and which is to be run mainly by the other person.”
Id. Art. 4(6).
157

Six core-activities include (i) investment trading business, (ii) investment brokerage business, (iii)
collective investment business, (iv) investment advisory business, (v) discretionary investment business, and
(vi) trust business. Id. Art. 6(1).
158

Under the pre-FSCMA regime, for example, a securities brokerage firm and a futures brokerage firm
were regulated by different statutes and the regulations that applied to each firm were also different, despite
the fact that they are essentially the same in the functional aspect.
159

Under the pre-FSCMA regime, intermediaries were prohibited from running different businesses
within the same entity unless otherwise permitted. For example, intermediaries were prohibited from
brokering securities and futures within the same entity. In addition, collective investment business was also
required to operate separately.
160

For more discussions relating to professional investors, see infra CHAPTER IV.A.2.
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were not previously covered by old statutes.161 Finally, general antifraud provisions that
are similar to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act of the United States, were adopted under
the FSCMA, despite criticism of its ambiguity, in order to plug a regulatory loophole in the
capital market.162

1.3. REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS
Unlike the United States, Korea adopted a consolidated financial regulatory system in
1999.163 This means that financial businesses are regulated by the same regulatory bodies,
the Financial Services Commission (FSC) and the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS).
Thus, the FSC and the FSS are two primary regulators that enforce the FSCMA in the
capital market.

Certain self-regulatory organizations (SROs) also performs limited

regulatory functions by establishing and enforcing the industry standards and requirements
related to securities transactions.

1.3.1. THE FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMISSION
The FSC is the administrative agency that has a broad authority over the financial
market. 164 The responsibility of the FSC includes making policies related to financial
markets and financial consumer protection, issuing new rules and amending existing rules,

161

Those transactions include (i) new issues of securities as a result of business reorganizations such as
a merger, a spin-off, acquisition or transfer of corporate assets, (ii) public offerings of bonds issued by banks
and (iii) public offerings of securities issued by collective investment schemes.
162

Byun, Jeho et al., supra note 152, at 538-40; also see infra Chapter II.B.2.4.1.a.

163

See generally Financial Supervisory Service, FSS Handbook 2015, at 1-2, available at
http://english.fss.or.kr/fss/eng/p/publications/fh_list.jsp?bbsid=1289364537633.
164

Geumyungwiwonhoeui seolchi deunge gwanhan beobyul [Act on the establishment, etc. of Financial
Services Commission], Act. No. 14242, May 29, 2016 [hereinafter Establishment Act], Art. 3.
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granting licenses, imposing administrative sanctions, overseeing the FSS and SROs, and
coordinating financial regulations with other authorities. 165 The FSC consists of nine
Commissioners who convene regularly at meetings. Its functional responsibilities are
organized into several Divisions and Offices. However, final authority to investigate
fraudulent trading in the capital market, establish accounting standards, and review audit
reports is delegated to Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), a subcommittee of the
FSC.166 The SFC also deliberates other proposals related to supervision and oversight of
the capital market before they are submitted to the FSC.167

1.3.2. THE FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY SERVICE
The FSS is the another primary regulator incorporated as an independent agency and
not a part of the administration. Contrary to the FSC that functions as a decision-maker,
the FSS functions as an enforcement agency. Thus, the FSS, led by the Governor who is
appointed by the President,168 has the authority to examine and sanction against financial
institutions.169 The FSS also engages in other activities by delegation of authority from the
FSC and individual statutes.170 For example, regarding the enforcement of the FSCMA,
the FSS staff reviews an application for new business licenses, monitors ongoing reports
submitted by the intermediaries, examines intermediaries, credit-rating agencies,

165

Id. Art.17.

166

Id. Art. 19.

167

Id. Art. 19 subpar. 3.

168

Id. Art. 29. Executives of the FSS consists of the Governor, four deputy governors or less, nine
assistant governors or less, and one auditor.
169

Id. Art. 37 subpars. 1-2.

170

Id. Art. 37 subpars. 3-4.
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accounting firms and SROs, reviews public disclosure documents or audit reports, and
investigates insider trading and other capital market violations.171
1.3.3. THE KOREA EXCHANGE
Unlike the United States, exchange markets for securities and derivatives are currently
monopolized by the Korea Exchange (KRX).172 The KRX provides trading markets for
diverse investment instruments such as stocks, bonds, derivatives. In particular, the stock
exchanges are segmented into the KOSPI, KOSDAQ and KONEX markets.173 The KRX
sets forth rules to provide listing and reporting requirements of the companies listed in the
exchange markets and the obligations of its members.174 It also monitors the abnormal
trading in the markets, examines its members and imposes disciplinary measures.175 The
KRX is subject to the FSC’s supervision and the FSS’ examination.176

171

Other than described above, the FSS staff also performs other activities related to consumer
protection including mediation of disputes between consumers and intermediaries, answer for consumer
complaints, and consumer education.
172

Article 373 of the FSCMA prohibits any one from establishing or operating an exchange for financial
investment instruments unless approved by the FSC pursuant to the Act. The KRX was established in 2005
by integrating the Korea Stock Exchange, the KOSDAQ Stock Market, the Korea Futures Exchange, and the
KOSDAQ Committee.
173

The KOSPI market is the main board of the KRX and large-sized companies are listed in this market.
The KOSDAQ market was added in 1996 to support capital raising of small and medium- sized companies,
especially venture businesses. The KONEX was newly launched in July 2013 to facilitate financing of small
and medium- sized startups which are unable to meet listing requirements for the KOSDAQ market.
174

Among three different markets for stocks, the KOSPI market demands the strictest listing and
reporting requirements and the KONNEX the least. The KONEX market significantly lowers disclosure
requirements compared to the KOSPI and KOSDAQ. Unlike the other two markets, the KONEX market does
not require companies to file a quarterly report. In addition, events in which companies are required to report
immediately to the KRX are shortened to 29 items from 64 items required in the KOSDAQ market.
175

Capital Market Act, Art. 404.

176

Id. Arts. 410-413.
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1.3.4. THE KOREA FINANCIAL INVESTMENT ASSOCIATION
The Korea Financial Investment Association (KOFIA) is a non-profit organization
whose members consist of licensed securities business firms.177 It was established in 2009
as the FSCMA went in effect by merging three existing associations representing each
securities business. Separate from its member supporting functions, the KOFIA performs
self-regulatory functions including mediation of disputes between its members and
customers, operation of the over-the-counter (OTC) markets for non-listed stocks and
bonds, 178 preliminary review of certain OTC derivatives transactions, registration of
certain market professionals (e.g., investment advisors, analysts, fund managers),
administration of qualification examinations, and education for employees of its members
and investors.179 To conduct such functions, the KOFIA sets a variety of rules and codes
of best practices. To mitigate the conflict of interests between the self-regulatory and the
member support functions, the FSCMA requires the KOFIA to maintain its self-regulatory
function independently from other functions.180 The KOFIA is also subject to the FSC’s
supervision and the FSS’ examination.181

177

Id. Art. 283.

178

The KOFIA has been operating the OTC market to facilitate the trading of stocks not listed on the
exchanges since 2000. This market was first named “FreeBoard” in 2005, and renamed “K-OTC” in 2014. It
also launched the “K-OTCBB” in 2015 to provide investors with information such as quotes submitted by
investors and settled prices for stocks not traded in the exchange and the K-OTC. For the OTC bond market,
the KOFIA operates the trading platform (FreeBond) and provides market participants with information such
as the details of bond trading, different types of yields. As the qualified Institutional Buyer (QIB) market
similar to Rule 144A market of the U.S. was created in 2012, the KOFIA also launched the QIB trading
platform. See generally KOFIA, Capital Market in Korea (2015), at 299-300.
179

Capital Market Act, Art. 286. See Capital Market in Korea (2015), supra note 178, at 292-312.

180

Id. Art. 287(2). To assure the independence of the self-regulatory function, the KOFIA establishes
the Self-Regulatory Committee and its primary responsibility is to resolve the enactment, amendment or
abolishment of the rules related to the self-regulation and dispute mediation, and recommend matters related
to the investigation of its members and sanctions against its members or executives and employees thereof.
181

Id. Arts. 290, 292, 293.
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1.3.5. THE KOREA SECURITIES DEPOSITORY
The Korea Securities Depository (KSD) is a central securities depository which was
established in 1974 and provides settlement as well as custody and recordkeeping services
for securities.182 Similar to the central depository system of the United States, securities
deposited in the KSD are registered in KSD’s name and the KSD’s book only records the
names of its member brokerage firms which manage their customers’ accounts for
deposited securities. The names of beneficial owners for deposited securities are recorded
in the brokerage firms’ books. To clarify legal relationship governing the central depositary
system, the FSCMA provides some specific provisions.183 In addition, the KSD provides
additional services such as separate, safe custody for restricted securities,184a transfer agent
service,185 management of uniform securities certificate forms, management of beneficial
shareholders, bond registration and cross-border deposit and settlement service. 186 The
KSD is subject to the FSC’s supervision and the FSS’s examination.187

182

Clearance of transactions for securities and derivatives traded in the exchange is provided by the
Korea Exchange.
183

Article 311(1) of the FSCMA provides that any person who is recorded in the brokerage firm’s book
or the KSD’s book is presumed to possess the securities respectively. In this case, the KSD (record owner in
the KSD’s book) and beneficial owners are presumed to have a co-ownership on deposited securities. In
addition, where securities are transferred through book entry or where securities are stated to be pledged and
pledgees are stated in the books, securities are deemed to have been delivered for such purposes. Capital
Market Act, Art. 312(2).
184

The KSD holds restricted securities in custody separate from other deposited securities which are
held on a fungible basis. Neither of the securities are transferred through book-entry. Since these securities
are not registered in KSD’s name, it does not exercise any rights in behalf of holders. KSD, Bright Light
(2014), at 21, available at http://www.ksd.or.kr/eng/bbs/bbsList. home?menuNo=52.
185

The transfer agent is required to register with the FSC pursuant to Article 365 of the FSCMA.
Transfer agents manage shareholders’ lists, pay out dividends, interests or principal to investors and issue
new certificates for the sake of an issuer. The KSD and other two commercial banks are currently registered
as transfer agents.
186

For the KSD’s service, see generally Bright Light (2014), supra note 184.

187

Capital Market Act, Arts. 305-307.
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FIGURE 1. PARTICIPANTS IN THE CAPITAL MARKET
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2. REGULATION OF THE REGISTERED OFFERING
2.1. INTRODUCTION
This section gives an overview of regulation of the registered offering in Korea. As
fully discussed in subsequent chapters, essential terms used in the regulation of securities
offerings are defined in the FSCMA and subordinate statutes.188 The term “public offering”
means activities of soliciting purchases of newly issued securities to fifty and more ordinary
investors.189 The term “public sale” is also defined in the same manner in connection with

188

See infra Chapter III.B.2.

189

Capital Market Act, Art. 9(7).
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offers of already issued securities.190 If the aggregate offering price of a public offering or
a public sale exceeds certain threshold amount, the public offering or the public sale must
be registered with the FSC. A regulatory scheme for registered offerings in Korea is quite
similar to that of the United States—it prohibits certain sales activities before a registration
statement is filed or becomes effective (gun-jumping restrictions), requires an issuer to
disclose information at the time of sale and periodically after issuance, and imposes certain
liability against violations of the FSCMA on the issuer and other persons involved in the
registered offering.

2.2. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES DURING REGISTRATION (GUN-JUMPING RULES)
2.2.1. PUBLIC OFFERINGS SUBJECT TO A REGISTRATION STATEMENT
Unlike Section 5 of the Securities Act of the United States which encompasses any
kind of offers of securities as a triggering event requiring an issuer to file a registration
statement, 191 the FSCMA only regulates public offerings exceeding certain aggregate
offering price as a triggering event. In other words, an issuer is required to file a
registration statement with the FSC only when the aggregate offering price of a public
offering is one billion won (approximately $828,000 as of December 31, 2016) or more.192
The aggregate offering price is calculated in the manner prescribed in Article 120(1) of the
Enforcement Decree of the FSCMA as shown in Figure 2.193

190

Id. Art 9(9).

191

15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).

192

Capital Market Act, Art. 119(1); Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 120(1).

193

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 120(1) subpars. 1-2.
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FIGURE 2. DETERMINATION OF THE AGGREGATE OFFERING PRICE
1

If the number of offerees are 50 persons or more in a proposed offering:

(1) amount to be offered in this offering + (2) amount offered in public offerings that were made
within one year from the date when offers are made and in which a registration statement was
not filed with the FSC in connection with such offerings

2

If the number of offerees becomes 50 persons or more as a result of aggregation
pursuant to article 11(1) of the Enforcement Decree:

(1) amount offered by means not involving a public offering or a public sale within past six
months (including amount offered in a proposed offering) (See Chapter III.B.2)

2.2.2. PRE-FILING PERIOD
If the aggregate offering price of a contemplated public offering is one billion won
(approximately $828,000 as of December 31, 2016) or more, no public offering or public
sale can be made before a registration statement is filed with and accepted by the FSC.194
In case of a public offering up to the amount of less than one billion won, an issuer must
file simplified disclosure documents with the FSC at least three days before commencing
offers of securities.195

194

Capital Market Act, Art. 119(1). When a registration statement is filed, it must be accepted by the
FSC. However, the FSC may not refuse to accept a registration statement unless the registration statement
(1) is not prepared in conformity with the prescribed form or (2) contains any untrue statement or omission
of a material fact. Id. Art. 120(2). In practice, when a registration statement is filed, the FSS staff sends the
issuer a letter with a date of acceptance notifying that the registration statement filed has been accepted by
the FSC. However, if the FSS demands an amendment of the registration statement after the staff review,
the registration statement that has already filed with the FSC is deemed not to be accepted by the FSC. Id.
Art. 122(2).
195

Id. Art. 130; see infra Chapter II.B.3.3.1.
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2.2.3. WAITING PERIOD
During the period between a registration statement being filed and before it becomes
effective, an issuer may engage in communications with potential investors to offer
securities by using a preliminary prospectus or a simplified prospectus.196 However, an
issuer and its agent are prohibited from accepting an offer made by potential investors to
purchase the securities during the waiting period.197

2.2.4. POST-EFFECTIVE PERIOD
A registration statement becomes effective after the passage of the time specified by
the Enforcement Rule of the FSCMA.198 After the registration statement becomes effective,
anyone who solicits purchases of securities must use a prospectus.199 Unlike the Securities
Act of the United States that broadly defines the term “prospectus,”200 the FSCMA limits
a prospectus only to a formal document that is prepared by the issuer or its agent and filed
with the FSC. Unless otherwise stated, a prospectus cannot contain any description
different from the one described in the registration statement or omit any description stated
therein.201 A prospectus must be delivered to investors before they purchase the securities
and may be delivered as a form of an electronic document.202

196

Capital Market Act, Art. 124(2) subpars. 2-3.

197

Id. Art. 121(1).

198

For the effective date of a registration statement, see Chapter II.C.2.2.

199

Capital Market Act, Art. 124(2) subpar. 1.

200

15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(10).

201

Capital Market Act, Art. 123(2).

202

Id. Art. 124(1). An issuer is not required to deliver a prospectus to professional investors and other
investors prescribed in Article 132 of the Enforcement Decree of the FSCMA.
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2.3. DISCLOSURE REQUIRED IN THE REGISTERED OFFERINGS
2.3.1. FILING A REGISTRATION STATEMENT
A registration statement consists of two main parts. Part I contains information related
to the security offered and the offering, including risk factors. Part II includes
comprehensive information about the issuer.203 A registration statement must accompany
an audited financial statement. If any item or supplement of a registration statement has
been already filed, such item or supplement may be incorporated by reference in the
registration statement.204 In addition, eligible issuers may engage in continuous offerings
by filing a shelf registration statement.205 A registration statement must be signed by the
CEO and the officer who is responsible for the filing of a registration statement.206 A
registration statement may be amended voluntarily or by the FSC’s demand.207 An issuer
is required to file a registration statement through the electronic filing system called “Data
Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer (DART) system.”208 After the completion of a public
offering, the issuer immediately files with the FSC a “post-issuance report” that contains
information on subscription and allocation of securities, delivery and listing date of
securities, etc.209

203

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 125(1).

204

Capital Market Act, Art. 119(4).

205

Id. Art. 119(2); Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 121.

206

Capital Market Act, Art. 119(5).

207

If a registration statement is amended, the effective date is recalculated from the date the amended
registration statement is filed unless amendments are minor changes that does not significantly affect
investment decision of investors or otherwise excepted by the FSC rules. FSC Disclosure Rules, Art. 2-3.
208

The DART system first launched in 1999 to replace the paper filing with the electronic filing and
help information users to access to disclosure documents more easily. Since 2001, all disclosure documents
are required to be filed in the electronic form through DART system.
209

Capital Market Act, art. 128; FSC Disclosure Rules, Art. 2-19.
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2.3.2. DISCLOSURE AFTER COMPLETION OF THE REGISTERED OFFERING
An issuer that made a public offering by filing a registration statement is generally
subject to certain reporting obligations on an ongoing basis after completion of the
offering. 210 The reporting obligations apply until the number of holders of securities
offered and sold by filing a registration statement is less than twenty five persons or other
events occur.211 First, an issuer must file an annual, semi-annual, and quarterly report
within forty five days (for semi-annual or quarterly reports) or ninety days (for annual
reports, 120 days for some exceptions) after the end of each term.212 An annual report must
accompany audited financial statements and a semi-annual report may include financial
statements reviewed by an independent auditor.213 Second, issuers also must file a current
report with the FSC by the following day after certain events occur.214 Triggering events
include matters that significantly affect an issuer’s business, management or financial
status such as filing a bankruptcy or receivership, suspension of all or some major business
activities, resolution for sale of major business or assets, and M&A and issuance of new
shares or bonds.215 Periodic reports and current reports filed with the FSC must be signed
by the CEO and an officer who is responsible for the filing.216

210

Capital Market Act, Art. 159(1); Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 167(1).

211

Capital Market Act, Art. 159(1); Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 167(2).

212

Capital Market Act, Art. 159(1); Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 160.

213

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Arts. 169(6), 170. An auditor’s opinion is not
required in a quarterly report except financial institutions and stock-listed companies whose amounts of total
assets are 500 billion won (approximately $414 million as of December 31, 2016) or more as of the end of a
recent fiscal year.
214

Capital Market Act, Art. 161(1).

215

Id. Art. 161(1); Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 171(3). The FSCMA and the
Enforcement Decree of the FSCMA enumerate 14 triggering events.
216

Capital Market Act, Arts. 159(7), 161(1).
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2.4. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN THE REGISTERED OFFERING
2.4.1. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT
a. Criminal liability
The FSCMA imposes criminal liability upon persons who violate certain obligations
in connection with the registered offering (e.g., failing to file a registration statement). In
particular, an issuer and other persons responsible for any untrue statement or omission of
a material fact contained in a registration statement or a prospectus are subject to criminal
penalty under Article 444 of the FSCMA.217 A person who is subject to criminal liability
under this provision is sentenced to either imprisonment of up to five years or a fine of up
to 200 million won (approximately $166,000 as of December 31, 2016), or both.218
In addition, any person who violates the general antifraud provisions (Article 178 of
the FSCMA) in connection with a registered offering is subject to criminal liability.219 The
first subparagraph of Article 178(1) which was nonexistent under the former Securities and
Exchange Act (SEA), prohibits any person from “utilizing unfair device, scheme, or trick”
in connection with trading of financial investment instruments (including public offering,
public sale and private placement of securities) or other transactions.220

217

Id. Art. 444 subpar. 13. Persons subject to criminal liability under this provision include (i) any
person that misrepresented or omitted a material fact in a registration statement or other reporting documents,
(ii) a CEO and a responsible officer who signed in such documents with a knowledge of any material
misrepresentation or omission that had existed in the documents, and (iii) CPAs, appraisers or credit rating
agencies that proved such documents as true and accurate with a knowledge of any material misrepresentation
or omission that had existed in the documents.
218

Id. Art. 444.

219

Id. Art. 178.

220

Id. Art. 178 subpar. 1. English translation of this provision used in the text is provided by the
Legislative Translation Center which officially services translation of Korean statutes. Though the translation
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The second subparagraph of Article 178(1) of the FSCMA prohibits any person from
“[a]ttempting to earn money or any interest in property, by using a document containing a
false description or representation of a material fact, an omission of a description or
representation of a material fact necessary for preventing others from being misled, or any
other description or representation” in connection with purchase and sale of financial
investment instruments (including public offering, public sale and private placement of
securities) or other transaction.221 Though the SEA retained a similar provision under
Article 188-4(4), subparagraph 2 of Article 178(1) of the FSCMA changes the old
provision in two aspects.222 First, unlike Article 188-4(4) of the SEA that prohibited any
person from employing “documents” to defraud, the FSCMA extended prohibited
activities to “non-document type descriptions or representations” (e.g., any broadcast over
television or radio, any seminar or meeting).223 Second, Article 178 of the FSCMA makes
clear that it applies to securities transactions in the primary market by adding a phrase in
parenthesis stating that purchase and sale includes “public offering, public sale and private
placement of securities.”224

is different from the language (“employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud”) of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, its meaning is substantially the same with Section 10(b) considering a legislative history of
subparagraph 1 of Article 178.
221

Id. Art. 178(1) subpar. 2.

222

Jeunggwongeograebeob [Securities and Exchange Act], Act. No. 8985, March 21, 2008, Art. 1884(4) subpar. 2 (repealed). Subparagraph 2 of Article 188-4(4) of the SEA provides as follows:
(4) With respect to purchase and sale or other transaction of securities, no person shall commit
an act which falls under any of the following subparagraphs:
2. Intending to gain money or other benefits, which has property value, by inducing
misunderstanding of other persons, through false representation of any material fact or making
use of document in which any fact required is omitted.
223

FSS, JABONSIJANG BULGONGJEONGGEORAE MIT GIEOPGONGSI PANRAE BUNSEOK
ON UNFAIR TRADING AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE], at 208 (Dec., 2015).
224

[CASE ANALYSIS

Since Article 188-4(4) of the SEA limited the application of the provision to “purchase and sale or
other transaction of securities,” it generally applied to cases involving transactions in the secondary market.
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Finally, the third subparagraph of Article 178(1) of the FSCMA prohibits “[u]sing an
inaccurate market price with intent to attract another to trade or make any other transaction
in financial investment instruments” in connection with purchase and sale of financial
investment instruments (including public offering, public sale and private placement of
securities) or other transaction. 225 A person who violates any of the general antifraud
provisions is sentenced to imprisonment of up to ten years or a fine of up to three times of
the profit gained or the loss avoided by a violation (maximum fine of 500 million won
(approximately $414,000 as of end of 2016)).226 A person sentenced to imprisonment is
concurrently sentenced to a fine.227

b. Administrative actions by the FSC
Violations in registered offerings are also subject to the FSC’s administrative actions.
Once violations are uncovered by the FSS staff’s investigation, the FSC may issue an order
to suspend or prohibit the pending transactions, issue an order to prohibit new issues of
securities for a certain period of time not exceeding one year, recommend an issuer to
remove a responsible officer from his post, and refer the case to the criminal investigative
agencies.228 In addition, the FSC has an authority to impose monetary sanctions called
“penalty surcharge” for certain violations.229 If authorized to do so by the statute, the FSC

On the other hand, it was unclear whether this provision extends to securities transactions in the primary
market.
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Capital Market Act, Art. 178(1) subpar. 3.

226

Id. Art. 443.

227

Id. Art. 447(1).

228

Id. Art. 132, 164; Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Arts. 138, 175.

229

A penalty surcharge can be imposed within the limit of three percent of offering amounts (for public
offering violations) or ten percent of daily average trading amounts of stocks issued by the corporation during
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may impose a penalty surcharge for the same misconducts subject to criminal liability.230
The FSC is authorized to impose a penalty surcharge upon persons enumerated in Article
125(1) of the FSCMA231 for violation of filing obligations and any untrue statement or
omission of a material fact on disclosure documents.232 However, a penalty charge is not
recognized for violation of the general antifraud provision.

2.4.2. CIVIL LIABILITY
a. Overview
Though private laws provide general remedies that investors can pursue to recover
losses or rescind transactions,233 the FSCMA provides special, civil liability provisions
that purchasers of securities can claim against persons responsible for damages caused by
fraudulent activities in connection with registered offerings. Civil liability under Article
125 of the FSCMA relates to any untrue statement or omission of a material fact contained
in a registration statement or a prospectus.234 On the other hand, Article 179 of the FSCMA

the previous year (for periodic or current reporting violations) and cannot exceed two billion won
(approximately $1,657,000 as of December 31, 2016). Capital Market Act, Art. 429.
230

Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2001Hun-Ka25, July 24, 2003, (15-2(A) KCCR, 1) (holding that
imposition of criminal penalty and penalty surcharge for the same misconduct does not constitute double
jeopardy since two penalties serve different purposes and thus is not unconstitutional).
231

Capital Market Act, Art. 125(1) subpars. 1-7.

232

Id. Art. 429(1).

233

E.g., Minbeob [Civil Act], Act. No. 14409, Dec. 20, 2016, Art. 750 (“Any person who causes losses
to or inflicts injuries on another person by an unlawful act, intentionally or negligently, shall be bound to
make compensation for damages arising therefrom.”), Art. 109(1) (“A declaration of intention made by fraud
or duress may be voidable.”); Sangbeob [Commercial Act], Act. No. 13523, Dec. 1, 2015, Art. 401(1) (“If a
director has neglected his/her duties intentionally or by gross negligence, he/she shall be jointly and severally
liable for damages against a third party.”).
234

Similarly, Article 162 of the FSCMA provides civil liability in connection with any
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact that exist in the periodic reports and current reports.
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provides investors with a civil remedy for damages caused by violation of the general
antifraud provisions.

b. Civil liability under Article 125 of the FSCMA
Article 125 of the FSCMA imposes civil liability on an issuer and other persons
responsible for any misrepresentation or omission of a material fact that exist in a
registration statement or a prospectus.235 The plaintiffs who can claim Article 125 liability
are limited to persons who purchased securities in a registered offering and does not include
secondary market purchasers who relied on a misleading registration statement.236 The
plaintiffs only need to prove any untrue statement or omission of a material fact in a
registration statement or a prospectus. 237 The FSCMA also enlists persons subject to
Article 125 civil liability including an issuer, its directors, underwriters and CPAs.238 To

235

Capital Market Act, Art. 125(1). Article 125(1) provides as follows:
(1) The following persons shall be liable for damages inflicted upon any person as a result of
acquiring securities by including a false description or representation of any material fact in a
registration statement … or omitting a material fact therefrom: Provided, That such person shall
not be liable if he/she proves that he/she was unable to discover such inclusion or omission even
if he/she exercised reasonable care or that the person who acquired the securities knew the fact
at the time when he/she made an offer to acquire them: . . . (omitted).
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Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2013Da88447, Dec. 23, 2015. However, the Supreme Court cases showed
inconsistency on the standing of secondary market purchasers under the former Securities and Exchange Act.
For cases having rejected a standing to sue, see 99Da48979 (May 14, 2002), 2001Da9311 (Sep. 24, 2002).
For the case having approved the standing, see 2008Da31751 (Nov. 27, 2008).
237

Civil liability under the FSCMA does not extend to forward-looking information unless plaintiffs
prove that defendants, intentionally or with gross negligence, misrepresented or omitted material forwardlooking information. To rely on the exemption, forward-looking information must be prepared in good faith
on the basis of reasonable assumptions or grounds, disclose such assumptions or grounds, and accompany
cautionary statements pursuant to the FSCMA. Capital Market Act, Art. 125(2).
238

Id. Art. 125(1) subpars. 1-7.

Article 125 defendants include: (i) a registrant (issuer) and directors of an issuer, (ii) de facto directors
enumerated in Article 401-2(1) of the Commercial Act who instructed or executed the preparation of a
registration statement, (iii) certain professionals (e.g., CPAs, appraisers, credit-rating agencies, etc.) that
assured with their signatures that information contained in a registration statement (including appendices) is
true or correct, (iv) persons who consented to include their statements of evaluation, analysis or verification
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escape from liability, defendants may rely on the due-diligence defense. In other words, a
defendant is not subject to the liability if he proves that he was unable to discover the
challenged misrepresentation, even after reasonable investigation.239
If there is any untrue statement or omission of a material fact, the plaintiff’s loss is
presumed and the amount of loss is calculated pursuant to Article 126(1) of the FSCMA,
unless defendants prove that there was no causation between materially misleading
statements and the investor’s loss. 240 Actions to enforce the liability must be brought
within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission or three years
from the effective date of a registration statement, whichever is shorter.241

c. Civil liability under Article 179 of the FSCMA
A person who violates the general antifraud provisions under Article 178 of the
FSCMA is liable for damages suffered by a person who purchases or sells securities in
reliance on such violation.242 Unlike civil liability under Article 125 of the FSCMA, a
plaintiff must prove the amount of damages. Actions to enforce liability must be brought
within one year after the discovery of the violation or three years from the time when
violation is occurred, whichever is shorter.243

in a registration statement, (v) underwriters or brokers (for the best-effort basis offerings), (vi) persons who
prepared or delivered prospectus, (vii) securityholders whose securities are offered and sold in a public sale.
239

Id. Art. 125(1).

240

Id. Art. 126.

241

Id. Art. 127.

242

Id. Art. 179(1).

243

Id. Art. 179(2).
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d. Class actions
Though class actions are not generally permitted in Korea, certain securities-related
claims arising under the FSCMA can be enforced through class actions pursuant to the
Securities-Related Class Action Act (hereinafter “Class Action Act”) that went into effect
in January 2005.244 Permissible claims are enumerated under Article 3(1) of the Class
Action Act and include civil liability claims under Articles 125 and 179 of the FSCMA.245
However, Article 3(2) of the Class Action Act further narrows permissible claims to those
arising in the transactions of securities issued by stock-listed companies.246

3. REGULATION OF THE EXEMPT OFFERINGS
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Similar to the U.S. securities regulation, the FSCMA also exempts certain securities
and transactions from registration requirements. In addition to exempted securities, the
FSCMA provides three types of exempt offerings: private placement, small public offering
and new crowdfunding offering. Since private placement is fully reviewed in Chapter III,
this section focuses on other exemptions. At the end of this section, a summary table is
provided to compare three exempt offerings.

244

Jeunggwon gwanryeon jibdansosongbeob [Securities-Related Class Action Act], Act. No. 7074, Jan.
20, 2004, amended by Act. No. 11845, May 28, 2013.
245

Class Action Act, Art. 3(1). In addition to Articles 125 and 179 of the FSCMA, permissible claims
include civil liabilities under following provisions: Article 162 (civil liability related to periodic and current
reports; but current reports are excluded for class actions), Article 170 (civil liability related to audit reports),
Article 175 (civil liability related to insider trading), Article 177 (civil liability related to market
manipulations).
246

Id. Art. 3(2).
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3.2. EXEMPTED SECURITIES
Certain securities are exempted from registration under the FSCMA in light of the
nature of the issuers and investor protection mechanisms operating outside the securities
laws.247 Exempted securities are virtually debt securities issued by the governments or
certain public organizations.248 For these securities, payments of principals and interests
are generally guaranteed by the government and information about issuers are publicly
disclosed in the issuer’s website pursuant to the relevant statutes. Bonds issued by banks
and certain financial institutions were previously recognized as exempt securities, but are
now subject to registration under the FSCMA regime. Unlike the Securities Act, the
FSCMA completely excludes exempted securities from the application of Articles 118-132
of the FSCMA that governs a registered offering.249 As a result, a civil liability against
any material misrepresentation or omission contained in a registered offering under Article
125 of the FSCMA does not apply to exempted securities. However, exempted securities
are subject to civil and criminal liabilities pursuant to the general antifraud provisions of
the FSCMA.250

247

Capital Market Act, Art. 118.

248

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 119.

249

Article 118 of the FSCMA provides that “[n]o provision of this Chapter shall apply to [exempted
securities] . . .” Capital Market Act, Part 3, Chapter 1, Art. 118.
250

Capital Market Act, Arts. 178, 179.
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3.3. EXEMPT OFFERINGS
3.3.1. SMALL PUBLIC OFFERINGS
Aside from private placements, a small public offering has been used as a traditional
means for small companies to seek limited capital without a significant compliance burden.
To be accurate, a public offering (or a public sale) of which the aggregate offering amount
is less than one billion won (approximately $828,000 as of December 31, 2016) is
“excluded” from registration of the securities under the FSCMA.251 Such an offering does
not trigger registration under Article 119 of the FSCMA at all. 252 For a small public
offering, there are no specific restrictions on the eligibility of issuers or purchasers of the
securities. Thus, “any issuer” including reporting companies may offer and sell the
securities to “any person” within the offering amount limit. Since securities acquired in a
small public offering are issued in the form of public offering, purchasers can freely resell
the securities if such resale does not constitute a “public sale” or is exempted from
registration pursuant to Article 119(6) of the FSCMA.253 Similar to exempted securities,
a civil liability under Article 125 of the FSCMA does not apply to small public offerings.

251

See infra Chapter II.C.1.2.

252

Article 119(a) of the FSCMA provides as follows:
No securities shall be publicly offered or sold, unless and until a registration statement filed
by the issuer in connection with the public offering or sale of the securities with the Financial
Services Commission is accepted by the Commission (limited to cases where the total amount
of securities publicly offered or sold, as calculated in accordance with a formula prescribed
by Presidential Decree, reaches or exceeds the amount prescribed by Presidential Decree).

(Emphasis added).
253

Capital Market Act, Art. 119(6). Article 124-2 of the FSCMA Enforcement Decree provides
requirements for a public sale to be exempted from registration.
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An issuer seeking a small public offering is required to file certain information with
the FSC.254 First, an issuer must electronically file with the FSC a recent year’s audit report
and the designated form no later than three days before commencing an offering.255 The
Form must contain the offering procedures and other information concerning issuer and
the security (similar to Parts I and II of the registration statement), which must be included
in the offering materials.256 Upon completion of the offering, an issuer must immediately
file with the FSC the designated Form to state the result of the offering.257 An issuer is
also required to file with the FSC financial statements within ninety days after the end of
each fiscal year unless otherwise exempted.258
Contrary to the legislative intent to facilitate the securities offerings of small
businesses, small public offerings have been abused to evade the registration process by
the financially-distressed KOSDAQ-listed companies. 259 In reality, many companies
employed small public offerings to misappropriate offering proceeds or temporarily avoid

254

Since the Securities and Exchange Act was first enacted in 1962, a small public offering had been
virtually unregulated until the 1990s. During this period, there was no requirement to qualify as a small
public offering except the offering amount limit. In the late 1990s, however, many internet-based companies,
along with the internet boom, sought online offerings of less than one billion won (typically “999 million
won”) to evade registration under the securities laws. As a result, relevant information could not be furnished
to investors and thousands of individual investors were financially damaged as the bubble burst. In the
aftermath of this event, the National Assembly amended the Securities and Exchange Act in January 2001 to
impose filing and information requirements on issuers of small public offerings. Seok Ho Yoo, A Study on
Regulations of Public Offering under Securities Exchange Act (2001), at 229 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Yonsei University) (on file with the Yonsei University Library).
255

Capital Market Act, Art. 130; Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 137(1); FSC
Disclosure Rules, Art. 2-17(1), (2).
256

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 137(1) subpar. 2.

257

Id. Art. 137(1) subpar. 4.

258

Id. Art. 137(1) subpar. 5. An issuer also must file an audit report if financial statements are audited
by an independent public accountant. The provision does not apply if the issuer is a reporting company, a
foreign issuer, an issuer whose securities publicly offered are redeemed or retired, or a company who issues
only secured bonds.
259

In typical cases, KOSDAQ-listed companies rely on small public offerings when a registered
offering is denied or expected to be delayed or screened by the FSS staff who review the registration statement.
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the delisting. In many instances, however, securities of these companies were delisted
shortly after they conducted small public offerings.260
A small public offering became more attractive to companies seeking capital without
a registration process after the offering limit was increased from one billion won
(approximately $828,000 as of December 31, 2016) to two billion won (approximately
$1,657,000 as of December 31, 2016) in 2001. Previously, the offering amounts were
aggregated only with those in offerings of the “same class of securities” as offered in a
contemplated offering. Consequently, companies could raise up to six billion won
(approximately $5 million as of December 31, 2016) annually by offering and selling
different classes of securities such as common stock, preferred stock, and debt securities.261
To curb abuse of small public offerings, the offering limit was reduced back to one billion
won (approximately $828,000 as of December 31, 2016) when the FSCMA was enacted.
As problems persisted without any improvement, even under the reduced offering limit,262
the FSC again tightened the regulatory requirements for a small public offering by
amending Article 120(a) of the FSCMA Enforcement Decree in 2012. 263 First, the
language of the “same class of the securities” was removed from Article 120(a).264 Thus,
260

Among forty-four companies whose securities were delisted from the exchange between January
2002 and June 2006, thirty-five companies (79.5%) were reported to have conducted small public offerings
within one year from the delisting. FSS, Press Release, Soaekgongmojedo Gaeseonchujin [FSS Is Taking
Steps To Improve a Small Public Offering] (Oct. 17, 2006).
261

In many instances, the companies typically raised 4 billion won (approximately $3,313,000 as of
December 31, 2016) in small public offerings by issuing common stock and either convertible bonds or
bonds with warrants.
262

Among 79 companies whose securities were delisted in 2010, 59 companies (74.6%) were reported
to have raised 120 billion won (approximately $107 million as of December 31, 2010) by using small public
offerings within one year from the delisting. FSC, Press Release, Jabonsijanggwa Geumyungtujaeobe
Gwanhan Beomnyul Sihaengnyeong Gaejeongan Ipbeobyego [Proposing Amendments to Enforcement
Decree of the FSCMA] (Feb. 24, 2012).
263

Id.

264

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 120(1).
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an issuer can use a small public offering only up to one billion won (approximately
$828,000 as of December 31, 2016) regardless of the class of the securities issued. Second,
the issuer could file offering documents with the FSC any time prior to commencement of
the offering in the past. However, the filing deadline was advanced by three days in order
to give investors more time to contemplate a proposed offering.265 Third, Article 137(1)
newly requires an issuer to enter into a contract with a financial institution which holds
committed funds in escrow to prevent an issuer from defalcating the funds.266

3.3.2. CROWDFUNDING OFFERINGS
Similar to the United States, Korea also adopted a new crowdfunding exemption under
the FSCMA to support the equity crowdfunding of early stage small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). The amendment to the FSCMA was passed by the National Assembly
in June 2015267 and Enforcement Decree and FSC Rules under the FSCMA were amended
in January 2016.268 New crowdfunding regulations went in effect on January 12, 2016.
a. Issuers
Issuers eligible for crowdfunding offerings are limited to SMEs (except finance,
insurance, and real estate businesses) that operate a business for less than seven years.269

265

Id. Art. 137(1) subpar. 3.

266

Id. Art. 137(1) subpar. 3-2.

267

Jabonsijanggwa Geumyungtujaeobe Gwanhan Beomnyul Ilbugaejeongbeomnyuran (daean)
(jeongmuwiwonjang) [Proposed Amendment to the Financial Investment Services and Capital Market Act
(Alternative) (Chair of National Policy Committee)], Bill No. 1915772 (passed on July 6, 2015).
268

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Presidential Decree No. 26898, Jan. 12, 2016; FSC
Disclosure Rules, FSC Public Notification No. 2016-2, Jan. 19, 2016.
269

Capital Market Act, Art. 9(27); Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 14-5(1). The
term “SME” is defined in Article 2 of the Framework Act on Small and Medium Enterprises.
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The seven year limitation does not apply to venture companies, technology-innovative
SMEs or management-innovative SMEs. 270 However, companies whose securities are
listed in the exchange cannot use crowdfunding offerings.271
b. Offering limit
Eligible issuers are allowed to raise capital up to 700 million won (approximately
$580,000 as of December 31, 2016) in one year through crowdfunding offerings by issuing
equity securities, debt securities, or securities in the form of investment contract.272 The
amounts of securities sold to professional investors and other qualified investors in
crowdfunding offerings are excluded in calculating the offering limit, provided they agree
to deposit in the KSD and not to resell the securities within one year.273 However, if the
sum of investment commitments does not reach or exceed 80% of the target offering
amount at the offering deadline, an issuer cannot issue the securities and committed funds
must be immediately returned to the investors.274
c. Investment limitations
In light of the risks associated with investments in early stage companies, investors
that are not professional investors or certain qualified investors are prohibited from
investing in excess of the annual investment limit in crowdfunding offerings. 275 The

270

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 14-5(2).

271

Id. Art. 14-5.

272

Capital Market Act, Art. 9(27), 117-10(1); Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 118-

15(1).
273

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 118-15(2).

274

Capital Market Act, Art. 117-10(3); Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 118-14(3).

275

Capital Market Act, Art. 17-10(1).
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annual investment limit for persons who satisfy certain income (for natural persons) or
equity (for entities) requirements is 10 million won (approximately $8,300 as of December
31, 2016) per issuer and 20 million won (approximately $16,600 as of December 31, 2016)
across all issuers.276 For persons who do not meet requirements, the annual limit is reduced
to 2 million won (approximately $1,700 as of December 31, 2016) and 5 million won
(approximately $4,100 as of December 31, 2016) respectively.277
d. Intermediary
To qualify as a crowdfunding exemption, an offering must be conducted exclusively
through online platform of an “online small investment intermediary” (hereinafter
“crowdfunding intermediary”). 278 A crowdfunding intermediary is a new type of an
investment intermediary that is authorized solely to act as a broker by using an online
platform in the public offering or the private placement of securities issued by issuers
relying on the crowdfunding exemption.279 A crowdfunding intermediary must register
with the FSC.280 Other investment intermediaries that are already registered with the FSC
can also participate in the crowdfunding offerings after registering as a crowdfunding
intermediary.
Article 117-7 and some other provisions of the FSCMA enumerates activities that
crowdfunding intermediaries are prohibited from performing in the course of business. A
crowdfunding intermediary is prohibited from acquiring an issuer’s securities for which it
276

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 118-17(3), (4).

277

Id. Art. 118-17(3), (4).

278

Capital Market Act, Art. 117-10(1).

279

Id. Art. 9(27).

280

Id. Art. 117-4.
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acts as a broker on its account. 281

It also may not give investment advice or

recommendations to investors and managerial consultation to issuers. 282 Any kind of
solicitations for purchases of securities are prohibited with some exceptions (e.g.,
displaying information on the issuer and its security on its platform). 283 Similarly, a
crowdfunding intermediary may not place advertisements related to crowdfunding
offerings other than on its website.284 A crowdfunding intermediary is prohibited from
accepting any funds or securities from investors and investment commitments must be
deposited in banks.285
e. Disclosure of information
Crowdfunding offerings are exempted from both full registration under Article 119 of
the FSCMA and disclosure obligations applicable to a small public offering under Article
130 of the FSCMA. 286 In fact, an issuer is not required to file any information in
connection with the crowdfunding offerings with the FSC. Instead, it must disclose certain
information on its security, business, and financials through a crowdfunding intermediary’s
website prior to offers of securities.287 Depending on the target offering amount, financial
information must be accompanied by an auditor’s opinion, a CPA’s confirmation and
opinion, or a CEO’s confirmation. 288

An issuer also may furnish, through the
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Id. Art. 117-7(2).

282

Id. Art. 117-7(3).

283

Id. Art. 117-7(10).

284

Id. Art. 117-9(1).
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Id. Art. 117-8(1), (2).

286

Id. Art. 117-10(1).

287

Id. Art. 117-10(2); Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 118-16(1).

288

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 118-16(1); FSC Disclosure Rules, Art. 2-2-4(2).
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intermediary’s website, other materials that can help investment decision of investors and
is not inconsistent with material information that has already been disclosed.289 Upon
completion of the offering, an issuer must disclose the result of the offering through the
intermediary’s website. 290 In addition, an issuer is required to disclose, periodically,
financial information required in the small public offering through the intermediary’s
website.291
f. Resale of securities
Investors who acquire securities in crowdfunding offerings must place the securities
in the KSD’s custody and cannot resell within one year from the date when the securities
were deposited.292 However, investors may resell the securities to professional investors,
other qualified investors, or the issuer and its largest shareholder, despite resale
restrictions.293 The resale made in the exchange markets or K-OTCBB (operated by the
KOFIA) is also not subject to resale limitation.294 On the other hand, an issuer or its largest
shareholder cannot sell the issuer’s securities it owns to anyone within one year after the
issuer issued securities through a crowdfunding offering.295

289

Capital Market Act, Art. 117-10(4).

290

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 118-16(3) subpar. 1.

291

Id. Art. 118-16(3) subpar. 2; see also supra notes 254-258 and accompanying text.

292

Capital Market Act, Art. 117-10(7).

293

Id. Art. 117-10(7); Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 118-17(5) subpars. 1-3.

294

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act Art. 118-17(5) subpar. 4. The Korea Exchange
launched a new trading market (Korea Startup Market: KSM) in November 2016 to facilitate resale
transactions for securities of crowdfunding issuers and other startups. FSC, Press Release, Changeop
jungsogieobe himi doeneun keuraudeupeonding baljeonbangan [New Initiatives for Boosting Crowdfunding
to Assist Startups and SMEs] (Nov. 7, 2016).
295

Capital Market Act, Art. 117-10(5).
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g. Civil liability
Separate from a general antifraud liability under Article 179 of the FSCMA, Article
117-12 provides a civil liability against any material misrepresentation or omission that
exists in the information disclosed through the intermediary’s website in connection with
crowdfunding offerings.296 The liability is substantively the same as a liability that applies
to a registered offering under Article 125 of the Act.297 The liability applies to an issuer,
its CEO and directors, de facto directors, and professionals who provide assurance on
accuracy of disclosed information, but does not extend to the crowdfunding
intermediary.298 To consider such an exemption from a liability and relieve the concern
for fraud, the FSCMA imposes the heightened gate-keeping role on a crowdfunding
intermediary. A crowdfunding intermediary must review in advance an issuer’s financial
status, business plans, criminal records and legal proceedings associated with the issuer, its
largest shareholders and directors, and other information disclosed through the
intermediary’s website.299 If an intermediary violates such obligations, it is subject to an
administrative fine.300

296

Id. Art. 117-12.

297

See supra Chapter II.B.2.4.2.b.

298

Capital Market Act, Art. 117-12; see also supra note 238 and accompanying text.

299

Id. Art. 117-11; Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 118-18; FSC Disclosure Rules,
Art. 2-2-7.
300

Capital Market Act, Art. 449(1) subpar. 35-10.
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TABLE 2. EXEMPT OFFERINGS UNDER THE FSCMA

Private Placement

Small Public Offering

Crowdfunding

FSCMA

§ 9(8)

§ 130

§ 117-10(1)

Offering limit (annual)

no limit

1 billion won
(approx. $828,000)

700 million won
(approx. $580,000)

Non-reporting co.

Y

Y

Foreign co.
Reporting co.
Investment co.
Blank check co.

Y
Y
Y
Y
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
N

Y
(SMEs & venture co.)
N
N
N
N
N

Y
up to 49
N

Y
Y
N

Y
Y
Y

prohibited
not required

allowed
not required

allowed
required

FSS staff review

N

N

N

FSC filing

N

Y

N

Eligible issuers

Disqualifications
Eligible purchasers
Professionals
Non professionals

Investment limit
Manner of offering
General solicitation
Intermediary
Disclosure

Y
Y

(financial info. must accompany
an auditor’s opinion, a CPA’s
confirmation and opinion, or a
CEO’s confirmation depending
target offering amount)

Disclosure to investors
in the offering

N

(financial information must be
audited)

Y

Y

Periodic disclosure

N

(financial information need not
be audited)

(financial information need not
be audited)

Y
Integration

(integrated with other private
placements made in preceding
6 months)

N

N

Resale limitation

1 year

not restricted

1 year
(exceptions apply)

Civil liability

§ 179

§ 179

§ 117-12 & § 179
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C. COMPARISON

OF THE

U.S.

AND

KOREAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

GOVERNING SECURITIES OFFERINGS
Securities offering regulations of the United States and Korea appear to have many
similarities in the overall structure. Both regulations divide the public offering process into
three critical stages (i.e., pre-filing period, waiting period, and post-effective period) to
regulate an issuer’s sales activities in connection with securities offerings, and also require
the filing of a registration statement. A registration statement is reviewed by the staff of
the regulatory agencies and a prospectus must be furnished to investors prior to the sale.
Both regulatory frameworks also provide civil and criminal liabilities and other remedies
to ensure full and truthful disclosure of material information.

Finally, as a policy

consideration, they exempt certain securities and transactions from registration.
Nonetheless, closer examination also reveals many substantive differences between the two
regulatory systems. This part compares such differences in terms of registered offerings,
exempt offerings and regulatory authority.

1. REGISTERED OFFERINGS
1.1. DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS
Underlying differences between the two regulatory systems originates from the
manner that securities statutes of both countries define terms essential to securities
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regulation. Both the Securities Act and the FSCMA define terms “security”301 “offer”302
“underwriter”303 and “prospectus.”304 Besides the term “security” in which both statutes
include a catch-all “investment contract,” other terms are different in their breadth. In
essence, the Securities Act defines such terms broadly enough to include any kind of
securities transactions for which investor protection might be necessary. Inevitably, the
broad reach of securities laws has been followed by continuous regulatory efforts to add
clarity to the securities laws. In contrast, the FSCMA defines these terms more restrictively
in light of stability in securities transactions. This approach, however, necessarily contracts
the scope of investor protection relative to the U.S. securities laws.

1.2. APPROACH TO REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES
The two regulatory systems take different approaches to registration of securities. The
U.S. federal securities laws first subject any offer or sale of securities to the requirement
of filing a registration statement and carve out certain securities and transactions to be
exempt from registration. On the other hand, the Korean securities laws subject only public
offering and public sale equal to, or exceeding, one billion won (approximately $828,000
as of December 31, 2016) to registration. A public offering (or a public sale) of less than

301

15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); Capital Market Act, Art. 4.

302

15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3); Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 2 subpar. 2. For
definition of the term “offer” in each statute, see Chapter II.A.3.1(term “offer” in the Securities Act), Chapter
II.B.2.2.1.a (the term “offer” in the FSCMA).
303

15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11); Capital Market Act, Art. 9(12) (defining as “an entity that takes over
securities in cases of public offering, private placement, or public sale of securities”).
304

15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10). The term “prospectus” is not directly defined in the FSCMA. However,
Article 123(1) of the FSCMA refers to the term “prospectus” as a document that is prepared by an issuer in
public offering or public sale of securities. Capital Market Act, Art. 123(1). Article 124(1) of the FSCMA
also requires that a prospectus be delivered to purchasers prior to offers or sales of the securities. Id. Art.
124(1).
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one billion won does not trigger the registration obligation from the beginning. Instead, a
public offering of less than one billion won (referred to as a “small public offering”) is
subject to relatively lax disclosure requirements. Therefore, the U.S. approach that any
offer or sale of securities must be registered or exempt from registration does not apply to
the Korean securities laws. The current approach of Korea appears to unnecessarily
complicate the task of carving out exempted transactions from existing regulation and
consequently increases the possibility of unintended errors in legislative drafting.

FIGURE 3. APPROACH TO REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES

1.3. FACTORS DETERMINING “PUBLIC OFFERING”
The Korean securities laws expressly define the term “public offering” solely based
on the number of offerees involved in the transactions. On the contrary, the U.S. federal
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securities laws evaded defining the term “public offering” by requiring any offer or sale of
securities to be registered as explained above. However, as is fully addressed in Chapter
III, the term “public offering” appears in Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act, which
exempts from registration “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.”305
In SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that the number of offerees is
not determinative in defining a public offering.306 The Supreme Court stated that the real
question is whether persons involved in the offering could “fend for themselves” and did
not need the protection afforded by the Securities Act.307 The SEC and lower courts also
stated that determining whether a transaction involves a public offering is a question of
facts and circumstances, and considered several factors to reach this conclusion.308 In this
regard, Korean securities regulation appears to oversimplify a public offering by defining
the term on the basis of the number of offerees and, more importantly, has unnecessarily
undertaken a difficult task that could have been avoided.

1.4. GUN-JUMPING EXCEPTIONS
In the United States, the definition of the term “offer” is broad enough to raise a
concern, especially in the pre-filing period, that even routine communications by an issuer
may be viewed as conditioning the market and trigger violations of “gun-jumping”
restrictions under Section 5 of the Securities Act. 309 Such concern was significantly

305

15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).

306

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).

307

Id.

308

See infra Chapter III.

309

See supra Chapter II.A.3.1.1.
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relieved by the U.S. SEC’s Securities Offering Reform of 2005:310 (1) an issuer is not
deemed “in registration” when any communication is made by or on behalf of an issuer
more than thirty days prior to filing of a registration statement, provided the proposed
offering is not mentioned; 311 (2) an issuer is permitted to publish regularly released
information during registration without containing information about the registered
offering;312 (3) after a registration statement is filed, issuers and other offering participants
are permitted to use a “free writing prospectus” which includes electronic road shows and
media publications;313 (4) well-known seasoned issuers (WKSIs) are permitted to make
any oral offers or use a free writing prospectus even in the pre-filing period;314 (5) use of
research reports during registration were expanded. 315 In 2012, the JOBS Act further
allowed emerging growth companies (EGCs) to engage in “test-the-waters”
communications to QIBs or accredited institutional investors either prior to or after filing
a registration statement.316
In contrast, any remarkable change has not been made as to the gun-jumping
regulation in Korea. This is partly because, unlike in the U.S., the narrowly defined term
“offer” did not raise much concern for gun-jumping.317 As a whole, communication rules
for a registered offering resemble the U.S. securities regulation prior to 2005.318 Under the

310

See supra Chapter II.A.3.1.2.

311

17 C.F.R. § 230.163A.

312

Id. §§ 230.168, 169.

313

Id. §§ 230.164, 405, 433.

314

Id. § 230.163.

315

Id. §§ 230.137-139.

316

15 U.S.C. § 77e(d).

317

See supra Chapter II.B.2.2.1.a.

318

See supra Chapter II.B.2.2.2.
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Korean securities regulation, the only exception recognized as preregistration
communications is the offering announcements similar to SEC Rule 135. 319 Once a
registration statement is filed, solicitation for the purchase of securities must be made by
using a prospectus (including a preliminary prospectus and a simplified prospectus).320
Any other form of written communications (e.g., “free writing prospectus”) is not expressly
recognized.

1.5. RESALE OF REGISTERED SECURITIES
In Korea, the registration requirements apply to not only “public offering” but also
“public sale.”321 An issuer must file a registration statement for the public sale of one
billion won (approximately $828,000 as of December 31, 2016) or more if the sale is made
outside the exchanges and alternative trading system. This is the same whether securities
to be resold were previously registered or not. The Korean regulation, however, does not
draw a distinction between affiliates and non-affiliates of the issuer in the resale regulation.
The U.S. resale regulation is quite different. The U.S. resale regulation distinguishes the
status of the seller (affiliate or non-affiliate) and the status of the securities to be sold
(restricted or unrestricted). Unlike non-affiliates of the issuer who can freely resell
unrestricted securities, affiliates of the issuer must find eligible exemptions to resell the
securities whether or not the securities to be sold are restricted.322

319

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 2 subpar. 2; FSC Disclosure Rules, Art. 1-3.

320

Capital Market Act, Art. 124(2).

321

For the definition of the terms “public offering” and “public sale” under the FSCMA, see Chapter
II.B.2.2.1.b.
322

E.g., 17. C.F.R. § 230.144.
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2. EXEMPT OFFERINGS
2.1. AVAILABILITY OF EXEMPTIONS
The U.S. securities regulation provides diverse transaction exemptions available to
issuers that cannot afford the regulatory burden required in a registered offering. In
addition to the statutory exemptions such as Section 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(5) of the Securities
Act, there are also exemptions implemented by the U.S. SEC such as Regulation A (tier 1
and tier 2 offerings), Regulation D (Rules 504, 506(b) and 506(c) offerings) and Regulation
Crowdfunding. The offering limit also varies from $1 million to $50 million (except the
Rule 506 offering having no dollar limit). On the contrary, the Korean regulation provides
only few exemptions compared to the United States. Other than private placements, only
two types of exempt offerings are available to small businesses. In addition, the maximum
offering amount of such offerings is as low as one billion won (approximately $828,000 as
of December 31, 2016) for small public offerings and 700 million won (approximately
$580,000 as of December 31, 2016) for crowdfunding offerings.

2.2. ISSUERS ELIGIBLE FOR EXEMPTIONS
In the United States, the SEC exemptions (except Rule 506) are generally not
available to reporting issuers under Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act. Exemptions
are also not available to issuers that have a criminal conviction or are subject to a court or
regulatory order or other disqualifying events. 323 In contrast, the Korean securities

323

E.g., Id. § 230.506(d).
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regulation does not have issuer eligibility for small public offerings as well as private
placement.324 There is no “bad actor” disqualification for exempt offerings, either. Thus,
reporting issuers subject to extensive disclosure requirements come by a virtually
“compliance cost free” exemption that can raise capital from the public. As a natural
consequence, the exemption crafted without caution resulted in financially-distressed
reporting companies flocking to small public offerings in search of easy money.325

2.3. INTEGRATION RULES
Under the U.S. securities regulations, certain separate offerings should be integrated
if such offerings are, in reality, part of a single financing for the purpose of determining the
availability of specific exemption. The integration rules intend to “prevent an issuer from
improperly avoiding registration by artificially dividing a single offering into multiple
[exempt] offerings.”326 If integrated, each transaction that is part of a single offering must
meet all the conditions of the exemption.327 Traditionally, determination as to whether
offerings should be integrated has relied on so-called “five-factor test.”328 The SEC also
considers how investors in the offering are solicited in specific circumstances. 329 To
provide clarity on integration issues, the SEC adopted safe harbor rules and other
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See supra Chapter II.B. Table 2.

325

See supra Chapter II.B.3.3.1.
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Regulation A+ Adopting Release, supra note 56, at 49 n164.

327

E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (providing that “[a]ll sales that are part of the same Regulation D
offering must meet all of the terms and conditions of Regulation D.”).
328

See infra Chapter III.A.

329

See infra Chapter III.A.
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guidelines.330
The integration concept under the Korean securities regulation is different from the
U.S. regulation. It seeks to prevent an issuer from evading “public offering” by splitting a
single public offering into multiple private offerings. To determine whether offers of
securities constitute a public offering, a fifty-person test is required to add the number of
persons offered in the private placements for the “same class of securities” as those
currently offered for those made within six months before offers are made.331 Unlike the
U.S. regulation that integrates “disparate exempt offerings,” the Korean regulation
integrates “multiple private placements.” This can be partly explained by the fact that
exemption methods are not diverse and the aggregate offering amount is also relatively
small, except for private placement. Besides, when determining whether separate offerings
should be integrated, the Korean regulation considers only two factors among “five-factors”
used in the U.S. regulation: 332 (1) “whether the sales involve issuance of the same class of
securities” and (2) “whether the sales have been made at or about the same time,” which is
preset to six months in Korean regulation.

2.4. FILING REQUIREMENTS
In the United States, exempt offerings are generally required to file certain
information with the SEC under the SEC rules. Additionally, an offering statement of the

330

E.g., SEC rules regarding integration safe harbors include Rules 147(g) and 147A(g) (intrastate
offering), Rule 152 (integration of a Section 4(a)(2) offering with a subsequent public offering), Rule 155
(integration of abandoned offerings), Rule 251(c) (Regulation A), 502(a) (Regulation D).
331

See supra Chapter II.B.2.2.1.

332

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) note.
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“Regulation A” offering must be reviewed and qualified by the SEC.

In general,

Information must be publicly disclosed for a sufficient period of time prior to the
commencement of offers.333 In contrast, the Korean exemption regulation does not require
the issuers to file information with the FSC except for a small public offering. For the
private placement exemption, no information is required to be filed with the FSC or
furnished to investors. For the crowdfunding exemption, information is only required to
be disclosed on the intermediary’s website.

Moreover, a minimum period when

information is publicly available to investors prior to the commencement of the offering is
relatively short or not guaranteed. With a small public offering, an issuer is only required
to file information with the FSC by three days before commencing the offers. With a
crowdfunding offering, no waiting period is required prior to commencement of the offers.

3. REGULATORY AUTHORITY
3.1. RULEMAKING AUTHORITY
The U.S. SEC is given a broad rulemaking authority to administer the federal
securities laws. Federal securities statutes provide the SEC with a general rulemaking
authority “necessary to carry out” the provisions of the statutes. 334 In 1996, Congress
further granted the SEC with the general exemptive authority so that the SEC can “more
easily adopt new approaches to registration, disclosure, and related issues.”335 At the same

333

E.g., id. § 227.303(a)(2) (requiring that the issuer information be “made publicly available on the
intermediary’s platform for a minimum of 21 days before any securities are sold” in the crowdfunding
offering).
334

E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a).

335

National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, title I, § 105(a), 110
Stat. 3416, 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3); H.R. Rep. No. 104-622, at 38 (1996).
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time, it also required the SEC to “consider, in addition to the protection of investors,
efficiency, competition, and capital formation” in its rulemaking.336
On the contrary, the FSC’s rulemaking authority is restricted by the higher statutes to
a large extent. The FSC is only authorized to make its own rules for matters specifically
delegated by the FSCMA, the Enforcement Decree of the FSCMA, or the Enforcement
Rule of the FSCMA. To overcome the limitation on addressing regulatory issues in its
rules, the FSC often chooses to amend the FSCMA by exercising the government’s power
to propose a bill under the Constitution.337 In light of the complexity and uncertainty of
the legislation process, however, its ability to respond to the rapidly changing capital
market in an efficient and timely manner might be challenged.

3.2. REVIEW OF REGISTRATION STATEMENTS
In the United States, the SEC staff of the Division of Corporation Finance reviews a
registration statement.338 Only some of the registration statements filed with the SEC are
fully reviewed and other registration statements are subject to different levels of review
under its selective review process.339 Unless the SEC staff or a registrant takes any action
to affect the effective date of a registration statement, the registration statement becomes

336

National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, title I, § 106(a), 110
Stat. 3416, 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b)).
337

Constitution Art. 52 (S. Korea).

338

For the SEC review process, see generally Coffee, supra note 16, at 174-185 (excerpt from William
W. Barker, SEC Registration of Public Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 52 Bus. Law. 65 (1996)).
339

The SEC adopted four different review procedures in 1972 to curtail time in registration under the
increasing number of the registration statement filings and burdening workload of the SEC staff. These
include: (1) deferred review, (2) cursory review, (3) summary review, (4) customary review (full review).
The Division of Corporation Finance’s Procedures Designed to Curtail Time in Registration Under the
Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release No. 5231, 1972 WL 129206 (Feb. 3, 1972).
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effective twenty days after it is filed with the SEC.340 Though the SEC may issue a refusal
or stop order to prevent or suspend the effectiveness of a misleading registration
statement,341 the Commission generally does not exercise such authority.342 Instead, the
SEC typically sends out comment letters to the issuer to address the staff concerns
regarding information contained in the registration statement and other issues. 343 The
issuer answers to issues raised by the SEC staff (typically in a response letter) and prepares
amendments to the registration statement to resolve all staff comments.344 To proceed with
a review process without being disturbed by a twenty-day limitation, the SEC asks a
registrant to stipulate in the cover page of a registration statement special language to the
effect that the registrant would continuously amend the registration statement (without
actually amending the registration statement) to delay its effectiveness. 345 Upon
completion of the review process, the SEC may accelerate the effective date of a
registration statement. 346 Meanwhile, the JOBS Act permitted confidential nonpublic
review by the SEC staff for a draft registration statement that the emerging growth
company submits to the SEC prior to the filing of a registration statement for its initial
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15 U.S.C. § 77h(a).

341

Id. § 77h(b), (d).

342

Coffee, supra note 16, at 246.
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Id. at 180-181.

344

Id. at 181-183.
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17 C.F.R. § 239.473. A registrant is required to include a following sentence in a registration
statement to delay the effectiveness of the registration statement:
The registrant hereby amends this registration statement on such date or dates as may be
necessary to delay its effective date until the registrant shall file a further amendment which
specifically states that this registration statement shall thereafter become effective in
accordance with Section 8(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 or until the registration statement
shall become effective on such date as the Commission acting pursuant to said Section 8(a),
may determine.
346

15 U.S.C. § 77h(a); 17 C.F.R. § 230.461.
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public offering.347
In Korea, the FSS staff of the Corporate Disclosure Department reviews the
registration statement by the FSC’s delegation of power. Since there is no legitimate device
to delay the effective date of a registration statement, the FSS staff is given only limited
time for review. The effective date of a registration statement differs depending on the
types of the security offered and the types of the issuer, from five days (e.g., secured bonds)
to fifteen days (e.g., IPO of stocks) after a registration statement is filed.348 However, there
are some special rules to shorten or extend the effective date of a registration statement.349
The FSS may demand that an issuer amend the registration statement by the day before the
issuer starts receiving offers to purchase securities from investors if (1) a registration
statement (1) is not prepared in conformity with the prescribed form, (2) contains any
untrue statement or omission of a material fact, or (3) contains any description or
representation of a material fact that is not clearly stated and could mislead investors.350 In
practice, however, the FSS demands such amendments before the registration statement
becomes effective. When the FSS demands the amendment of a registration statement, it
347

Jumpstart Our Business Startup Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, Title I, § 106(a), 122 Stat. 306,
312 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77f(e)). Nonpublic review by the SEC staff is also available for a draft offering
statement submitted by Regulation A issuers. 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(d).
348

Jabonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeobe gwanhan beobyul sihaenggyuchik [Enforcement Rule of the
Financial Investment Services and Capital Market Act], Ordinance of the Prime Minister No. 1248, Jan. 25,
2016 [hereinafter Enforcement Rule of the Capital Market Act], Art. 12(1).
349

In special circumstances, amendments of the registration statement become effective one to three
days after the filing (e.g., amendment of the shelf registration statement) or do not affect the effective date
(e.g., amendment for a minor modification to wording in the registration statement). Id. Art. 12(2), (3); FSC
Disclosure Rules, Art. 2-3. On the other hand, the effective date is extended by three days for registration
statements filed by issuers that have an audit opinion other than an unqualified opinion, negative stockholders’
equity or failed to file periodic reports in time. Enforcement Rule of the Capital Market Act, Art. 12(4).
350

Capital Market Act, Art. 122(1). Even after the registration statement is effective and the issuer
commenced the offering, an order to suspend or stop ongoing transactions can be issued against the issuer if
the FSS discovers any untrue statement or omission of a material fact in the registration statement. However,
an authority to issue a suspension or stop order is vested in the FSC and the FSS must seek such order from
the FSC. Id. Art. 132.

79

sends a letter to the issuer that contains information to be amended and other relevant issues,
which is substantively identical to the comment letter used by the U.S. SEC staff. Once
the FSS issues such a demand, the current registration statement is deemed not to be
accepted by the FSC.351 Such a demand is made public through the FSS’s online filing
system (DART).352 The FSS staff generally does not review a draft registration statement
before it is filed through the DART. If the amended registration statement does not fully
resolve the concerns raised by the FSS staff, the demand can be repeated several times. To
focus limited agency resources on the review of troublesome registration statements, the
FSS reformed the staff review process for the registration statement in 2012.353 Under the
new process, review procedures of a registration statement vary to the levels of risk (level
one to level five) involved in the offering.
3.3. ENFORCEMENT POWERS
In the United States, the SEC has broad enforcement powers to carry out its mission
under the federal securities laws.354 The SEC enforcement authority was expanded even
to accountants and lawyers who appear and practice before the SEC.355 The SEC can
enforce any violation under the federal securities laws in judicial proceedings as well as
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See supra note 62.
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However, unlike the SEC which releases the comment letters and response letters on the EDGAR,
the FSS does not publicize the content of the letter and it can be only inferred by comparing an amended
registration statement and a previously filed registration statement.
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FSS, Press Release, Geumyunggamdogwon, sin gieopgongsisimsasiseutem bongyeok gadong [The
FSS Initiates New Disclosure Review Process] (Feb. 15, 2012).
354

See supra Chapter II.A.3.2.2.
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title VI, § 602, 116 Stat. 745, 794 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78d-3); 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.102(e), 205.1-7.
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administrative proceedings. 356 The SEC enforcement actions also can parallel criminal
proceedings initiated by the U.S. Department of Justice.357 In practice, most SEC actions
are settled with defendants that neither admit nor deny the charges instead of paying a large
sum of illegal profits and civil penalties.358
In Korea, the FSC and FSS are empowered with an investigative and disciplinary
authority to enforce the FSCMA. To investigate the possible violations of the FSCMA, the
FSC and FSS can issue a subpoena for witness testimony and production of documents.359
For investigation of securities fraud related violations including insider trading, market
manipulation, general antifraud violation (hereinafter, “unfair trading”), the FSC’s
investigation officials, appointed by the Prosecutor General, can interrogate a suspect and
search and seize evidence by executing a warrant issued by a judge on a prosecutor’s
request.360 However, such a broad investigative power is not supported by a sufficient
disciplinary power. After the FSC or FSS investigation reveals a defendant’s involvement
in unfair trading, a next step is to formally or informally transmit any evidence it found to
the prosecution. The FSC has no enforcement authority for unfair trading cases.361 In

356

Any person who “willfully” violates the federal securities laws is also subject to criminal liability.
E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77x.
357

However, the SEC investigation may be limited after a criminal indictment is returned. See Sec.
Exch. Comm’n v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that parallel
investigations are allowed “in the absence of “special circumstances” in which the nature of the proceedings
demonstrably prejudices substantial rights of the investigated party or of the government”).
358

In fiscal year 2015, the SEC obtained orders to disgorge illegal profits of approximately $3.0 billion
and to pay penalties of approximately $1.2 billion. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Select SEC and Market Data,
Fiscal Year 2015 (Feb. 5, 2016).
359

Capital Market Act, Art. 426.

360

Id. Art. 427.

361

Opponents of administrative actions against unfair trading insist on the following grounds: (1) Unfair
trading is a serious criminal “fraud” crime by its nature and must be effectively punished by a criminal penalty;
(2) Administrative actions delay the criminal investigation to obtain criminal evidence in the early stage of
the crime; (3) Evidence collected in the FSS investigation (e.g., interrogation with a suspect) is inadmissible
in a criminal proceeding; (4) Imposing a penalty surcharge for unfair trading cases significantly undermines
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connection with other securities law violations, such as a material misrepresentation in a
registration statement, a penalty surcharge is widely used, but actual penalty amounts
ordered by the FSC are significantly lower than the U.S. SEC’s civil monetary penalties.362

a subsequent criminal investigation or criminal proceeding since evidence and records that were gathered or
prepared by the FSS or FSC are exposed to a defendant in the administrative proceeding to appeal the penalty
surcharge imposed by the FSC. See Seung mo Koo, The problems and the direction of reforms of the
investigative system for the unfair trading practices in Korea, BEOBJO [LEGAL PROFESSION] 54, VOL. 670
(July, 2012); see also Daeil Kim, Enhancing the Compensatory Roles of Financial Regulatory Agencies in
South Korea: Lessons from the U.S. SEC's FAIR Fund 1, 81-86 (May, 2015) (unpublished LL.M. thesis,
Indiana University), available at http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/etd/17.
362

The maximum penalty surcharge for a violation cannot exceed 2 billion won (approximately
$1,657,000 as of December 31, 2016) pursuant to Article 429(1) of the FSCMA. In calculating the amount
of penalty surcharge, the number of violations was not considered if multiple violations are caused by a single
act. Thus, the FSC ordered 2 billion won as a penalty surcharge even where financial statements that
overstated hundreds of billion won had been used in the periodic reports and registration statements for years.
In July 2016, the FSC amended rules to consider the number of violations in calculating a penalty surcharge
for accounting fraud cases. However, violations appearing in periodic reports of the same year are counted
one. Jabonsijangjosa eopmugyujeong [Regulation on Investigation of Capital Markets], FSC Public
Notification No. 2016-26, July 13, 2016, Appendix 2. 2.6.
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TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF THE U.S. AND KOREAN SECURITIES OFFERING REGULATION

United States

Korea

1. REGISTERED OFFERING
Terms
Security
Offer
Underwriter
Prospectus

Public offering
SEC (or FSC)
Registration
Gun-jumping
Preregistration
communication
Test the waters
Free writing prospectus

broadly defined
includes investment contract
includes “every attempt” or offer to
dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to
buy a security for value
any person who has purchased securities
from an issuer with a view to distribution
includes any written communication
not defined in the statute
(offering to those who cannot “fend for
themselves”; multi-factor test)
any offer or sale
(unless otherwise exempted)

narrowly defined
includes investment contract
activities of notifying a proposed offering
or providing information on procedures for
acquisition by using communication means
securities firms
statutory prospectus
defined in the statute
(50-person test)
public offering +
at least one billion won (approx. $828,000)

modernized in 2005 offering reform
30 day bright-line test for “in-registration”
regularly release information
WKSI communication
allowed for EGCs and WKSIs
recognized

no significant change has been made

registration is not required
treated differently (resale by affiliates
must satisfy conditions under Rule 144)

registration is required for “public sale”

offering announcement
not allowed
not recognized

Resale
Resale of registered securities
Resale by affiliates & nonaffiliates of the issuer

no distinction

2. EXEMPT OFFERING
Types of exemptions
Issuer eligibility
Reporting issuer
Bad actor disqualification

Integration
Disclosure
Filing with the SEC (FSC)
Time between filing and
commencement of offering

diverse

limited

not eligible except Rule 506
Yes

eligible except crowdfunding
No

“disparate exemptions”

only “multiple private placements”

required

not required except small public offering

relatively long

relatively short

3. REGULATORY AUTHORITY
Rulemaking authority
Review of registration
statement (RS)
Effective date of RS
Delaying amendment

Broad

Limited

20 days after filing
allowed

5 ~ 15 days after filing
not allowed

for any violation
high

not for unfair trading case
low

Enforcement
Disciplinary power
Level of monetary penalty
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CHAPTER III. PRIVATE PLACEMENT REGULATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
AND SOUTH K OREA

A. UNITED STATES
1. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Congress enacted the Securities Act in 1933 to protect investors and prevent
securities fraud by promoting full disclosure of necessary information with respect to new
offerings of securities. On the other hand, Congress also intended to limit the scope of the
Act by excluding “certain types of securities and securities transactions where there is no
practical need for its application or where the public benefits are too remote.”1 For this
purpose, Section 4(1) [currently Section 4(a)(2)] of the Securities Act exempted
“transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering” from registration under
Section 5.2 However, the undefined term “public offering” and its scant legislative history3
made it difficult to cast light on the meaning of Section 4(a)(2). Both the SEC and the
courts struggled to cast light on the meaning of Section 4(a)(2) and set clear-cut boundaries
between public offering and private placement. These efforts finally led to the adoption of
Regulation D which was intended to provide objective standards for the Section 4(a)(2)
and other exemptions.

1

Thus, this section first explores judicial and administrative

H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. 5 (1933).

2

The current language of Section 4(a)(2) is not identical with the one first appeared in 1933. When the
Securities Act was enacted in 1933, the second clause of Section 4(1) exempted from the provisions of
Section 5 “transactions by an issuer not with or through an underwriter and not involving any public offering
[emphasis added].” However, the phrase “not with or through an underwriter” was viewed as “superfluous”
and eliminated from the clause in 1934. In 1964, the second clause was separated from Section 4(1) and
codified as Section 4(2). In 2012, Section 4(2) was re-designated as Section 4(a)(2). see 7B J. WILLIAM
HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 § 11:2 (2016).
3

For the brief legislative history of Section 4(a)(2), see id.`
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interpretations on Section 4(a)(2) and proceeds to review specific contents of Rule 506
under Regulation D.3A

2. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS ON SECTION 4(A)(2) OF
THE SECURITIES ACT PRIOR TO REGULATION D

2.1. LETTER OF THE SEC GENERAL COUNSEL
The first important guidance relating to the interpretation of Section 4(a)(2) came
from the letter of the Commission’s General Counsel John J. Burns, which was published
in 1935. 4 In this letter, the General Counsel objected to the then-existing practice of
determining a private placement solely based on the number of offerees and recognizing
an offering to “twenty-five or fewer” as a safety line to claim a private offering. 5 Instead,
he suggested several factors that must be considered in determining the availability of the
exemption under Section 4(a)(2). Those factors include, (1) the “number of offerees and
their relationship to each other and to the issuer,” (2) the “number of units offered,” (3) the
“size of the offering,” and (4) the “manner of offering.”6 However, the number of offerees

3A

Though discussions in this chapter are focused on Rule 506 of Regulation D, it should be noted that
offerings in reliance on Rule 504 are also “private” for the most part. See Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation
D, The “Seed Capital” Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 7644, 1999 WL 95490, *5 (Feb. 25, 1999)
(stating that “[w]e believe that the vast majority of current Rule 504 offerings are private”). See also supra
Chapter II.A.4.c.(2)-(3).
4

Letter of General Counsel Discussing Factors to be Considered in Determining the Availability of the
Exemption From Registration Provided by the Second Clause of Section 4(1), Securities Act Release No.
285, 1935 WL 27785 (Jan. 24, 1935) [hereinafter 1935 Interpretive Release].
Id. at *1 (stating that “the opinion has been expressed that under ordinary circumstances an offering
to not more than approximately twenty-five persons is not an offering to a substantial number and presumably
does not involve a public offering”).
5

6

Id at *1-2.
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was considered as the most critical factor in determining the availability of the exemption
even after the letter of the General Counsel. 7

2.2. SEC V. SUNBEAM GOLD MINE CO.
Though not many cases examined the private placement exemption prior to the
Ralston Purina decision in 1953,8 the Nine Circuit’s decision in SEC v. Sunbeam Gold
Mine Co. is especially worth noting.9 The case involved the offering of promissory notes
issued by the defendant Sunbeam Gold Mines Co. (Sunbeam). Offers were made to 530
stockholders of Sunbeam and Golden West Consolidated Mines to be acquired by the
former. On the appeal by the SEC from the district court’s order denying a temporary
injunction, the Court of Appeals first noted that “[t]o determine the distinction between
‘public’ and ‘private’ in any particular context, it is essential to examine the circumstances
under which the distinction is sought to be established and to consider the purposes sought
to be achieved by such distinction.” 10 After having examined the legislative history of the
Securities Act to elicit the “exceptive purpose” to justify the exemption, the Court held that
“Congress did not intend the term ‘public offering’ to mean an offering to any and all
members of the public who cared to avail themselves of the offer.”11 It further concluded

7B Hicks, supra note 2, § 11:11 (stating that “[d]espite the General Counsel’s effort . . . the numerical
standard continued to be used by SEC staff attorneys and issuers.”).
7

8

For cases decided prior to the Ralston Purina decision, see Fed. Regulation of Sec. Comm., Section
of Corp., Banking & Bus. Law of the Am. Bar Ass’n, Section 4(2) and Statutory Law, 31 BUS. LAW. 483,
512-13 (1975) [hereinafter Section 4(2) Position Paper]; 7B Hicks, supra note 2, § 11:12 n1.
9

SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938).

10

Id. at 701.

11

Id. at 702. The Court also stated:
[A]n offering of securities to all red-headed men, to all residents of Chicago or San
Francisco . . . is no less ‘public’ . . . than an unrestricted offering to the world at large. Such
an offering, though not open to everyone who may choose to apply, is none the less ‘public’
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that “an offering to stockholders, other than a very small number, was a public offering.” 12
However, the Nine Circuit “construed the exemption in terms of a numerical test” and,
though it did not view the number of offerees as a sole factor, did not proceed to find other
relevant criteria in characterizing the private placement.13

2.3. SEC V. RALSTON PURINA CO.
In June 1953, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a seminal decision on the scope
of the private offering exemption in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.14 This is the only case
involving the question of an issuer’s purported private placement to be reviewed by the
Supreme Court, and the Court’s interpretation has played a central role in resolving issues
on the Section 4(a)(2) exemption for over sixty years.

2.3.1. BACKGROUND
Ralston Purina was a manufacturer and distributor of feed and cereal products which
was staffed by about 7,000 employees. 15 The company had a long-standing “policy of
encouraging stock ownership among its employees”16 and sold its treasury stocks to more

in character, for the means used to select the particular individuals to whom the offering is to
be made bear no sensible relation to the purposes for which the selection is made. [Emphasis
added].
Id. at 701.
12

Id. at 702.

13

7B Hicks, supra note 2, § 11:11.

14

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).

15

Id. at 120.

16

Ralston Purina began to sell its stocks to employees in 1911. In addition, approximately 80 percent
of common stock of the company was “owned or controlled by employees, members of employees’ families,
or former employees, about 1,000 to 1,500 employees being stockholders.” Concerning the reason why the
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than a thousand of “key employees” between 1947 and 1951 without registration.17 The
SEC brought an action against Ralston Purina to enjoin the unregistered offering of stock
to its employees in 1951. The district court held that the defendant’s offering was private
and exempt from the Securities 18 and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 19

2.3.2. THE LOWER COURT OPINIONS
Both district court and Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit primarily based their
opinions on the decision of the Ninth Circuit in the Sunbeam Gold Mines Co.20 However,
lower courts distinguished the purposes of the offerings in both cases. They found, unlike

company had a policy of encouraging employee stock ownership, Mr. Lewis B. Stuart, the company’s
executive vice president testified as follows:
We feel . . . that that creates a greater efficiency with the company . . . Many of our people
come from the rural area, where proprietorship is a matter of great pride to them. The fact that
they feel that they are owners . . . contributes to the morale, and we feel that the idea of breaking
down the gap between the ownership and management is something that is highly desirable
and . . . contributed substantially to the success of the company.
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co, 200 F.2d 85, 87-88 (8th Cir. 1952).
According to the company, the definition of a key employee was “not confined to an organization
chart.” Rather, it included “an individual who is eligible for promotion, an individual who especially
influences others or who advises others, a person whom the employees look to in some special way, an
individual . . . who carries some special responsibility, who is sympathetic to management and who is
ambitious and who the management feels is likely to be promoted to a greater responsibility.” Those who
classified as key employees include “employees with the duties of artist, bakeshop foreman, chow loading
foreman, clerical assistant, copywriter, electrician, stock clerk, mill office clerk, order credit trainee,
production trainee, stenographer, and veterinarian.” SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 121-122
(1953).
17

18

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co, 102 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Mo. 1952).

19

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co, 200 F.2d 85 (8th Cir. 1952).

20

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co, 102 F. Supp. 964, 968 (E.D. Mo. 1952). The district court stated:
In the Gold Mines case the Court adopted certain norms of construction of the exemption in
the Act which were there urged by the plaintiff: . . . We think this line of reasoning more in
harmony with the statute than the arbitrary one of numbers . . . An examination of the
‘circumstances under which the distinction is sought to be established’ by the defendant and
‘the purposes sought to be achieved by such distinction’ should be examined. We also
consider- is there a ‘sensible relation to the purposes for which the selection’ is made by the
employer? [Emphasis added].
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Sunbeam Gold Mine Co. where the “sole purpose of the offering was to raise finances to
effect a consolidation,”21 “the sole purpose of the ‘selection’” [in Ralston Purina] is to keep
part stock ownership of the business within the operating personnel of the business and to
spread ownership throughout all departments and activities of the business.”22 The district
court found that the “purpose of the selection” in the offering bears a ‘sensible relation’ to
the class chosen.”23 Thus, the district court concluded that the offering in Ralston Purina
was “private and not public under the terms of the Act.”24 The Court of Appeals also
concluded that the Ralston Purina’s offering to key employees was an “intra-organizational
offering” to be exempted,25 and also did not “frustrate or impair the purpose of the Act.” 26

2.3.3. U.S. SUPREME COURT OPINION
The U.S. Supreme Court held that transactions in the case were not exempted under
the second clause of former Section 4(1) of the Securities Act, reversing the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit.27 In the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Clark, the
Supreme Court first looked to the statutory purpose that exempted certain securities

21

Id. at 968.

22

Id. at 968-69; SEC v. Ralston Purina Co, 200 F.2d 85, 91 (8th Cir. 1952) (stating that the offering in
Ralston Purina was made “without solicitation of common stock to a selected group of key employees of the
issuer, most of whom are already stockholders when the offering is made, with the sole purpose of enabling
them to secure a proprietary interest in the company or to increase the interest already held by them.”).
23

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co, 102 F. Supp. 964, 969 (E.D. Mo. 1952).

24

Id. at 970.

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co, 200 F.2d 85, 93 (8th Cir. 1952) (“we do not think that the intraorganizational offerings of stock by Company, unaccompanied by any solicitation, which have resulted in a
limited distribution of stock, for investment purpose, to a select group of employees considered by the
management to be worthy of retention and probably future promotion, is to be excluded from the exemption”).
25

26

Id. at 93.

27

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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transactions under Section 4(1). Since the Act intended to exempt transactions that “there
is no practical need for . . . [the bill’s] application,” the Court stated that “the applicability
of § 4(1) should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected need the protection
of the Act.”28 In this regard, it concluded that “[a]n offering to those who are shown to be
able to fend for themselves is a transaction ‘not involving any public offering’.”29
The Supreme Court, however, did not accept SEC’s contention “that ‘an offering to a
substantial number of the public’ is not exempt under § 4(1),” stating that “the statute would
seem to apply to a ‘public offering’ whether to few or many.”30 Rather, the Court held that
“the exemption question turns on the knowledge of the offerees.” Thus, it construed that
“corporate employees, as a class” are protected by the exemption of the Act. 31 The Court
acknowledged special circumstances could exist that renders registration protection for
employees unnecessary, such as an offering “made to executive personnel” whose position
enables access to the same kind of information as a registration statement would disclose. 32
Except for such special circumstances, the Court emphasized that “employees are just as
much members of the investing ‘public’ as any of their neighbors in the community.”33
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court in that the burden of proof rests on the

28

Id. at 124-125.

29

Id. at 125.

Id. at 125 (also stating that “there is no warrant for superimposing a quantity limit on private offerings
as a matter of statutory interpretation.”).
30

31

Id. at 125.

32
Id. at 125-126. In addition to the “access” test described in the text, the Supreme Court also suggested
that “the exemption question turns on the knowledge of the offerees.” However, “two potentially conflicting
tests” proved by the Court “left lower courts and practicing lawyers in a protracted and frequently heated
debate over the exact scope of the exemption.” 7B Hicks, supra note 2, § 11:25.
33

Id. at 126.
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issuer that claims the exemption. 34 The Court, however, disagreed on the lower court
opinion that the issuer satisfied the burden “primarily because of the respondent’s purpose
in singling out its key employees for stock offerings.” Instead, it concluded that Ralston
Purina failed to prove to show that employees had “access to the kind of information which
registration would disclose.”35

2.4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AFTER RALSTON PURINA
2.4.1. ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
Nine years after the Ralston Purina decision, the SEC issued another statement on
private placement exemption in 1962. 36 The statement reflected the SEC’s concern over
“an increasing tendency to rely on the exemption for offerings of speculative issues to
unrelated and uninformed person.”37 First, being aware of the Supreme Court’s rejection
of the numerical test, the SEC noted the relevant question regarding the number of offerees
is “whether they have the requisite association with and knowledge of the issuer which

Id. at 126 (“Keeping in mind the broadly remedial purposes of federal securities legislation,
imposition of the burden of proof on an issuer who would plead the exemption seems to us fair and
reasonable.”).
34

Id. at 127. The Supreme Court’s decision in Ralston Purina Co. made it difficult for companies to
rely on the Section 4(a)(2) exemption in connection with employee stock offerings. Prior to the adoption of
Rule 701 in 1988, companies had to make use of Regulation A or Rule 504 of Regulation D for their employee
benefit plans or other arrangements. To provide an exemption from registration for certain offers and sales
of securities made by non-reporting companies in connection with compensatory benefit plans and contracts,
the SEC adopted Rule 701 in 1988. Since Rule 701 was promulgated under Section 3(b) of the Securities
Act, the aggregate offering price could not exceed $5 million. In 1999, the SEC amended Rule 701 to remove
the $5 million ceiling and make some other significant changes by exercising its general exemptive authority
under Section 28 of the Act. See generally, 7A Hicks, supra note 2, § 8:17.
35

36

Non-public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 1662 WL 69540 (Nov. 6, 1962)
[hereinafter 1962 Interpretive Release].
37

Id. at *1.
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make the exemption available.” 38 The SEC also emphasized that the focus of the
exemption question is “offerees” not “purchasers.”

Thus, the SEC asserted that

communications with “an unrestricted and unrelated group of prospective purchasers” is
not compatible with a claim of the private offering exemption “even though ultimately
there may only be a few knowledgeable purchasers.”39 In addition, the SEC statement also
addresses the determination of the exemption in specific circumstances (e.g., employee
offerings, promotional offerings, offerings in which investment bankers are engaged) and
other issues related to resale of securities and integration of offerings. 40

2.4.2. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
Since the Supreme Court’s “ultimate test” unfortunately failed to provide practical
guidelines to determine the availability of the exemption,41 “four factors” suggested by the
Commission’s General Counsel in 1935 were frequently cited by lower courts.42 Among
the four factors, the most significance was given to the first factor--“the number of offerees
and their relationship to each other and to the issuer.”43 Most courts deemed the number

38

Id. at *1.

39

Id. at *1.

40

Id. at *1-3.

SEC v. Cont’l Tobacco Co. of S.C., 463 F.2d. 137, 158 (5th Cir. 1972) (“The ultimate test, of course,
is whether the particular class of persons affected need the protection of the Act.”).
41

E.g., Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int’l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d. 680, 687-689 (5th Cir. 1971) (“we find
S.E.C. criteria both legally accurate and meaningfully sufficient for testing the issue”); Doran v. Petroleum
Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d. 893, 899-900 (5th Cir. 1977); Henderson v. Hyden, Stone Inc., 461 F.2d. 1069, 71
(5th Cir. 1972); SEC v. Cont’l Tobacco Co. of S.C., 463 F.2d. 137, 158 (5th Cir. 1972).
42

E.g., Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d. 893, 900 (5th Cir. 1977) (“We must examine more
closely the importance of demonstrating both the number of offerees and their relationship to the issuer in
order to see why the defendants have not yet gained s 4(2) exemption.”); see also 7B Hicks, supra note 2, §
11:54 (“Since Ralston Purina, lower courts have struggled to understand the precise meaning of the terms
“fend for themselves” and “access,” usually in the process of exploring the relationship of the offerees to the
issuer.”).
43
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of offerees, though not decisive in itself, relevant in considering other indications of the
private offering.44 A “relationship between the offerees and their knowledge of each other”
was also considered by courts. In Hill York Corp. v. American Int’l Franchises, Inc., the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that the offering “made to a diverse and
unrelated group” is indicative of a public offering. 45 To varying degree, courts also
considered the offeree’s sophistication to determine the availability of the exemption.46
For example, some courts viewed sophistication as a factor of an independent
significance,47 while other courts identified the role of sophistication in connection with
the disclosure requirement.48 Concerning “the nature of sophistication,” the courts’ focus
of inquiry is whether “the offeree is able to understand and evaluate the nature of the risk
based upon the information presented to him.”49 The courts do “not require sophistication

44
E.g., Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int’l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d. 680, 688 (5th Cir. 1971) (“Obviously . . .
the more offerees, the more likelihood that the offering is public”); Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545
F.2d. 893, 900 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Establishing the number of persons involved in an offering is important both
in order to ascertain the magnitude of the offering and in order to determine the characteristics and knowledge
of the persons thus identified.”). For judicial attitude regarding the number of offerees, see generally 7B
Hicks, supra note 2, § 11:43.

E.g., Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int’l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d. 680, 688 (5th Cir. 1971) (“an offering
to a select group of high executive officers of the issuer who know each other and of course have similar
interests and knowledge of the offering would more likely be characterized as a private offering.”); Mark v.
FSC Securities Corp., 870 F.2d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 1989) (“That the purchasers are so diverse suggests the
offerees were likewise diverse and unrelated, militating against a ‘private offering.’”).
45

Contrary to the general perception, the survey of courts of appeals revealed that “only three of 12
circuits have come to close to expressly stating that an issuer’s claim to a Section 4(a)(2) exemption must be
supported by a factual record that establishes the sophistication of all offerees.” See 7B Hicks, supra note 2,
§§ 11:55-61.
46

47

E.g., SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 644 (9th Cir. 1980).

48
E.g., United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675, 678 (4th Cir. 1967) (“‘sophistication’
is not a substitute for ‘access to the kind of information which registration would disclose.’”); Hill York Corp.
v. Am. Int’l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d. 680, 690 (5th Cir. 1971) (“Obviously if the plaintiffs did not possess
the information requisite for a registration statement, they could not bring their sophisticated knowledge of
business affairs to bear in deciding whether or not to invest in this franchise sales center”).
49

7B Hicks, supra note 2, § 11:63.
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to be grounded on issuer-specific expertise.”50 In the meantime, Tenth Circuit in Lively v.
Hirschfeld clarified that the party claiming the exemption bears the burden of proof with
respect to each offeree as well as each purchaser.51 Lastly, with respect to the availability
of information to the offerees, the Fifth Circuit in Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp.
imposed the disjunctive requirement that all offerees “either actually have such
information as a registration would have disclosed, or have access to such information.”52
In particular, the Court in Doran required that defendants must show “the offerees occupy
a privileged or ‘insider’ status relative to the issuer” when they relies on the “access”
requirement.53

3. RULE 146
Though the SEC interpretation and judicial precedents emphasized various factors to
affect determination as to the availability of the exemption, they failed to find “proper mix
of the universe of factors,” only resulting in uncertainty about the application of the
exemption. 54 In 1974, the SEC adopted Rule 146, a non-exclusive safe harbor for an

50

Id.

51

Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971).

52
Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d. 893, 905 (5th Cir. 1977) (italicization added); see also
Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1959).
53

Id. at 906-907. The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Wolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591,
610 (5th Cir. 1975), that criticism that Continental Tobacco “virtually requires that all offerees have ‘insider’
status, if a transaction is to qualify as exemption under § 4(2)” is unfounded.
54

Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38 EMORY L. J. 67, 75-76 (1989)
(stating that “as each court has played its part in defining the parameters of Section 4(2), the list of factors
has been shortened (or lengthened), and particular factors have been emphasized (or de-emphasized),
resulting in a “tale of growing confusion.”). The former SEC Chairman Garret also criticized:
[A] kind of mishmash. The issuer is now told that all of these factors have something to do
with whether he has an exemption under Section 4(2), but he is never given a hint as to the
proper proportions in the brew. The saving recipe is kept secret, a moving target which he can
never be sure he has hit.
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exemption under Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act, to provide objective standards for
the Section 4(a)(2) exemption.55
Rule 146 set forth the general conditions to be eligible for the private placement
exemption. 56 First, paragraph (c) of Rule 146 regulated the manner of offering. It
prohibited the issuer or its agent from engaging in “any form of general solicitation and
general advertising.”57
Second, paragraph (d) of Rule 146 specified qualifications for offerees and purchasers.
It required an issuer and its agent to “have reasonable ground to believe” and believe that
the offeree is sophisticated or “is able to bear the economic risk of the investment” (e.g.,
the wealthy).58 The SEC required the economic risk test for not only purchasers, but also
offerees “to control the types of persons to whom offers are made.” 59 If the offeree was
qualified based on his ability to bear the economic risk, he and his offeree representative(s)
together must be shown to have sophistication prior to issuer’s sale. 60
Third, paragraph (e) of Rule 146, among other requirements, required each offeree to
have access to, or each offeree or his offeree representative(s), or both to be furnished, “the

Section 4(2) Position Paper, supra note 8, at 489 (citing Fourth Annual on Securities Regulation 10-11
(Mundheim, Fleischer, & Schupper, eds. 1973)).
55

Notice of Adoption of Rule 146 Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release No. 5487,
1974 WL 161966 (April 23, 1974); 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 preliminary note 1 (1974) (“Attempted compliance
with this rule does not act as an election; the issuer can also claim the availability of Section 4(2) outside the
rule.”).
56

17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (repealed).

57

Id. § 230.146(c).

58

Id. § 230.146(d)(1).

59

Notice of Revision of Proposed Rule 146 Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release
No. 5430, 1973 WL 150950, at *8 (Oct. 10, 1973).
60

17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d)(2)(ii) (repealed).
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same kind of information that is specified in Schedule A of the Act.” 61 The SEC noted that
“[a]ccess can only exist by reason of the offeree’s position with respect to the issuer” such
as “an employment or family relationship or economic bargaining power.”62 In 1978, the
SEC relaxed disclosure requirements and allowed an issuer seeking capital of up to $1.5
million in reliance on Rule 146 to disclose the simplified information prescribed by
“schedule I of regulation A.”63
Fourth, paragraph (g) of Rule 146 limited the number of purchasers to thirty-five or
less.64 It excluded from calculating the number of purchasers certain persons including,
most importantly, purchasers of minimum $150,000 worth of securities.65 However, the
issuer was required to satisfy all other conditions of Rule 146 with respect to each
purchasers regardless of whether they were counted or not.66
Fifth, paragraph (h) of Rule 146 required the issuer and its agent to “exercise
reasonable care to assure that the purchasers . . . are not underwriters within the meaning
of Section 2(11) of the Act.” 67 It also provided non-exclusive methods that could show
such reasonable care to prevent “distribution” of unregistered securities. 68

61

Id. § 230.146(e)(1).

62

Id. § 230.146(e) note.

63

Private Placement Exemptive Rule, Securities Act Release No. 5975, 1978 WL 196020 (Sept. 8,

1978).
64

17 C.F.R. § 230.146(g)(1) (repealed).

65

Id. § 230.146(g)(2)(i).

66

Id. § 230.146(g)(2)(i) note.

67

Id. § 230.146(h).

68

Id. § 230.146(h)(1)-(4).
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Last condition set forth in paragraph (i) of Rule 146 was added in 1978. 69 It required
the issuer to file a Form 146 with the SEC at the time of the first sale.70 In adopting the
rules, the SEC explained that the notice requirement would be necessary to collect
“empirical data as to the use of Rule 146” for future analysis on impact of Rule 146, and
also monitor misuses of Rule 146 and prevent fraud.71
The SEC also reminded the issuers of the risk that offerings which appear to be
discrete could be integrated for the purpose of determining availability of the exemption.
Rule 146 emphasized five factors, which had been suggested in 1962, to be considered in
determining whether multiple offerings should be integrated, 72 and further provided an
integration safe harbor for offers made outside six month periods.73
Though Rule 146 was designed to remove impediments to the capital raising of new
businesses by improving clarity in the private placement exemption, it was criticized for
having placed “disproportionate restraints on small issuers.”74 Unlike reporting companies
that were already exposed to extensive disclosure obligations, non-reporting issuers
virtually had to prepare a registration statement, resulting in higher compliance costs.75
Commentators also criticized that the uncertainty of exemption conditions still persisted

69

Private Placement Exemptive Rule, Securities Act Release No. 5912, 1978 WL 197107 (March 3,
1978) [hereinafter Revision of Rule 146].
70

17 C.F.R. § 230.146(i) (repealed).

71

Revision of Rule 146, supra note 69, at *2.

72

17 C.F.R. § 230.146 preliminary note 3 (repealed).

73

Id. § 230.146(b)(1).

74
Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and
Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 1982 WL 35662, at *2 (March 8, 1982).
75

Robert A. Kessler, Private Placement Rules 146 and 240-Safe Harbor?, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 37,
54 (1975) (stating that “[t]he economic burden of rule 146 disclosure thus falls most heavily on the small
issuers.”).
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under Rule 146.76 In the SEC’s small business hearings held in April and May of 1978,
for example, commentators particularly pointed out an uncertainty of the sophistication test
requiring the issuer’s subjective determination. 77 They also indicated an ambiguity of the
disclosure obligations requiring the issuers to furnish their offerees with substantially the
same information “as would be required to be included” in a registration statement. 78

4. RULE 506 UNDER REGULATION D
4.1. OVERVIEW
The SEC’s first experiment, Rule 146 was replaced by Rule 506, which is one of
exemptions adopted under Regulation D in 1982.79 Regulation D made some important
changes in terms of the private placement exemption in comparison with Rule 146. First,
Regulation D newly adopted the term “accredited investor” to identify persons who can
“fend for themselves” in light of their financial sophistication and ability to bear the
economic risks of the investment. The “access” test that previously existed in Rule 146
with respect to information requirements was in fact incorporated into the term “accredited
investor” who encompasses directors and executive officers of the issuer and purchasers of
at least $150,000 of the securities. Second, Rule 506 eliminated the requirement to furnish
information to the accredited investors. It also modified contents of information furnished
by the issuers. Third, Rule 506 discarded qualification requirements with respect to the
76
See generally id. at 63-68; Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers under the
Securities Act of 1933: Practical Foreclosure from the Capital Market, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1139, 1143-47 (1977).
77

Exemption of Limited Offers and Sales by Corporate Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6121, 1979
WL 170237, at * 2 (Sept. 11, 1979).
78

Id.

79

For the overview of Regulation D, see supra Chapter II.A.4.3.2.c(1)
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offerees which had been required by Rule 146. The SEC believed that the general
solicitation ban and resale limitation would be sufficient to assure private nature of the
Rule 506(b) offering.80 As mandated by the JOBS Act, the SEC adopted a new Rule 506(c)
safe harbor under Regulation D in 2013 which lifted the ban on the general solicitation if
certain conditions are met.81 Therefore, there are two different safe harbors with respect to
Section 4(a)(2) exemption--Rule 506(b) and 506(c) of Regulation D. This section broadly
reviews conditions and other requirements with respect to Rule 506 safe harbors.

4.2. AVAILABILITY OF EXEMPTION
4.2.1. GENERAL APPLICABILITY OF REGULATION D
SEC Rule 500, under the Securities Act, delineates the applicability of Regulation D.
Exemptions under Regulation D are available only to the “issuer” of the securities, not to
any other person.82 Regulation D may be used for securities issued in connection with a
business combination (e.g., merger or consolidation) described in Rule 145(a),

83

or

employee stock option plan. 84 However, technical compliance with Regulation D does not

80

Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of
1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6339, 1981 WL 31063,
at *21 (Aug. 7, 1981).
81

Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and
Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415 (July 10, 2013); JOBS Act, Title II, § 201(a)(1), 122
Stat. 306, 313-14 (2012).
82

17 C.F.R. § 230.500(d).

Id. § 230.500(e). Before 1972, the SEC did not view a merger between two companies as “sales” of
securities for the purpose of Section 5 of the Securities Act. Id. § 230.133 (1971) (repealed). Thus, registration
was not required for securities issued in business combinations and other transactions that are submitted to
the shareholder vote or consent. The SEC abandoned “no-sale” theory in 1972 by adopting Rule 145 and
repealing former Rule 133. Id. § 230.145.
83

84
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Div. of Corp. Fin., Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations: Securities
Act Rules [hereinafter C&DIs], Question 254.04.
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give an issuer exemption if the purpose of such transaction is to evade registration. 85
Exemptions under Regulation D are non-exclusive and the issuer can rely on any other
applicable exemption if it later realizes Regulation D may not have been available. 86
4.2.2. BAD ACTOR DISQUALIFICATION
In July 2013, the SEC adopted the “bad actor” disqualification provisions in Rule 506
which was mandated by Section 926 of the Dodd-Frank Act.87 Paragraph (d) of Rule 506
disqualifies an issuer from relying on Rule 506 exemption if the issuer or any other person
covered by paragraph (d)(1) of Rule 506, such as “underwriters, placement agents and the
directors, officers and significant shareholders of the issuer,” is subject to certain
“disqualifying events.” 88 Disqualifying events include past criminal convictions, orders
of courts, Commission or other regulators, and other disciplinary actions that may cast a
doubt on the issuer’s ability to comply with securities laws in a contemplated offering. 89
However, Rule 506(d) provides certain situations where a disqualification of covered

85

17 C.F.R. § 230.500(f).

86

Id. § 230.500(c); C&DIs, supra note 84, Question 254.01.

87

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, Title IX, § 926,
124 Stat. 1376, 1851 (2010); Disqualification of Felons and Other Bad Actors From Rule 506 Offerings,
Securities Act Release No. 9414 (July 10, 2013) [hereinafter Bad Actor Disqualification Adopting Release].
88
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d)(1). Persons covered by paragraph (d)(1) of Rule 506 include: (i) the issuer
and any predecessor of the issuer or affiliated issuer; (ii) any director, officer, general partner or managing
member of the issuer; (iii) any beneficial owner of 10% or more of any class of the issuer’s equity securities;
(iv) any promoter connected with the issuer in any capacity at the time of the sale; (v) any person that has
been or will be paid (directly or indirectly) remuneration for solicitation of purchasers in connection with
sales of securities in the offering; and (vi) any director, officer, general partner, or managing member of any
such compensated solicitor. Bad Actor Disqualification Adopting Release, supra note 87, at 7, 13-14.
89

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d)(1)(i)-(viii). Disqualifying events include: (i) criminal convictions; (ii) court
injunctions and restraining orders; (iii) final orders of certain regulators; (iv) Commission disciplinary orders;
(v) certain Commission cease-and-desist orders; (vi) suspension or expulsion from SRO membership or
association with an SRO member; (vii) stop orders and orders suspending the Regulation A exemption; and
(viii) U.S. Postal Service false representation orders. Bad Actor Disqualification Adopting Release, supra
note 87, at 30-62.
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persons does not bar an issuer from relying on the exemption under Rule 506.90 A “bad
actor” disqualification does not apply if a disqualifying event occurred before September
23, 2013.91 In this case, such fact must be disclosed to purchasers prior to the sale. 92 In
addition, the disqualification does not apply if it is waived by the SEC for a good cause or
by the court or regulatory authority that issued the relevant order. 93 It is also not applicable
if the issuer could not have known the disqualifying event despite the exercise of
reasonable care.94
4.2.3. GENERAL CONDITIONS
a. Integration
The availability of the exemptions under Regulation D must be determined on the
integration basis to “prevents an issuer from circumventing the registration requirements
of the Securities Act by claiming a separate exemption for each part of a series of
transactions that comprises a single offering.” 95 Rule 502(a) under Regulation D provides
that “[a]ll sales that are part of the same Regulation D offering must meet all of the terms
and conditions of Regulation D.”96 Thus, the issuer might lose the exemption if two or

90

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d)(2). Other than exceptions described in Rule 506(b)(2), the issuer can rely on
Rule 506 if the issuer terminates a relationship with a covered person subject to the disqualifying event prior
to the commencement of the offering. C&DIs, supra note 84, Question 260.15.
91

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d)(2)(i).

92

Id. § 230.506(e).

93

Id. § 230.506(d)(2)(ii), (iii).

94

Id. § 230.506(d)(2)(v).

95
Interpretive Release on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 6455 (March 3, 1983), 1983 WL
409415 [hereinafter 1983 Interpretive Release], at III.A.

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a). Rule 502(a) does not directly address the “issuer integration” (or “single
business enterprise”). For discussion on the issuer integration, see 7A J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933supra note, §§ 7:112-114 (2016).
96

101

more discrete offerings were integrated as parts of the same Regulation D offering. Though
the SEC suggested the “five factor test” as explained below, the determination of
integration is still not an easy task and is “dependent on particular facts and
circumstances.”97 To increase the clarity of application for the integration doctrine, Rule
502(a) provides a safe harbor provision that excludes from integration offers and sales
made more than six months before or after a Regulation D offering “so long as during those
six month periods there are no offers or sales of securities by or for the issuer that are of
the same or a similar class as those offered or sold under Regulation D, other than those
offers or sales of securities under an employee benefit plan.”98 However, transactions for
which the safe harbor provision does not apply must pass muster of the traditional “five
factor test” not to be integrated. Under this test, the following five factors should be
considered in determining whether two or more distinct offerings are integrated:99
(a) Whether the sales are part of a single plan of financing;
(b)Whether the sales involve issuance of the same class of securities;
(c) Whether the sales have been made at or about the same time;100
(d) Whether the same type of consideration is being received; and
(e) Whether the sales are made for the same general purpose.101

97
1983 Interpretive Release, supra note 95, at III.A; 7A Hicks, supra note 96, § 7:103 (stating that
traditional five factors are “imprecise.”).
98

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a).

99

Id. § 230.502(a) note; Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6,
1962), 1962 WL 69540, at *3-4.
100
Six month “window periods” used in the safe harbor provision of Rule 502(a) are likely to make the
issuer difficult to successfully argue that two offerings have not been “made at or about the same time.” 7A
Hicks, supra note 96, § 7:109 (stating that “an issuer must look to the other four factors to support its claim
of independent offerings.”).
101
In the LaserFax no-action letter, the counsel of LaserFax Inc. argued that two offerings would serve
the different purposes by distinguishing that the first “private placement of common stock under Regulation
D was for the purpose of raising “seed” money” to organize the business and the second “offering of
convertible subordinate debentures is for the primary purpose of raising funds to finance inventory and
subordinate receivables that are anticipated in the near future.” However, the SEC staff did not agree with

102

However, all five factors need not to be dispositive of the question of integration,102 and
the SEC staff may further consider other factors to support integration.103 Moreover, there
are some important exceptions for the integration doctrine with respect to Rule 506
offerings.
First, Rule 152 provides that a private offering made under Section 4(a)(2) of the
Securities Act would not be integrated with a “subsequent” registered offering.104 This
safe harbor enables an issuer to use a Rule 506 offering for a “bridge financing” before the
issuer makes an initial public offering. 105
Second, Rule 155 provides a safe harbor for an “abandoned private offering followed
by a registered offering” or an “abandoned registered offering followed by a private
offering.”106 The SEC adopted Rule 155 in 2001 to “enhance an issuer’s ability to switch
from a private offering to a registered offering, or vice-versa, in response to changing
market conditions.”107 Assuming other conditions prescribed in Rule 155 are met, a private
offering and a registered offering would not be integrated if there are at least 30 calendar

the counsel, stating that “the funds received from all . . . offerings are to be used primarily for business
operations.” 7A Hicks, supra note 96, § 7:109 (citing LaserFax, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 54332,
at *1 (Aug. 15, 1985)).
102
7A Hicks, supra note 96, § 7:109 (citing Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 1, 1961), 1961 WL
61651, at *1; also Kunz v. SEC, 64 Fed. Appx. 659 (10th Cir. 2003)).
103

In Sonnenblick, Parker and Selvers no-action letter that addressed the question of integration
between a 504 offering and a registered offering which would be made within six months, in addition to five
factors, the SEC staff noted that “the offerees in the Rule 504 offerings are not limited to those processing
first-hand information with respect to the proposed venture who are providing capital for organization and
preliminary operations.” 7A Hicks, supra note 96, § 7:109 (citing Sonnenblick, Parker and Selvers, SEC
No-Actioin Letter, 1986 WL 66490, at *1 (Dec. 1, 1985)).
104

17 C.F.R. § 230.152.

105

7A Hicks, supra note 96, § 7:110.

106

17 C.F.R. § 230.155.

107
Integration of Abandoned Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7943 (Jan. 26, 2001), 2001 WL
68771, at *1.
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days of the cooling period between termination of a preceding abandoned offering and
commencement of a subsequent, private or registered offering. 108
Third, the SEC provided the interpretive guidance in 2007 to clarify integration issues
regarding “concurrent” private and public offerings.109 Though relevant issues were, in
part, addressed by the SEC staff,110 the SEC established a general guidance on concurrent
private and public offerings in the 2007 proposal. According to the SEC, the determination
of integration in concurrent private and registered offerings “should be based on a
consideration of whether the investors in the private placement were solicited by the
registration statement or through some other means that would otherwise not foreclose the
availability of the Section 4(2) exemption.”111 The SEC also clarified the traditional fivefactor test does not apply to concurrent public and private offerings.112

108

17 C.F.R. § 230.155(b), (c).

109
Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 8828, at 5161 (Aug. 3, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Regulation D Revisions Proposal].
110

See e.g., Black Box Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (June 26, 1990), 1990 WL 286633; Squadron,
Ellenoff, Pleasant & Lehrer, SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 28, 1992), 1992 WL 55818. In the Black Box noaction letter, the SEC staff took a position that a private offering needs not be integrated with a simultaneous
registered offering where purchasers of a private offering are limited to qualified institutional buyers pursuant
to Rule 144A and “no more than two or three large institutional accredited investors.”
111

The SEC provided following examples as to application of the integration guidance:
For example, if a company files a registration statement and then seeks to offer and sell
securities without registration to an investor that became interested in the purportedly private
offering by means of the registration statement, then the Section 4(2) exemption would not be
available for that offering. On the other hand, if the prospective private placement investor
became interested in the concurrent private placement through some means other than the
registration statement that did not involve a general solicitation and otherwise was consistent
with Section 4(2), such as through a substantive, pre-existing relationship with the company
or direct contact by the company or its agents outside of the public offering effort, then the
prior filing of the registration statement generally would not impact the potential availability
of the Section 4(2) exemption for that private placement and the private placement could be
conducted while the registration statement for the public offering was on file with the
Commission.

2007 Regulation D Revisions Proposal, supra note 109, at 55-56.
112

C&DIs, supra note 84, Question 139.25 (Nov. 26, 2008).

104

Lastly, the Regulation D offering is not integrated with the offshore offering. A note
on Rule 502(a) provides that “[g]enerally, transactions otherwise meeting the requirements
of an exemption will not be integrated with simultaneous offerings being made outside the
United States in compliance with Regulation S.”113

b. Information requirements
Information requirements under Rule 502(b) relate to the offering in reliance on Rule
506(b) which can be offered and sold to the limited number of non-accredited
purchasers. 114 Rule 502(b) requires the issuer to “furnish” certain information to nonaccredited purchasers in the Rule 506(b) offering at “a reasonable time prior to sale.”115
The issuer’s obligation to furnish relevant information does not extend to accredited
investors. 116 The types of information to be furnished pursuant to Rule 502(b) vary,
depending on the type of the issuers (reporting, non-reporting, or foreign private issuers)
and for issuers that are not subject to reporting requirements of Section 13 or 15(d) of the
Exchange Act, the maximum offering amount.117 In addition to the registration statementlike disclosures, Rule 502(b) provides special requirements, especially to assure an
informed investment decision of non-accredited investors participating in the private
offering. Specific contents of information requirements under Rule 502(b) are addressed

113

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) Note; Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863 (April 24,
1990), 1990 WL 311658, at *26-27.
114

17 C.F.R. §§230.502(b), 506.

115

Id. § 230.502(b)(1). It should be noted that Rule 502(b) only requires relevant information to be
“furnished.” Rule 502(b) does not require the information to be “provided or delivered using a particular
medium.” 7A Hicks, supra note 96, § 7:116.
116

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1).

117

Id. § 230.502(b)(2)(i), (ii).

105

at full length in Chapter IV.118

c. Limitation on manner of offering (ban on general solicitation)
This condition which is fully discussed later,119 only applies to any offering made in
reliance on Rule 506(b) and certain Rule 504 offerings.120 Rule 502(c) prohibits the issuer
and its agent from making an offer or sale of securities “by any form of general solicitation
or general advertising.”121 Though Rule 502(c) enumerates certain mass communicative
mediums, the general solicitation or general advertising is “not limited to” enumerated
communications. 122 With respect to the interpretation of what constitutes a general
solicitation or general advertising, the SEC staff has consistently required the issuer or any
person acting on its behalf to have a “pre-existing, substantive relationship” with
offerees.123 This requirement relating to the Rule 506(b) exemption was very onerous for
small businesses that had only limited contacts with potential investors. Thus, the issuers
had no choice but to employ broker-dealers that already established pre-existing,

118

See infra Chapter IV.C.1.

119

See infra Chapter IV.B.1.

120

17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504(b)(1), 506(b)(1), (c).

121

Id. § 230.502(c).

122
Id. § 230.506(c)(1), (2). Communications to constitute a general solicitation or general advertising
include: “(1) [a]ny advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in any newspaper,
magazine, or similar media or broadcast over television or radio; and (2) [a]ny seminar or meeting whose
attendees have been invited by any general solicitation or general advertising.” However, a notice of certain
unregistered offerings under Rule 135c, filing a Form D, and certain offshore communications under Rule
135e are not deemed to constitute general solicitation or general advertising.

C&DIs, supra note 84, Questions 256.29 (“A “pre-existing” relationship is one that the issuer has
formed with an offeree prior to the commencement of the securities offering or, alternatively, that was
established through either a registered broker-dealer or investment adviser prior to the registered brokerdealer or investment adviser participation in the offering.”), 256.31 (“A “substantive” relationship is one in
which the issuer (or a person acting on its behalf) has sufficient information to evaluate, and does, in fact,
evaluate, a prospective offeree’s financial circumstances and sophistication, in determining his or her status
as an accredited or sophisticated investor.”).
123
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substantive relationships with their clients in the course of business before the JOBS Act
removed this requirement for Rule 506(c) exemption.124

d. Resale limitation
Rule 502(d) provides that the securities acquired in the Rule 506 offering “have the
status of securities acquired in a transaction under Section 4(a)(2) of the [Securities]
Act.” 125 This means the securities acquired in the Rule 506 offering are “restricted
securities” pursuant to Rule 144(a)(3) under the Securities Act. 126 Unless restricted
securities are subsequently registered by the issuer, the holders of restricted securities must
find any applicable exemptions to resell these securities without violation of Section 5 of
the Act. Section 4(a)(1) of the Act provides “any person other than an issuer, underwriter,
or dealer” with an exemption for the secondary trading.127 However, the term “underwriter”
is broadly defined to include “any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view
to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with the distribution of any security.”128
Depending on facts and circumstances involved in the transactions, resale of restricted
securities by those who purchased in the 506 offering, though they did not intend to do so,
may be viewed as “distribution” of the securities and violate Section 5 of the Act.129 Thus,

124

See infra Chapter IV.B.1.2.3.b.

125

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d).

The term “restricted securities” defined in Rule 144(a)(3) includes “[s]ecurities acquired directly or
indirectly from the issuer, or from an affiliate of the issuer, in a transaction or chain of transactions not
involving any public offering.” Id. § 230.144(a)(3)(i).
126

127

15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1).

128
Id. § 77b(a)(11). Broad definition of the term “underwriter” makes the “trading exemption” under
Section 4(a)(1) less attractive to investors who seek resale of unregistered securities. Instead, Rules 144 and
144A under the Securities Act provide more clear and useful guidelines for both affiliates or non-affiliates
of the issuer to resell their securities. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144, 144A.
129

In the preliminary note of Rule 144, the SEC explains as follows:

107

the issuer in the Rule 506 offering is required to “exercise reasonable care to assure that
the purchasers of the securities are not underwriters within the meaning of Section 2(a)(11)
of the Act.”130 In this regard, paragraph (d) of Rule 506 provides a non-exclusive method
to demonstrate the issuer’s reasonable care.131 This method suggests certain precautionary
actions including an inquiry on the purpose of acquisition, written disclosure to each
purchaser on limitation on resale, and placement of a legend stating resale limitation on the
certificate.132

4.2.4. SPECIFIC CONDITIONS
a. Rule 506(b) offerings
In addition to all terms and conditions of Rules 501 and 502, the Rule 506(b) offering
prohibiting the general solicitation must satisfy two additional conditions. 133 The first
condition relates to the number of purchasers. Subparagraph (i) of Rule 506(b)(2) requires
that any Rule 506 offering should be made to, in actuality or the issuer reasonably believes,

[I]ndividual investors who are not professionals in the securities business also may be
“underwriters” if they act as links in a chain of transactions through which securities move
from an issuer to the public. Since it is difficult to ascertain the mental state of the purchaser
at the time of an acquisition of securities, prior to and since the adoption of Rule 144,
subsequent acts and circumstances have been considered to determine whether the purchaser
took the securities “with a view to distribution” at the time of the acquisition.
17 C.F.R. § 230.144 preliminary note.
130

Id. § 230.502(d).

131

In the past, the issuer had to take all precautionary actions described in Rule 502(d). In March 1989,
the SEC amended Rule 502(d) to provide that listed actions would not be mandatory. Regulation D;
Accredited Investor and Filing Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 6825 (March 14, 1989), 1989 WL
1093485 [hereinafter Regulation D Revisions of 1989].
132

17 C.F.R. § 502(d)(1)-(3).

133

Id. § 506(a), (b).
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no more than 35 purchasers.134 The number of purchasers is calculated pursuant to Rule
501(e), and excluded in the calculation “accredited investors” defined in Rule 501(a) and
other persons closely related to the purchaser (e.g., spouse of a purchaser who has the same
primary residence as the purchaser).135 In addition, the integration doctrine of Rule 502(a)
also should be considered for the calculation of purchasers. 136 Persons who purchased
securities in the offering that constitutes part of the same Rule 506(b) offering are included
in calculating the number of purchasers. Regardless of whether purchasers are included in
the calculation, “the issuer must satisfy all the other provisions of Regulation D for all
purchasers.”137
The second condition relates to the nature of purchasers. Subparagraph (ii) of Rule
506(b)(2) requires that a “purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or with
his purchaser representative(s) ha[ve] such knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment.” 138 Qualification of each purchaser can also be established by the issuer’s
“reasonable belief,” typically evidenced by a suitability letter or offeree questionnaires.139
In Mark v. FSC Securities Corp., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
defendant that “the plaintiffs’ executed subscription documents . . . may have been
sufficient to establish the reasonableness of any belief the issuer may have had as to the

134

Id. § 506(b)(2)(i).

135

Id. § 501(e)(1). In addition to exclusion of certain purchasers, a business entity (e.g., corporation,
partnership) or a non-contributory employee benefit plan is counted as “one purchasers.” Id. § 501(e)(2).
136

Id. §§ 502(a), 506 note to paragraph (b)(2)(i).

137

Id. § 501(e) note.

138

Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).

139

Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
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plaintiffs’ particular qualifications.”140 However, the Court concluded that the defendant
“failed to sustain its burden of proving an exemption under Rule 506” by simply offering
as evidence “a set of documents in blank” from which the jury could not determine whether
the issuer had the requisite belief.141

b. Rule 506(c) offerings
As mandated by Section 201(a) of the JOBS Act, the SEC adopted a new Rule 506(c)
exemption under Regulation D in July 2013.142 The Rule 506(c) offering permits an issuer
to engage in general solicitation and general advertising by excluding paragraph (c) of Rule
502 from conditions to be met to claim the exemption.143 Further, Rule 506(c) offerings
are not “deemed public offerings . . . as a result of general advertising or general
solicitation.”144
Rule 506(c) imposes two specific conditions. First, securities sold under Rule 506(c)
can be offered to the general public, but all purchasers are limited to “accredited
investors.” 145 As is discussed in Chapter IV, accredited investors include financial
institutions, certain entities with total assets in excess of $5 million, and natural persons
whose income or net worth exceeds certain financial thresholds.146

140

Mark v. FSC Sec. Corp., 870 F.2d 331, 336-337 (6th Cir. 1989).

141

Id. at 337.

142

JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, Title II, § 201(a), 126 Stat. 306, 313-314 (2012); Eliminating the
Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings,
Securities Act Release No. 9415 (July 10, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)).
143
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(1). Paragraph (b) of Rule 502 (information requirements) is also excluded
from conditions of the Rule 506(c) offering.
144

15 U.S.C. § 77d(b).

145

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(i).

146

Id. § 230.501(a); see infra Chapter IV.A.1.
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Second, the issuer must “take reasonable steps to verify” the accredited investor status
of the purchasers.147 The availability of the Rule 506(c) exemption depends on whether
the issuer actually takes reasonable steps to verify the accredited investor status, not
whether the purchasers are actually accredited investors. 148 Rule 506(c) provides nonexclusive methods to verify that the purchaser is an accredited investor. 149
4.3. NOTICE OF SALES (FORM D)
In Regulation D offerings, an issuer must file with the SEC a “notice of sales” on
Form D within 15 days after the first sale of securities.150 The filing of a Form D, though
previously it was, is not a condition to exemptions under Regulation D.151 Thus, failure to
file a Form D neither deprives an issuer making an offering of securities in reliance on Rule
506 of the availability of the exemption, nor the “covered security” status under Section 18
of the Securities Act. 152 However, the issuer cannot use Regulation D in the future if any
court order has been entered to enjoin the issuer, any of its predecessors, or affiliates for

147

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii).

148

C&DIs, supra note 84, Questions 260.06-07.

149

Id. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(A)-(D).

150

17 C.F.R. § 230.503. Form D also can be used for Section 4(a)(5) of the Securities Act. Id. §

239.500.
151

When Regulation D was adopted in 1982, the filing of Form D was a condition to claim exemptions
of Rules 504, 505 and 506. In 1989, the SEC amended Regulation D to exclude the Form D filing requirement
from conditions of the Regulation D exemptions. Regulation D Revisions of 1989, supra note 131.
152

C&DIs, supra note 84, Question 257.07-08.
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failure of filing Form D.153 Form D contains information on 16 separate items related to
the issuer and the offering 154 and must be filed electronically through EDGAR.155

4.4. PREEMPTION OF STATE SECURITIES LAWS
The National Securities Market Improvement Act (NSMIA) of 1996 amended Section
18 of the Securities Act to preempt state registration of offerings of “covered securities.” 156
In particular, a “covered security” includes a security exempt from the registration pursuant
to SEC rules or regulations issued under Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act. 157 Unlike a
private offering in reliance upon Section 4(a)(2), an exempt offering under Rule 506 is not
subject to state registration requirements except “notice filing requirements that are
substantially similar to those required by” Rule 503 of Regulation D.158 Thus, an issuer
relying on the Rule 506 exemption is only required to file a Form D with the SEC through
EDGAR and securities regulators of

states in which securities are offered within

designated time. To facilitate and expedite the notice filings with the states, the North
American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) launched the online Electronic

153

17 C.F.R. § 230.507(a).

154

Form D is organized into 16 numbered items, signature and submission, and instructions (and
continuation pages for certain items). 16 items include: issuer’s identity; principal place of business and
contact information; related persons; industry group; issuer size; federal exemptions and exclusions claimed;
type of filing; duration of offering; type(s) of securities offered; business combination transaction; minimum
investment; sales compensation; offering and sales amount; investors; sales commissions and finders’ fees
expenses; use of proceeds. Form D is available on the SEC’s website (https://www.sec.gov/forms).
155

Electronic filing of Form D was required for the filing on or after March 16, 2009. Electronic Filing
and Revision of Form D, Securities Act Release No. 8891 (Feb. 6, 2008).
156

National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, Title I, § 102(a), 110
Stat. 3416, 3417-20 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r); see also supra Chapter II.A.2.2.
157

15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(F). Lower courts were split on the issue of whether the issuer must satisfy all
the conditions of the Rule 506 exemption to claim the federal preemption. See 7A Hicks, supra note 96, §
7:237.
158

15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(F).
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Filing Depository (EFD) in December 2014. 159 In addition, the preemption of state
registration does not affect a state’s authority to “investigate and bring enforcement actions”
with respect to Rule 506 offerings. 160

5. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF THE EXEMPTION UNDER RULE 506
5.1. CIVIL LIABILITY
A failure to satisfy conditions required by the Rule 506 offering may result in the loss
of the exemption and a violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act, unless the offering can
qualify any other exemption such as a statutory exemption under Section 4(a)(2) of the Act.
As explained in Chapter II, the Securities Act imposes a Section 12(a)(1) liability on the
“sellers” who violate Section 5 of the Act. 161 Thus, a person purchasing unregistered
securities in the Rule 506 offering rely on the civil remedy under Section 12(a)(1) of the
Act to rescind the transaction or recover damages. However, the Section 12(a)(1) liability
does not cover any materially false representation in connection with the offering. Instead,
Section 12(a)(2) of the Act holds liable “any person who offers or sells a security . . . by
means of a prospectus or oral communication” containing any material misrepresentation

159
See Scott C. Withrow, “Keeping Current: Finally, State Securities Filings Electronically: NASAA’s
Electronic Filing Depository,” Business Law Today (April 2015). After first filing a Form D with the SEC,
the issuer can file notices and pay filing fees for any of the 46 jurisdictions in the EFD system. As of the end
of 2016, 46 of 53 states and territories (including the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands) are participating in the EFD system. The EFD is currently not available for 7 states (Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina). Information on states
participating in the EFD system is available on the EFD website (https://www.efdnasaa.org/
AboutEFDStates).
160

15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1).

161

Id. § 77l(a)(1); see supra Chapter II.A.3.2.1.
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or omission.162 Prior to 1995, due to a broad definition of the term “prospectus” under the
Securities Act, 163 the Section 12(a)(2) liability was widely perceived to apply to
unregistered offerings as well as registered offerings.164 In Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc.,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court, after having examined Sections 2(a)(10), 10, and
12(a)(2) and the legislative history of the Securities Act, concluded that “the term
‘prospectus’ refers to a document soliciting the public to acquire securities” 165 and Section
12(a)(2) of the Act applies only to public offerings by issuers or controlling shareholders.166
As Justice Ginsburg indicated in her dissenting opinion, “the Court’s definition of a public
offering encompass[es] both transactions that must be registered under § 5, . . . and
transactions that would have been registered had the securities involved not qualified for
exemption under § 3” of the Securities Act. 167 In sum, after Gustafson, plaintiffs can no

162

15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2).

Id. § 77b(a)(10) (defining the term “prospectus” as “any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement,
letter, or communication, written or by radio or television . . .”).
163

164
As with the application of Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act prior to Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.
Inc., Professor Hicks explains as follows:

Prior to Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. . . . [p]rimary transactions for which relief under Section
12(a)(2) was clearly available include registered public offerings, [] unregistered public
offerings,[] whether exempted or in violation of Section 5.[] It was also widely assumed that
nonpublic or limited offerings, whether exempted[] or violative of the registration requirements
were subject to Section 12(a)(2).[] The issue on which the courts were split was whether that
Section also applied to subsequent trading.
17A J. WILLIAM HICKS, CIVIL LIABILITIES: ENFORCEMENT & LITIGATION UNDER THE 1933 ACT § 6:4
(2016).
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co. Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (holding that “the word ‘prospectus’ is a
term of art referring to a document that describes a public offering of securities by an issuer or controlling
shareholders.”).
165

Id. at 584. The Supreme Court also stated that the Section 12(a)(2) liability “cannot attach unless
there is an obligation to distribute the prospectus in the first place (or unless there is an exemption).” Id. at
571.
166

167

Id. at 596. Professor Hicks categorizes transactions for which Section 12(a)(2) liability continues to
apply after the Gustafson decision as follows:
(1) a registered public offering by an issuer; (2) a registered public offering by a controlling
shareholder; (3) an unregistered public offering by an issuer made in reliance on an exemption
under Section 3, including Sections 3(a)(9), 3(a)(10), 3(a)(11), Rules 504 and 505 of
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longer rely on the Section 12(a)(2) remedy against the seller’ misrepresentations or
omissions of material facts in connection with a nonpublic offering exempted under
Section 4(a)(2) of the Act. 168 Though general antifraud provision of Section 10(b) under
the Exchange Act is reserved for such cases, plaintiffs in a private action, arising under
Section 10(b), have to meet more rigorous requirements than those required in Section
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act.169

5.2. INSIGNIFICANT NONCOMPLIANCE OF REGULATION D
Rule 508 of Regulation D provides special provisions to serve as a defense against a
plaintiff’s rescissory relief under Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act in connection with
insignificant violation of Regulation D. 170 To establish a defense for Section 12(a)(1)
liability, a person relying on the exemption under Rule 506 must prove all three prongs
described in paragraph (a) of Rule 508. 171

Regulation D, Regulation A, and Rule 701; (4) an unregistered public offering by a controlling
shareholder in reliance on an exemption under Section 3; (5) an unregistered public offering
by an issuer or controlling shareholder that does not qualify for an exemption.
17A Hicks, supra note 164, § 6:14.
Though some courts followed this bright-line approach, others followed a more functional approach.
E.g., Hyer v. Malouf, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,857 (D. Utah 2008) (denying the defendant’s motion
to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Section 12(a)(2) claim by stating that “the public offering analysis is factintensive and requires extensive inquiry regarding each of investors whom the securities were offered or
sold and their relationship with the offeror”).
168

Section 12(a)(2) liability does not apply to Sections 4(a)(6) and 4(a)(1) of the Securities Act either.
17A Hicks, supra note 164, § 6:14.
Unlike a Section 12(a)(2) action, a Section 10(b) action requires a plaintiff to prove the defendant’s
“scienter” and reliance. In addition, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 heightened the
pleading requirements and required a plaintiff to prove a loss causation for the Section 10(b) fraud action.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b).
169

170

17 C.F.R. § 230.508(a).

171

Id. § 230.508(a)(1)-(3).
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The first prong focuses on “the impact of noncompliance on each purchaser of an
unregistered security who seeks to rescind under Section 12(a)(1).” 172 It requires that
noncompliance should not “pertain to a term, condition or requirement directly intended to
protect that particular individual or entity.”173 Thus, failure to comply with requirements
to furnish information to a particular investor could not be argued by other investors who
had received information to seek a recession pursuant to Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities
Act.174
The second prong requires that noncompliance be “insignificant with respect to the
offering as a whole.”175 However, failure to comply with the ban on general solicitation
under Rule 502(c) or the limitation on the number of purchasers under Rule 506(b)(2)(i) is
deemed to be significant to the Rule 506 offering as a whole. 176 Noncompliance of other
conditions or requirements can be deemed as insignificant depending on conditions or

172

7A Hicks, supra note 96, § 7:241.

173

17 C.F.R. § 230.508(a)(1).

174

A following example explains how the first prong applies to information requirements.
Assume that two unaccredited investors, A and B, seek rescissory relief under Section
12(a)(1) . . . Investor A received all of the disclosure material required by Rule 502(b) . . .
investor B failed to receive any of the required information . . . Under the first subparagraph
of Rule 508(a), investors A and B are not on an equal footing. The issuer can prove that its
failure to satisfy Rule 502(b) was insignificant to the offer and sale to investor A and,
therefore, Rule 506 will exempt its sale to him. However, because the issuer did not provide a
disclosure document to investor B and the information condition in Rule 502(b) was “directly
intended to protect that particular individual or entity,”[] the failure to comply will result in the
loss of the exemption for the offer and sale to investor B.

7A Hicks, supra note 96, § 7:242.
175

17 C.F.R. § 230.508(a)(2).

176

Id. § 230.508(a)(2).
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requirements that have been violated and the facts and circumstances involved in the
violation.177
The last prong requires the showing of the issuer’s “good faith and reasonable attempt”
to comply with Regulation D.178 Thus, this prong necessitates a factual “assessment of the
issuer’s effort” that could be “best decided by the jury.” 179 However, Rule 508 does not
affect the SEC’s ability to enforce any insignificant violation of Regulation D. 180

177

See 7A Hicks, supra note 96, § 7:247 (evaluating relative significance of different conditions and
requirements of Regulation D), 248(exemplifying the facts and circumstances to affect the significance of
violation including quantitative and qualitative aspect of violations).
178

17 C.F.R. § 230.508(a)(3).

179

7A Hicks, supra note 96, § 7:241, 249 (citing Pinnacle Communication International Inc. v.
American Family Mortgage Corporation, 417 F. Supp.2d 1073, 1086-1087 (D. Minn. 2006)).
180
17 C.F.R. § 230.508(b) (providing that “the failure to comply shall nonetheless be actionable by the
Commission under Section 20 of the Act.”).
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B. SOUTH KOREA
1. INTRODUCTION
A distinction between “public offering” and “private placement” is relatively simple
and clear under the Korean securities laws because both concepts are defined by the
FSCMA. The term “private placement” is defined as offers of newly issued securities
which is not a “public offering.”181 Thus, whether certain securities offering constitutes a
private placement can be determined by examining the definition of the term “public
offering.” Accordingly, the primary focus of this section is placed on how a public offering
is determined under the Korean securities regulation.

2. DETERMINATION OF A “PUBLIC OFFERING”
2.1. THE TERM “PUBLIC OFFERING”
The statutory definition of the term “public offering” has changed several times. When
the Securities and Exchange Act (SEA) enacted in 1962, it defined the term “public
offering” as “offers of newly issued securities on equal conditions to the public.”182 In
1976, the phrase “to the public” was replaced with “to many and unspecified persons.” 183
However, the criticism continued that the definition of the term “public offering” was too
ambiguous to determine whether a particular securities transaction involves a public

181

Capital Market Act, Art. 9(8).

182

Jeunggwongeograebeob [Securities and Exchange Act], Act. No. 972, Jan. 15, 1962, Art. 2(2)
(repealed).
183

Securities and Exchange Act, Act. No. 2920, Dec. 22, 1974, Art. 2(2) (repealed).
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offering in an objective manner.184 Responding to such criticism, the National Assembly
amended the SEA in 1991 to eliminate the phrase “to many and unspecified persons” and
also delegated the former Securities and Exchange Commission of Korea (KSEC) which
was succeeded by the FSC, an authority to specify the term in its rules.185 Accordingly,
the KSEC adopted rules to specify the definition of the term “public offering.” The KSEC
adopted the numerical standard called “50-person test” for the purpose of determining
whether an issuance of new securities involves a public offering. In 1997, the SEA was
amended again to remove the language “equal conditions” from the definition of the term
“public offering” to prevent an issuer from evading the registration requirement by slightly
altering offering terms (e.g., offering price).186 The National Assembly also decided to
relocate provisions of the KSEC rules which specified the term “public offering” to the
Presidential Decree, since such provisions are related to the registration obligation that
triggers a criminal punishment if it is violated. In 2007, the “public offering” definition
under the SEA was succeeded by the FSCMA without any significant modification. The
term “public offering” is currently defined as “offers of newly issued securities to fifty or
more persons whose number is calculated in the manner specified in the Presidential
Decree.” 187 In the meantime, the FSCMA also defines the term “public sale” in the
identical manner, except that it relates to the offer of already issued securities.188

184

Seok Ho Yoo, A Study on Regulations of Public Offering under Securities Exchange Act (2001), at
187-88 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yonsei University) (on file with the Yonsei University Library).
185

Securities and Exchange Act, Act. No. 5254, Jan. 13, 1991, Art. 2(3) (repealed).

186

Jeunggwongeograebeobsihangryeong [Enforcement Decree of the Securities and Exchange Act],
Presidential Decree. No. 15312, March 22, 1997, Art. 2-4 (repealed).
187

Capital Market Act, Art. 9(7).

188

Id. Art. 9(9).
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2.2. CALCULATION OF THE NUMBER OF OFFEREES (50-PERSON TEST)
To provide specific guidelines for determining as to whether an offering of securities
involves fifty or more persons, Article 11(1) of the Enforcement Decree under the FSCMA
sets forth the method of calculating the number of offerees. In determining the number of
offerees involved in the offering, Article 11(1) requires persons to be included if they are
offered (i) by means not involving a public offering or public sale, (ii) for the same class
of securities, and (iii) within six months before current offers are made.189 However, it
excludes in the calculation “professional investors” defined in Article 9(5) of the FSCMA,
other professionals (e.g., accounting firm), and certain persons deemed to be closely related
to the issuer (e.g., largest shareholder of stock of the issuer, directors of the issuer).190 Each
category of persons excluded in the calculation are fully addressed in Chapter IV. 191
In cases where offerees are not natural persons, determination of the number of
offerees depends on whether such person has a legal status. Thus, an entity, such as a
corporation, an incorporated association, or an incorporated foundation that is established
and registered pursuant to the relevant statutes, is counted as “one person.” 192 On the
contrary, where an offeree of securities is a partnership or a consortium, each member of
such entity is counted as an offeree, respectively, since it does not have a legal status.193

189

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 11(1).

190

Id. Art. 11(1) subpars. 1-2.

191

See infra Chapter IV.A.2.

192

FSS, Gieobgongsi Silmuannae 2016 [Corporate Disclosure Handbook 2016], at 271.

193

Id.
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In interpreting “the same class of securities,” the FSS takes a position that each
instrument listed in the definition of six types of securities recognized by the FSCMA
constitutes the same class.194 For example, Article 4(3) of the FSCMA, with respect to the
definition of the term “debt securities,” enumerates state bonds, local government bonds,
bonds issued by a special entity, corporate bonds, corporate commercial papers, and other
similar instruments.195 Thus, several corporate bonds issued by the particular corporation
are treated as the same class of securities, though they have different flavors or maturity.
However, there is one exception. Stock with different priority in dividend or liquidation
(e.g., common stock and preferred stock) is viewed as different classes of stock since the
Commercial Act expressly recognizes different types of stock.196

2.3. TRANSFERABILITY TEST
Even if the number of offerees calculated pursuant to Article 11(1) of the Enforcement
Decree of the FSCMA is less than fifty at the time of issuance, such offering is “deemed
to be a public offering” if there is a possibility that securities can be transferred to “fifty or
more persons” within one year from the date of issuance. 197 The FSS reasons the need for
the transferability test as follows:

194
Corporate Disclosure Handbook 2016, supra note 192, at 185-186. The FSCMA first categorizes
“financial investment instruments” into “securities” and “derivatives.” Next, it divides “securities” into 6
categories: “debt securities” “equity securities” “beneficiary certificates” “investment contract securities”
“derivatives-combined securities” and “securities depositary receipts.” Capital Market Act, Art. 4.
195

Capital Market Act, Art. 4(3).

196

Corporate Disclosure Handbook 2016, supra note 192, at 186.

197

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 11(3); FSC Disclosure Rules, Art. 2-2(1).

Unlike the 50-person test, language of Article 11(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the FSCMA does not
exclude persons who are excluded in calculating the number of offerees in the 50-person test. In addition,
language of Article 11(3) puts an emphasis on the “securityholders,” not “offerees.”
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The private offering of securities is made on the basis of agreement between parties
and does not necessitate disclosure of information, thus is exempt from registration.
However, if privately placed securities are freely transferable after issuance,
subsequent purchasers of such securities may be exposed to unforeseen damages since
information necessary for the investment decision may not be disclosed.198

The FSC rules set forth specific criteria to determine whether various types of
securities can be viewed as transferable to fifty or more persons. 199 For example, equity
securities are deemed to be transferable to fifty or more persons if the same class of
securities as those currently offered were previously publicly offered or sold, or are
currently registered on the exchange.200 If securities are deemed to be transferable under
this criteria, an issuer of securities is required to take preventive measures to cut off the
transferability.201 Though Article 2-2(2) of the FSC Disclosure Rules provides different
measures to be taken to types of securities as shown in Table 4,202 there is one common
measure applicable regardless of types of securities. If (i) securities are deposited in the
Korea Securities Depository (KSD) immediately after the issuance, (ii) made with the KSD
is a depository contract stating that such securities shall not be withdrawn nor sold for one
year from the date of deposit, and (iii) the depository contract is duly performed, such
securities are not deemed to be transferable.203

198

Corporate Disclosure Handbook 2016, supra note 192, at 281.

199

FSC Disclosure Rules, Art. 2-2(1).

200

Id. Art. 2-2(1) subpar. 1.

201

Id. Art. 2-2(2).

202

Id. Art. 2-2(2) subpar. 2.

203

Id. Art. 2-2(2) subpar. 1.
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TABLE 4. TRANSFERABILITY TESTS
Type of
securities

Criteria

Preventive measures

1. Equity
securities

Transferable if the same class of
securities were previously publicly
offered or sold, or such securities are
listed on the securities market
(excluding the KONEX market)

2. Non-equity
securities
(except CPs)

Transferable if the number of the
certificates at issuance is at least fifty,
or the certificates can be reissued
within into different denominations
which can result in fifty or more
certificates

Required to issue certificates to less than
fifty and state on the face of the certificate
that it is prohibited from being reissued
into two or more certificates within one
year after the issuance.

3. Conversion
rights,
preemptive
rights

Transferable if securities subject to
conversion or preemptive rights meet
transferability tests provided in the
categories 1 or 2 above

Required to restrict the exercise of a right
at least one year after issuance

4. Commercial
Papers (CPs)

Transferable if (a) the number of
commercial papers issued is at least 50;
(b) the maturity of commercial papers
is 365 days or longer; or (c)
commercial papers are purchased
through
the
non-discretionary
investment trust

Required to (a) state in the underwriting
agreement and purchase agreement that
the number of purchasers cannot reach or
exceed fifty persons (including settlors of
non-discretionary investment trusts), and
(b) take relevant measures to secure
compliance

5. Derivative
linked securities

Transferable if derivative linked
securities are purchased through the
non-discretionary investment trust

Same as above

Required to (a) deposit securities in the
KSD immediately after the issuance, (b)
make a depository contract with the KSD
stating that such securities will not be
withdrawn nor sold for one year from the
date of deposit, and (c) carry out such
depository contract

For all types of
securities
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2.4. HYPOTHETICAL CASE
Examining a hypothetical case can be helpful to better understand how public offering
and private placement are determined under the Korean securities regulation. In the
hypothetical example, Company A whose common stock is listed in the KOSPI market did
not issue any bonds during the past six months. Company A now contemplates a private
offering of unsecured bonds (debentures) and sends emails with a term sheet to 100
institutional investors to solicit the purchases. Company A’s offers of bonds do not
constitute a public offering because all investors offered are persons who are excluded in
calculating the number of offerees under the 50-person test. Responding to the issuer’s
offers, 60 of 100 institutional agreed to purchase bonds. To make this offering private,
Company A must take preventive measures to cut off the transferability of bonds. As seen
in Table 4, the FSC rules provide bond issuers with two alternative measures. One is a
measure specific to bonds and the other is a measure commonly applicable regardless of
types of securities. However, in this case, Company A cannot rely on the measure that
limits bond certificates to less than fifty since the number of purchasers exceed fifty.
Instead, Company A must enter into a contract with the KSD to deposit bonds in the KSD
for at least one year.
What kind of procedures is Company A required to follow if it decides to issue bonds
convertible to its common stock in lieu of unsecured bonds? For convertible bonds, the
issuer must take two separate measures into account. First, it should take an action to
restrict transferability of bonds. This would be the same as that required in unsecured
bonds. Additionally, Company A must consider whether a measure for a conversion right
is necessary, and what kind of measure is required. In this example, a security subject to

124

conversion is the common stock of Company A, and its common stock is listed on the
exchange. Thus, its common stock is deemed to be transferable to fifty or more persons
within one year without any restrictive action. The exercise date of a conversion right must
be set at least one year after the date of bond issuance.

2.5. SUMMARY
In conclusion, the question of whether offers of securities constitute a public offering
can be answered through the 50-person test and the transferability test.

Figure 5

summarizes the process determining a public offering. If both tests indicate that the
securities transaction in issue does not involve a public offering, such transaction is a
private placement. Thus, an issuer who structures a securities offering as private placement
is required to limit offerees to certain qualified investors and less than fifty ordinary
investors, and take measures relevant to the types of securities in order to cut off the
transferability of securities.
FIGURE 5. DISTINCTION BETWEEN PUBLIC OFFERING AND PRIVATE PLACEMENT204

204

Corporate Disclosure Handbook 2016, supra note 192, at 182.
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3. REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVATE PLACEMENT
Besides restrictions on the number of offerees, neither the FSCMA nor the FSC rules
provide any other requirements to qualify for the private placement such as information
requirements, minimum investment amount or reporting to the authority. However, as
discussed earlier in Chapter II, general antifraud provisions of Article 178(1) of the
FSCMA apply to transactions involving a private placement of securities.205 Therefore, a
person is subject to civil and criminal liability if he employed “unfair device, scheme, or
trick” or attempted to obtain profits by misrepresenting or omitting material facts in
connection with a private placement.

TABLE 5. COMPARISON OF PRIVATE PLACEMENT REGULATIONS
United States

Korea

Rule 506(b) Offering

Rule 506(c) Offering

N

N

N

Issuer disqualification

Y (bad actors)

Y (bad actors)

N

Investor qualification

accredited investors
(AIs) & 35 non-AIs
(sophistication required)

only AIs
(status must be verified)

certain qualified persons &
49 persons (sophistication
not required)

General Solicitation

prohibited

allowed

prohibited (by limiting the
number of offerees)

Information requirement

Y (to non-AIs)

N

N

Action for limiting resale

Y

Y

Y (generally)

Filing with the authority

Y (Form D)

Y (Form D)

N

Y (6 months prior to and
following the offering)

Y (6 months prior to and
following the offering)

Y (6 months prior to
the offering)

general anti-fraud
provisions apply

general anti-fraud
provisions apply

general anti-fraud
provisions apply

Offering Limit

Integration
Liability

205

Capital Market Act, Art. 178(1); see supra Chapter II.B.2.4.1.a.
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CHAPTER IV. CRITICAL REVIEW OF PRIVATE PLACEMENT REGULATIONS

Chapter III gave an overview of the private placement regulations of the United States
and South Korea. This chapter more closely examines some essential factors that define
the private placement.

Among other factors, four factors have been given special

importance in determining whether or not securities transactions would constitute a private
placement: (1) investor (offeree or purchaser) qualifications; (2) manner of offering; (3)
availability of information; (4) resale restriction. 1 Interestingly, as briefly compared in
Chapter III, there are substantial differences between the U.S. and Korean regulation in the
regulatory approach to factors except resale restriction. Therefore, this chapter reviews
how both countries have regulated three essential factors (investor qualification, manner of
offering, and information requirement), and evaluates the current regulatory scheme with
a critical eye.

A. INVESTOR QUALIFICATIONS
Why does securities law require certain investor qualifications for private placement?
This may be answered by comparing the private placement markets to the mechanism of
public offering markets. Contrary to private placements, investors freely participate in
public offerings regardless of their sophistication, wealth or other qualifications. An issuer
that intends to sell its securities to the public must provide material information about the

1

Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Section 4(2)
and Statutory Law, 31 BUS. LAW. 483, 489 (1975) (stating that “there are only four attributes of any real
significance in determining whether the exemption is available under Statutory Law”) [hereinafter ABA
Positioning Paper].
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investment in the form of a registration statement and a prospectus.2 Though investors
rarely read such lengthy documents and some people believe it is too burdensome to digest
all the information contained in such documents, such concern can be relieved by certain
market mechanisms. Instead of reading a prospectus, investors may also rely on the
information furnished by the market intermediaries that analyze the issuer and its securities
based on the registration statement and other relevant sources.3 Additionally, the efficient
market hypothesis suggests that stock prices reflect all available information in a semistrong market such as those in the United States and South Korea markets.4 Thus, if there
exists the active trading market for the securities, investors may simply look to the recent
price of the same class of the securities offered by the issuer to make an investment decision.
However, the private capital markets lack these type of mechanisms. 5 Investors
participating in private placement need to identify the necessary information related to the
investment, extract the information from the issuer, assess investment risks and evaluate
the value of the securities for themselves.6 Investors are also expected to hold the securities

2

15 U.S.C. § 77e.

3

STEPHEN J. CHOI AND A. C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 31-32 (3rd
ed. 2012) (explaining that “through the filtering mechanism of the broker, individual investors may learn
indirectly about disclosed information”).
4

E.g., Eugene Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael Jensen and Richard Roll, The Adjustment of Stock
Prices to New Information, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 10, NO. 1 (1969); Woo-baik Lee and
Woo-Suk Choi, Market Efficiency in Real-time: Evidence from the Korea Stock Exchange, KOREA JOURNAL
OF FINANCIAL M ANAGEMENT 103, VOL. 23, NO. 3 (2009) (concluding that stock prices reflect all available
information within two minutes and the South Korea stock market is semi-strongly efficient, based on the
analysis of stock price responses on fair disclosure released by listing companies).
5

See generally, Syed Haq, Revisiting the Accredited Investor Standard, 5 MICH. BUS. &
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 59, 63-68 (2015).
6

Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae in Contemporary
Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291, 297-98 (1994) (stressing that accurate pricing is more important
in private offerings than IPOs because, unlike investors participating in the IPOs, many investors who
purchase the private offerings would “have portfolios heavily weighted with” privately placed securities
which are not efficiently priced).
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for a long period of time due to resale restrictions and, in many instances, the absence of
an active trading market, both of which can aggravate the investment risks.7 For these
reasons, private placement regulations specify the scope of investors who can participate
in private placement markets. This section explores investor qualifications required in the
U.S. and South Korean private placements and points out potential problems under the
current regulatory schemes.

1. UNITED STATES
1.1. ELIGIBLE PURCHASERS IN THE RULE 506 OFFERINGS
1.1.1. OVERVIEW
As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, SEC Rule 506(b) offerings limit
purchasers to accredited investors and 35 non-accredited, but sophisticated investors; Rule
506(c) offerings are limited to only accredited investors. Though Rule 506 offerings may
involve non-accredited investors, in practice, most of the offerings are made only to
accredited investors. 8 Thus, the accredited investor definition is the very core of the private

7

E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. Congress recently amended the Securities Act to add new resale exemption
in Section 4(a)(7) thereunder. New exemption allows resale of the restricted securities after at least 90 days
outstanding period when conditions enumerated in Section 4(d) are met. See Fixing America’s Surface
Transportation Act, Title LXXVI, § 76001(a), Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312, 1787-89 (2015) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(7), (d) (Supp. III 2015)). Section 4(a)(7) exemption is intended “to increase market
liquidity and resolve legal uncertainty that impedes employees of private companies from selling their
company-issued securities.” H.R. REP. NO. 114-281, at 3 (2015).
Scott Bauguess, Rachita Gullapalli, and Vladimir Ivanov, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Div. of Econ.
& Risk Analysis, Capital Raising in the U.S.: An Analysis of the Market for Unregistered Securities Offerings,
2009-2014, at 35-36 (Oct. 29, 2015) [hereinafter Unregistered Offerings Analysis] (reporting that only 8
percent of all 506(b) offerings include non-accredited investors between 2009 and 2014).
8
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placement regulations.9 This part of the review focuses on the historical development of
the accredited investor concept and the types of persons who fall within the definition.
1.1.2. ACCREDITED INVESTORS
a. Brief history of the accredited investor definition
The accredited investor definition originates in the term “accredited person” which
was defined under the former SEC Rule 242.10 Providing an exemption of limited offerings
of up to $2 million by qualified issuers, Rule 242 created the term “accredited person” so
that an issuer could make an objective determination on the investor’s sophistication.11
Paragraph (a)(1) of Rule 242 divides the accredited person into three categories: (i) a
specified type of institutional investors (e.g., bank, insurance company, employee benefit
plan), (ii) a person purchasing $100,000 or more of the issuer’s securities, (iii) a director
or executive officer of an issuer. 12 Accredited persons were excluded when computing the
35-purchaser limit of offerings in reliance on Rule 242.13

9
Roberta S. Karmel, Regulation By Exemption: The Changing Definition of an Accredited Investor, 39
RUTGERS L.J. 681, 681 (2008) (stating that “[t]he SEC exemptions have been achieved through the use of the
“accredited investor” concept”).
10
17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(1) (repealed); Exemption of Limited Offers and sales by Qualified Issuers,
Securities Act Release No. 6180, 19 SEC Docket 295, 1980 WL 29335 (Jan. 17, 1980) [hereinafter Rule 242
Adopting Release]; Friedman, supra note 6, at 305 (stating that “[Regulation D] was the legacy of Rule 242
that permitted the full movement toward allowing uninhibited sales to wealthy investors.”).
11

Rule 242 Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 3.

12

17 C.F.R. § 230.242(a)(1) (repealed). Similar to Paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of Rule 242, Rule 146 also
excluded persons purchasing $150,000 or more of an issuer’s securities when computing a 35-purchaser limit
of offerings thereunder. Id. § 230.146(g)(2)(i)(d). However, while Rule 146 excluded a person purchasing
$150,000 or more of securities for installments in computation, Rule 242 did not recognize as the accredited
person those who satisfy the minimum purchase amount for installments which exceed 60 days. Regarding
the imposed time limit, the SEC explained that “the 60-day limit on obligation to pay is necessary to assure
the accredited person has the economic bargaining power to obtain access to the information he requires to
make an informed decision.” See Rule 242 Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 4-5.
13

Id. § 230.242(e)(2)(iv).
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The term “accredited investor” first appeared in the Securities Act when Congress
enacted the Incentive Act in 1980 to facilitate the capital raising of small businesses. 14 The
Incentive Act amended the Securities Act to exempt offers and sales of up to $5 million
made solely to accredited investors from registration under Section 5 of the Securities
Act.15 The Incentive Act also amended the Securities Act to define the term “accredited
investor” under Section 2(a)(15).16 Subparagraph (i) of Section 2(a)(15) of the Securities
Act enumerates persons qualifying as an accredited investor and subparagraph (ii) allows
the SEC to add accredited investors on the basis of factors such as “financial sophistication,
net worth, knowledge, and experience in financial matters, or amount of assets under
management.”17
The SEC also defined the term “accredited investor” in Rule 501(a) when it adopted
Regulation D in 1982.18 The SEC stated that the definition was intended to “encompass
those persons whose financial sophistication and ability to sustain the risk of loss of
investment or ability to fend for themselves render the protections of the Securities Act’s
registration process unnecessary.”19 The accredited investor definition under Rule 501(a)
14

Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (codified as
amended in scattered Sections of 15 U.S.C.).
15

Incentive Act, § 602 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(5)). At the time the Incentive Act
was enacted, this provision was designated as Section 4(6) of the Securities Act. Later, Section 4(6) was
redesignated Section 4(5) by Section 944(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 944(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1897-98 (2010). Section 4(5) was
again redesignated Section 4(a)(5) by Section 201(b) of the JOBS Act. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(b), 126 Stat. 306, 314 (2012).
16

Incentive Act, § 603 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 77b(a)(15)). This provision was originally
designated as Section 2(15) of the Securities Act. Later, Section 2(15) was redesignated Section 2(a)(15) by
Section 106(a) of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 106(a),
110 Stat. 3416, 3424.
17

15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15).

18

17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (1982).

19
Exemption for Certain Employee Benefit Plans, at 2, Securities Act Release No. 6683 (Jan. 16, 1987),
37 SEC Docket 588, 1987 WL 847503 [hereinafter Regulation D Revision Proposing Release].
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enumerated several categories of persons and entities and significantly expanded investor
pools that businesses can attract to raise capitals privately. 20 In conjuncture with the
promulgation of Regulation D, the SEC also adopted Rule 215 pursuant to Section
2(a)(15)(ii) of the Securities Act in order to make the accredited investor definition under
Section 2(a)(15) consistent with that under Rule 501(a).21 As a result, accredited investors
covered by Section 2(a)(15) combined with Rule 215 are virtually the same as the
accredited investors covered under Rule 501(a) of Regulation D.22
The accredited investor definition was revised twice since its adoption in 1982. 23 In
Regulation D revisions of 1988, the SEC adjusted several categories of accredited
investors. 24 It also eliminated the $150,000 purchaser category which was previously
recognized under Rule 501(a)(6). 25 In 2011, the SEC amended Rule 501(a)(5) in order to

Friedman, supra note 6, at 300 (stating that “[c]apital formation was the driving force behind the
development of the concept of the “accredited investor.”).
20

21

17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (1982).

When adopting Regulation D, the SEC stated that “the definition in Rule 501(a) is identical to the
combined provisions of Section 2(15) and Rule 215 thereunder.” See Revision of Certain Exemptions from
Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, at 6 n.11, Securities Act Release No. 6389,
24 SEC Docket 1166, 1982 WL 35662 (Mar. 8, 1982) [hereinafter Regulation D Adopting Release].
22

Besides the revisions discussed in the text, the SEC proposed to create a new “accredited natural
person” category under the accredited investor definition in 1996, and also proposed to revise the accredited
investor definition as it relates to natural persons in 1997, among other things, to adopt an “investmentsowned” test, but they were never adopted. For the outline of proposals, see U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Report on the Review of the Definition of “Accredited Investor,” at 19-20 (Dec. 18, 2015) [hereinafter
Accredited Investor Study].
23

24

17 C.F.R. §§ 230.215, 501(a) (1988).

25

Id. Subparagraph (6) of Rule 501(a) prior to revision recognized an accredited investor as any person
purchasing at least $150,000 of the issuer’s securities, where the total purchase price does not exceed 20
percent of the purchaser’s joint net worth. Elimination of this category reflected the SEC’s concern that the
investment amount itself “does not assure sophistication or access to information.” See Regulation D
Revisions, Securities Act Release No. 6758, at 4, 40 SEC Docket 449, 1988 WL 237022 (March 3, 1988)
[hereinafter 1988 Revisions Release].

132

exclude the value of a person’s primary residence from the net worth calculation used to
determine whether a natural person qualifies as accredited investor. 26
The Dodd-Frank Act retains the special provisions relating to the accredited investor
definition. Section 413(b) mandates the SEC to undertake a review of the accredited
investor definition, in its entirety, as it applies to natural persons, no earlier than four years
after enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act and at least once every four years thereafter in order
to determine whether requirements of the definition should be adjusted or modified. 27

b. Categories of accredited investors
Rule 501(a) of Regulation D enumerates certain persons categorized as accredited
investors. To be accredited, an investor must, as of the time of sale, actually or based upon
reasonable belief of the issuer, come within any one of the eight categories in Rule 501(a).28

(1) Institutional investors
Rule 501(a)(1) lists institutional investors recognized as an accredited investor
including banks, insurance companies, investment companies and employee benefit plans

26

Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, 76 Fed. Reg. 81793, 81805-06 (Dec. 29, 2011)
(codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.215, 501(a)). This amendment was mandated by Section 413(a)
of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 413(a) requires the SEC to adjust the net worth standard so that the individual
or joint net worth is more than $1 million, excluding the value of the primary residence. Dodd-Frank Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, §413(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010).
27
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §413(b)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1578 (2010). The SEC
published the staff report that broadly reviews the accredited investor definition on December, 2015.
Accredited Investor Study, supra note 23.

Further, Section 415 of the Dodd-Frank Act also mandated the Comptroller General of the United
States to conduct a study on the criteria to qualify as accredited investor and submit it to the Congress no
later than three years after enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. Pursuant to Section 415, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) released its report in July, 2013. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office,
Alternative Criteria for Qualifying As An Accredited Investor Should Be Considered, GAO-13-640 (July 18,
2013) [hereinafter GAO Accredited Investor Report].
28

17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).

133

and “virtually all classes of institutional investors.”29 Some institutions, such as savings
and loan associations and broker-dealers registered under Exchange Act §15, were added
in 1988.30

(2) Private business development companies
Rule 501(a)(2) sets forth, as an accredited investor, private business development
companies as defined in Section 202(a)(22) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. A
business development company (BDC) is a form of unregistered close-end investment
company which invests at least certain percentage of its total assets in privately issued
securities or other eligible investments.31 A BDC was introduced in 1980 by the Incentive
Act which amended the Investment Company Act of 1940 for the purpose of facilitating
capital formation for domestic companies of small and mid-size.32

(3) Tax-exempt and for-profit organizations
Rule 501(a)(3) encompasses various forms of organizations with total assets in excess
of $5 million. When Regulation D was enacted in 1982, the organizations were limited to
tax-exempt organizations (e.g., college or university endowment funds) under Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.33 However, the rule was later expanded to include
other for-profit organizations such as corporations, partnerships and business trusts with

29

1988 Revisions Release, supra note 25, at 2.

30

17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1) (1988).

31

For brief explanation about the business development company, see Ze´–ev D. Eiger and Anna T.
Pinedo, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Frequently Asked Questions About Business Development Companies
(2016),
available
at
http://media.mofo.com/files/uploads/Images/FAQ-Business-DevelopmentCompanies.pdf.
32

Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2294 (1980) (codified
as amended in scattered Sections of 15 U.S.C.).
33

17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3) (1982).
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assets in excess of $5 million unless they are formed for the purpose of acquiring the
securities offered.34

(4) Directors, executive officers and general partners
Rule 501(a)(4) recognizes certain insiders of an issuer as accredited investors due to
their position which allows access to the information that a registration statement would
disclose. This category includes “any director, executive officer, or general partner of the
issuer of the securities being offered or sold, or any director, executive officer, or general
partner of a general partner of that issuer.” 35

(5) Natural person with net worth in excess of $1 million
This category includes “any natural person whose individual net worth, or joint net
worth with that person’s spouse, exceeds $1 million.”36 Although the term “net worth” is
not defined, it is generally recognized that net worth is calculated by adding up a person’s
assets and subtracting the person’s liabilities. 37 When it was originally adopted in 1982,
Rule 501(a)(5) did not provide any specific item to be excluded from a person’s total assets

34

Id. § 230.501(a)(3) (1988).

35

Id. § 230.501(a)(4). In proposing revision of Regulation D in 1987, the SEC asked for public
comments to decide whether Rule 501(a)(4) would expand to other officers who serve no policy-making
function but have financial sophistication. See Regulation D Revision Proposing Release, supra note 19, at
3. However, the SEC did not adopt this proposal in the final revision, stating “since [the SEC] has not been
persuaded that, absent a policy-making function characterizing an executive officer position, employees
regardless of their titles meet the standards of access to information and ability to bear the risk which are
necessary to achieve the status of accredited investor.” 1988 Revisions Release, supra note 25, at 3.
36

17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5). This paragraph was designated Rule 501(a)(6) when it was originally
adopted, but it was redesignated Rule 501(a)(5) by revision of Regulation D in 1988. Id. § 230.501(a) (1988).
37
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Office of Inv. Educ. and Advocacy, Investor Bulletin: Accredited
Investors, available at https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib_accreditedinvestors.pdf.
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or liabilities, despite some commentators’ concern for including “certain assets such as
principal residences and automobiles” in net worth calculation. 38
The SEC amended Rule 501(a)(5) in 2011 to exclude the value of a person’s primary
residence from the net worth calculation to determine whether a natural person qualifies as
accredited investor. 39 Specifically, the value of the person’s primary residence and
indebtedness secured by such residence are excluded in calculating net worth from an asset
and a liability, respectively.40 If indebtedness secured by the primary residence exceeds
the estimated value of such residence, the amount of such excess is included as a liability. 41
If debt secured by the primary residence was incurred within 60 days preceding the sale of
securities other than as a result of the acquisition of such residence, it is included as a
liability.42

(6) Natural persons with income in excess of certain financial threshold
This category identifies natural persons having an individual income in excess of
$200,000 ($300,000 with that person’s spouse) in each of the two most recent years and
having a reasonable expectation to reach the same income level in the current year. 43 The

38

To address the concern, the SEC simply increased the threshold amount to $1 million from $750,000
which was originally proposed. See Regulation D Adopting Release, supra note 22, at 9.
39
Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 9287 (Dec. 21, 2011)
[hereinafter Net Worth Standard Release].
40

17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)(i)(A)-(B).

41

Id. § 230.501(a)(5)(i)(C).

42
Id. § 230.501(a)(5)(i)(B). This 60-day look back period was adopted to “reduce the incentive for
individuals to try to “game” the accredited investor net worth standard or for salespersons to attempt to induce
individuals to take on incremental debt secured against their homes to facilitate a near-term investment in an
offering.” See Net Worth Standard Release, supra note 39, at 13-17.
43
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6). This paragraph was originally designated Rule 501(a)(7) when it was
adopted, but it was redesignated Rule 501(a)(6) by revision of Regulation D in 1988. Id. § 230.501(a) (1988).
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SEC adopted a flexible approach to income calculation by not defining the term
“income.”44

(7) Trusts with total assets in excess of $5 million
This category was added in 1988. 45 It accredits trusts with total assets in excess of $5
million unless they are formed for the purpose of acquiring the securities offered.46 It also
requires that investment decisions be made by a sophisticated person described in Rule
502(b)(2)(ii).47

(8) Entities owned entirely by accredited investors
The final category accredits any entity where all of its “equity owners” are accredited
investors under any of the categories listed above. 48 For example, an employee benefit or
retirement plan whose participants are all accredited investors is deemed an accredited
investor.49 Generally, this provision does not extend to a conventional trust. 50

The SEC originally proposed to employ an “adjusted gross income” as reported in the federal income
tax return with respect to income calculation. However, commentators objected to this approach for some
reasons and this was not adopted in the final rule. See Regulation D Adopting Release, supra note 22, at 9.
44

45

17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(7) (1988). Prior to adoption of this category, a trust could be qualified as an
accredited investor only if it has a bank as its trustee or it falls under the $150,000 purchaser category of Rule
501(a)(5) which was removed by Regulation D revision of 1988.
46

Id. § 230.501(a)(7).

47

Id. § 230.501(a)(7).

48

Id. § 230.501(a)(8).

49
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Div. of Corp. Fin., Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations: Securities
Act Rules [hereinafter C&DIS], Question 255.23; see also Thomas Byrne Swartz, SEC No-Action Letter,
1982 WL 29328 (June 10, 1982).
50

See C&DIs, supra note 49, Question 255.21; see also Lawrence B. Rabkin, SEC No-Action Letter,
1982 WL 30405 (July 16, 1982) (applying this provision in the case where the grantors of a revocable trust
were accredited investors and the trust could be amended or revoked at any time by the grantors).
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c. Verification of accredited investor status
To address the concern for lifting the ban of general solicitation and implement the
JOBS Act mandate, 51 the requirement that an issuer take reasonable steps to verify
accredited investor status was adopted as a condition for Rule 506(c) offerings.52 Thus,
without verification process, an issuer may not rely on the exemption under Rule 506(c)
even though all purchasers are actually accredited investors. 53 However, it does not
constitute reasonable steps for verification to simply require an investor to “check a box in
a questionnaire” as used in Rule 506(b) offerings. 54 The SEC asserted that an issuer should
consider whether the verification steps taken are reasonable “in the context of particular
facts and circumstances of each purchaser and transaction.” 55 To balance flexibility of the
verification process and legal certainty, 56 the SEC adopted the principle-based approach
but provided four types of verification methods on which an issuer may rely. 57 Since these
JOBS Act §201(a)(1) provides that “[the SEC’s] rules shall require the issuer to take reasonable steps
to verify that purchasers of the securities are accredited investors, using such methods as determined by the
Commission.” Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 313-14
(2012).
51

52

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii).

53

Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and
Rule 144A Offerings, at 26, Securities Act Release No. 9415 (July 10, 2013) [hereinafter Rule 506(c)
Adopting Release].
54

Id. at 33-34.

55

For this purpose, the SEC specifically listed some factors to be considered: (i) the nature of the
purchaser and the type of accredited investor that the purchaser claims to be; (ii) the amount and type of
information that the issuer has about the purchaser; and (iii) the nature of the offering (e.g., the manner in
which the purchaser was solicited to participate in the offering) and the term of the offering (e.g., minimum
investment amount). Id. at 27-34.
56

Id. at 27.

57

Verification methods prescribed under Rule 506(c)(2)(ii) are as follows:

(A) reviewing IRS forms and obtaining a written representation from the purchaser as to his
reasonable expectation of reaching the required income level during the current year for income test;
(B) reviewing documentations (e.g., a bank statement, credit report) dated within the prior three
months to ascertain an investor’s assets and liabilities and obtaining a written representation from
the purchaser as to accuracy of liabilities for net worth test;
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methods are non-exclusive and non-mandatory examples, different verification methods
may be employed for verification.

1.1.3. NON-ACCREDITED INVESTOR
An issuer may offer and sell its securities to a limited number of non-accredited
investors in a private offering under Rule 502(b), subject to the prohibition of general
solicitation under Rule 506(c). Under this safe harbor, the number of non-accredited
purchasers are limited to thirty-five persons58 and each purchaser “either alone or with his
purchaser representative” is required to have financial sophistication. 59 The investor’s
sophistication can be met with the issuer’s reasonable belief.60 Though the sophistication
requirement described in Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) originated in Rule 146(d)(2)(ii) which was
repealed by promulgation of Regulation D, the current rule eliminated the economic risk
test required by Rule 146.61

(C) obtaining a written confirmation from third parties (e.g., an attorney, CPA, registered
broker-dealer, investment adviser); and
(D) obtaining a certification from an investor who purchased the securities of an issuer as an
accredited investor in the Rule 506(b) offering prior to the effective date of Rule 506(c), and
participates in the same issuer’s Rule 506(c) offering.
17 C.F.R. §230.506(c)(2)(ii)(A)-(D).
58

Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(i). For origin of the figure 35, see Homer Kripke, Has the SEC Taken All the
Dead Wood Out of its Disclosure System?, 38 BUS. LAW. 833, 836-37 n.14 (1983) (also citing William J.
Casey, The SEC’s Strategy for Increasing Investor’s Confidence In the Integrity of Our Capital Markets, 28
BUS. LAW. 537, 538 (1973)).
59

Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) provides:
Each purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or with his purchaser
representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or the issuer reasonably
believes immediately prior to making any sale that such purchaser comes within this description.

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
60

Id.

61

Rule 146(d)(2)(ii) required an issuer and its agents to have reasonable grounds to believe that,
immediately prior to a sale of the securities, “an offeree is able to bear the economic risk of the investment”
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1.2. ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT REGULATION
1.2.1. WEALTH AS AN UNCONVINCING PROXY FOR ABILITY TO “FEND FOR ONESELF”
a. Arguments for the wealth test
In developing the accredited investor definition, the SEC intended to encompass
persons having “financial sophistication and ability to sustain the risk of loss of
investment.”62 Though the latter factor is not found in court cases,63 the SEC might need
this factor to maintain investor confidence in a capital market and facilitate capital
formation.64 The SEC also needed to develop a clear and objective standard to relieve legal
uncertainty with respect to application of the exemption rules. For this purpose, the SEC

where the offeree himself is not sophisticated and represented by sophisticated person. Id. § 230.146(d)(2)(ii)
(repealed).
In adopting the economic risk test, the SEC placed an importance on considerations that, “whether
the offeree could afford to hold unregistered securities for an indefinite period, and whether, at the time of
investment, he could afford a complete loss.” Notice of Adoption of Rule 146 Under the Securities Act of
1933-“Transactions by an Issuer Deemed Not to Involve Any Public Offering,” at 8, Securities Act Release
No. 5487, 4 SEC Docket 154, 1974 WL 161966 (April 23, 1974) [hereinafter Rule 146 Adopting Release].
It further stated, without additional explanation, that “[t]he concept of bearing the economic risk of the
investment is not inconsistent with the discussion in Ralston Purina about the offeree’s ability to fend for
himself.” Id. at 4.
However, in adopting Regulation D, the SEC accepted the comments that, “where the purchaser is
represented by person(s) meeting the sophistication standards, given information substantially equivalent to
a registration statement and fully appraised of restrictions regarding resale, it is inappropriate to make a
separate judgment concerning the investor’s ability to bear economic loss.” Proposed Revision of Certain
Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving
Limited Offers and Sales, at 22, Securities Act Release No. 6339 (Aug. 7, 1981), 23 SEC Docket 446, 1981
WL 31063 [hereinafter Regulation D Proposing Release].
62

Regulation D Revision Proposing Release, supra note 19, at 2.

Joseph R. Soraghan, Private Offerings: Determining “Access,” “Investment Sophistication,” and
“Ability to Bear Economic Risk,” 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 12 (1980) (stating that “[n]o courts had previously
required [] [“risk-bearing ability”] or expressly considered it as an added factor in establishing that an investor
could “fend for themselves”).
63

For consideration of the economic risk test in the SEC’s rulemaking, see supra note 61; see also Haq,
supra note 5, at 77 (stating “[i]t must be noted that if an individual loses a substantial portion of their assets,
their costs are not simply bore by those investors. Systemic investor failures caused by poor decision makers
can affect capital formation as a whole.”).
64
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employed the investor’s wealth as a proxy to identify persons for whom protection through
the registration process is unnecessary. The rationale behind the wealth test is the belief
that wealth enables investors to “purchase sophistication by hiring financial advisors,” 65
“have either access to or the economic power to obtain access to the material information” 66
and “bear the economic risk of an investment in unregistered securities.”67

b. Drawbacks of the wealth test
The current wealth-based test has been criticized because it does not appear to
correctly reflect an investor’s sophistication.68 However, it seems that commentators did
not clearly respond to the argument that the rich can have sophistication necessary to
remove statutory protection by hiring a professional adviser.69 If this simple assumption
cannot be defeated, criticism for the wealth test seems to not be so persuasive. Accordingly,
by reviewing a legislative history of the accredited investor definition and environments
surrounding the private placement, this section begins demonstrating why the underlying

65

Greg Oguss, Should Sizes or Wealth Equal Sophistication in Federal Securities Laws?, 107 NW. U.
L. REV. 285, 294 (2012); see also Kripke, supra note 58, at 836; Karmel, supra note 9, at 683.
66
Manning Gilbert Warren III, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen for Limited
Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 335, 381 (1984).
67

Net Worth Standard Release, supra note 39, at 4.

E.g., Marc I. Steinberg, The “Accredited” Individual Purchaser Under SEC Regulation D: Time to
Up the Ante, 29 SEC. REG. L.J. 93, 95 (2001) (indicating that “the $1 million net worth level is far too low to
deem one as accredited.”); Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88
CAL. L. REV. 279, 310 (2000) (stating that the accredited investor standard is “both under- and
overinclusive”).
68

69

See sources cited supra note 65. For example, Kripke states in his article as follows:
Yet, it is by no means self-evident that every person falling within the definition can fend for
him/herself. . . . Yet, I do not question the justification for these objective tests as working rules
of law. Persons of wealth, if they are not themselves competent to appraise the risk, will tend to
use professional advisers.

Kripke, supra note 58, at 836.
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assumption of the wealth test is false. Subsequently, it argues that the wealth standard fails
to measure an investor’s own sophistication and risk bearing.
(1) False assumption of accreditation through third party’s sophistication
(a) Statutory language of Section 2(a)(15) of the Securities Act
The assumption that wealthy but unsophisticated investors would rely on the third
party’s sophistication is not consistent with a plain reading of Section 2(a)(15)(ii) of the
Securities Act.70 Section 2(a)(15) defines the term “accredited investor.” Subsequent to
paragraph (i) of the Section 2(a)(15), which enumerates certain institutional investors,
paragraph (ii) accredits “any person who, on the basis of such factors as financial
sophistication, net worth, knowledge, and experience in financial matters, or amount of
assets under management, qualifies as an accredited investor under rules and regulations
which the Commission shall prescribe.” 71 Thus, paragraph (ii) of Section 2(a)(15) gives
the SEC specific instruction in its rule-making and the SEC is bound to this mandate.72
However, any part of paragraph (ii) is not understood that a person can be qualified on the
basis of sophistication imputed to a third party. In contrast, defining the qualification
standard of purchasers other than accredited investors in Rule 506(b) offerings,
subparagraph (ii) of Rule 506(b)(2) requires a non-accredited purchaser to have financial

70

15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15).

71

Id.

72

15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15). The SEC retains the general exemptive authority under Section 28 of the
Securities Act by the 1996 amendment. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA),
Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 105(a), 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3). However, Regulation
D was adopted under the SEC’s general rule-making authority of Section 19(a) of the Securities Act. Section
19(a) authorizes the SEC to make, amend, and rescind rules and regulations “necessary to carry out the
provisions” of the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a). The NSMIA also mandated the SEC to “consider, in
addition to the protection of investors, efficiency, competition, and capital formation” in its rulemaking. Pub.
L. No. 104-290, § 106(a), 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b)).

142

sophistication “either alone or with his purchaser representative(s).” 73 Though Rule
506(b)(2)(ii) is different from the Section 2(a)(15)(ii) in the legal form, it expressly
distinguishes an investor’s own sophistication from sophistication in reliance on
knowledge of professionals. Absent such explicit distinction, it is a more natural reading
of paragraph (ii) of the Section 2(a)(15), at least on the SEC’s part, that the Securities Act
mandates the Commission to consider financial sophistication and other factors that an
investor actually possesses in expanding the scope of accredited investors through its rules.

(b) Legislative history of Section 2(a)(15) of the Securities Act
This interpretation is more convincing when examining the legislative history of
Section 2(a)(15) which was added by the Incentive Act in 1980. Though the Incentive Act
was enacted by passage of the House bill, H.R. 7554,74 the statutory language of current
Section 2(a)(15) originated from H.R. 3991.75 Section 3(b) of H.R. 3991 was to amend
Section 2 of the Securities Act by adding Paragraph (15) thereunder which defines the term
“accredited investor.”76 The accredited investor definition drafted in the Section 3(b) of
H.R. 3991 consisted of three clauses. Clauses A and B are, in the most part, similar to
paragraphs (i) and (ii) of current Section 2(a)(15) of the Securities Act. 77 Further, the
Section 3(b) of H.R. 3991 contained clause C, which does not exist in the current definition
under Section 2(a)(15). This clause would have qualified as an accredited investor “any

73

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).

74

SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT INCENTIVE ACT OF 1980, H.R. 7554, 96th Cong. (1980) (enacted).

75

SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT INCENTIVE ACT OF 1979, H.R. 3991, 96th Cong. § 3(b) (1979).

76

Id.

77

Id. Paragraph (i) of Section 2(a)(15) of the Securities Act enumerates certain institutional investors.
Paragraph (ii) authorizes the SEC to prescribe additional categories of accredited investors in its rules. 15
U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15).
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person who does not qualify as an accredited investor under such rules and regulations but
who relies upon the investment advice of a person who does so qualify.” 78 However, when
the SEC was asked to comment on H.R. 3991, it expressed a negative view of clause C
because of the expanding scope of accredited investors by using the sophistication of other
accredited investors. 79 The SEC remarked that “[p]ursuant to clause C, sales could be
made to an unlimited universe of purchasers without the benefit of the disclosures required
under the Securities Act.” 80 Several bills, including H.R. 7554 and S. 2990 reflected the
concern that the SEC raised in the subcommittee hearing on H.R. 3991 and did not include
the language of clause C in defining the term “accredited investor.”81 With respect to the

78

H.R. 3991, 96th Cong. § 3(b) (1979).

79

At the hearing before the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance, the SEC
Commissioner, Philip A. Loomis, Jr. stated:
We are, however, concerned about the unduly broad definition of “accredited investor” in clause
C of Section 3(b) of the bill, which includes persons who rely on the investment advice of the
accredited investors, described in clause A and B. It may be that investors of the type described
in clauses A and B of the definition can fend for themselves. But this does not mean that persons
advised by those persons should be deprived of the protections of the registration provisions of
the Securities Act.
Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1979: Hearing on H.R. 3991 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Protection and Finance of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong. 37
(1979) (statement of Philip A. Loomis, Jr., Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
80

Id.

81
E.g., H.R. 7554, 96th Cong. § 101 (1980); H.R. 6580, 96th Cong. § 4 (1980); H.R. 6723, 96th Cong.
§ 101 (1980); S. 2699, 96th Cong. § 4 (1980); S. 2990, 96th Cong. § 403 (1980).

Enacted bill H.R. 7554 which was introduced on June 12, 1980 by Representative Broyhill, who is also
a sponsor of the bill H.R. 3991, intended to accommodate concerns raised by the SEC during the
subcommittee hearings. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1341, at 19 (1980). When H.R. 7554 was introduced, Section
101 of the bill rewrote the term ‘accredited investor.’ Though the Section 101 was different from the previous
accredited investor definition under H.R. 3991 in some aspects (for example, it included a minimum $100,000
purchaser in the accredited investor definition), it did not adopt troublesome clause C of Section 3(b) of the
previous bill, H.R. 3991. See H.R. 7554, 96th Cong. § 101 (1980). However, Section 101 was stroke out
when the bill H.R. 7554 was reported in the House on September 17, 1980. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1341, at 1.
Instead, the Senate and the House agreed to adopt the language of Section 403 of the Senate bill S. 2990
which defines the term “accredited investor” in Section 603 of H.R. 7554, which was finally enacted. See
126 CONG. REC. 27,258-79 (1980); 126 CONG. REC. 28630-35 (1980).
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interpretation of Section 2(a)(15)(ii), its legislative history clearly shows the congressional
intent that an accredited investor should be qualified on the basis of his own sophistication.

(c) Disintermediation in the startup financing markets
Separate from the discussions above, the assumption of reliance on knowledge of
professionals would be meaningless if the investors were likely to seek investment advice
in an actual investment setting. In reality, current market environments surrounding private
placement markets appear to make it difficult for wealthy investors to seek professional
advice on their investments. Wealthy individuals are known to invest in early-stage startup
firms before they reach the stage where they can attract venture capital funds. 82 Further, it
is also known that traditional broker-dealers and investment advisers do not play an active
role in early-stage startup financing “because the transactions are not large enough to
generate sufficient commissions.” 83 Thus, startup financing markets, backed up by the
technological advance and market needs, involve the internal motivation to directly link
enterprises and investors without intermediation by traditional broker-dealers.84 Though
this will be more closely examined in the Chapter IV.B, we have already witnessed how
the markets have evolved to bypass the general solicitation ban, which restricts enterprises

82
Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending For Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should Encourage Angel
Groups, 13 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 107, 115 (2010) (explaining the tendency that early stage startup companies
often rely on wealthy individuals “when funding requests are below minimum VC investment amounts”).
83

Id. at 136-142 (indicating that placement agents or investment advisers are not involved in early stage
startup financing because it is not cost-efficient).
Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of “Technological
Disintermediation” for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 4-9 (1998)
(explaining that, though earlier no-action letters as to general solicitation ban had an effect to channel
unregistered offerings in the direction that registered broker-dealers intermediate the deals, communication
technology gave birth to matching systems such as Ace-Net and IPOnet which resulted in disintermediation).
84
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from offering their securities to investors with whom they do not have a pre-existing
relationship.85
In the disintermediated markets, however, investors cannot enjoy the certain benefits
which exist when those investors employ financial intermediaries which conduct due
diligence for securities which they sell, and provide their clients with advisory service.
Though investors may try to secure professionals who separately assess a given investment
opportunity, this effort is likely to end in vain because commissions for this kind of work
do not justify use of professionals in most investments. Therefore, it might be hard to
guarantee that wealthy investors can be protected by investment professionals considering
the nature of startup financing markets.

(2) Wealth as insufficient indicia for sophistication and risk bearing
(a) Insufficiency of empirical evidence
The preceding section demonstrates why we cannot hold the underlying assumption
of the wealth test. As its natural consequence, this section should discuss whether the
wealth-based standards accurately measure an investor’s own sophistication and “ability to
sustain investment losses.”86 If an argument that wealth is a predominant variable for such
factors were supported by empirical studies, this evidence would be a strong defense for
maintaining the wealth test.

Presumably for this purpose, the SEC presented three

empirical studies and the 2012 National Financial Capability Study in the staff report on

85
86

See infra part IV.B.1.
Accredited Investor Study, supra note 23, at 71.
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the accredited investor definition which was published in December 2015, to demonstrate
a correlation between wealth and financial sophistication.87
However, whether such literature can be used to support the wealth test requires closer
examination. It should be noted that the goals of the empirical studies cited in the SEC
report were not to prove a causal relation between wealth and sophistication (e.g., whether
level of wealth affects positively a person’s sophistication), but only to explain irrational
investor behaviors discovered in the capital market. For example, a study by Dhar and Zhu
(2006) explains that investor sophistication is negatively correlated with the disposition
effect. This means “the tendency to sell stocks that have appreciated in price (winners)
sooner than stocks that trade below the purchase price (losers).” 88 Diminution of irrational
behaviors for wealthy investors does not necessarily mean that such investors are
financially sophisticated, at least in the context of our discussion.

89

Financial

sophistication used in the accredited investor concept needs higher level of capability to
actively collect and analyze information relevant to the investment and to assess investment

87
Accredited Investor Study, supra note 23, at 44-46 (stating “[s]ome academic studies lend support to
the theory that wealth is correlated to financial sophistication.”).
88

Ravi Dhar and Ning Zhu, Up Close and Personal: Investor Sophistication and the Disposition Effect,
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 726, 726-29, VOL. 52, NO. 5 (2006). Similarly, two other studies also explain
investor irrational behaviors with variables:
A 2003 study by by Annette Vissing-Jorgensen shows irrational investor beliefs by analyzing
UBS/Gallup data. The study also demonstrates a negative correlation between investor wealth and irrational
investor actions. Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Perspectives on Behavioral Finance: Does “Irrationality”
Disappear with Wealth? Evidence from Expectations and Actions 139, 189-90, NBER MACROECONOMICS
ANNUAL 2003, VOL. 18.
2009 study by Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini explains that factors such as financial wealth and
household size are negatively correlated with a single index of financial sophistication which consists of
“three types of investment mistakes: under-diversification, inertia in risk taking, and the disposition effect in
direct stockholdings.” Lauren E. Calvet et al., Measuring the Financial Sophistication of Households,
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 393, 393-94, VOL 99. NO. 2 (2009).
89

2003 study indicates that even wealthy investors formulate irrational beliefs in their investments.
Calvet, id. (reporting that “even for wealthy investors, (1) expected returns were high at the pick of the
market; . . . .”).
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risks rather than to passively avoid irrational behaviors. However, investor sophistication
is loosely defined in these studies. For example, a study by Dhar and Zhu (2006) equates
income with sophistication90 and a study by Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2009) associates
sophistication with “three types of investment mistakes: under-diversification, inertia in
risk taking, and the disposition effect.”91
Even assuming these studies can be interpreted in favor of correlation between wealth
and sophistication, they may not be used to support the SEC’s wealth test. In these studies,
wealth is measured as financial assets or income, not overall wealth or net worth.92 In
addition, explanatory power of income for irrational investor behaviors is not satisfactory
in certain study.93
Finally, the National Financial Capability (NFC) Study by the FINRA Investor
Education Foundation is also insufficient to justify the wealth test.94 The SEC viewed this
study as supportive of the wealth test because “higher income individuals correctly

Dhar, supra note 88, at 728-29 (stating that “[b]ecause we do not have direct data on individual
knowledge about investments, we rely on demographic variables that have been shown to proxy differences
in expertise in general and about investment products in particular.”).
90

91

Calvet, supra note 88, at 393.

92

As explained above, the 2006 study uses income as proxy for sophistication. Dhar, supra note 88, at
729. The 2009 study employs various financial characteristics such as disposable income, private pension
premia/income, financial wealth, real estate wealth total liability in order to identify persuasive factors for
investor mistakes. In particular, it defines financial wealth as the sum of “three classes of liquid financial
assets”: bank account balances, money market funds and stocks. Calvet, supra note 88, at 394-96. The 2003
study also, in most parts, relies on financial assets and income in the analysis of UBS/Gallup data. Though
the 2003 study partly analyzes net worth data from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances, it only
shows that wealthier investors hold directly a greater number of stocks and trade much more than less wealthy
investors, which could be interpreted, as the author did, as “evidence that wealthier investors are more
overconfident than others.” Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 88, at 164-78.
93
In a 2009 study, correlation between disposable income and a sophistication index is as low as 0.137
compared to 0.923 of correlation between financial wealth and a sophistication. Calvet, supra note 88, at
397.
94
Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Inv. Educ. Found., Financial Capability in the United States: Report of
Findings from 2012 National Financial Capability Study (2013) [hereinafter 2012 NFC Study].
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answered 3.5 out of five questions on a financial literacy quiz compared to only 2.2 correct
responses for lower income individuals.” 95 However, the financial literacy surveys of the
NFC Study consist of five questions regarding interest, inflation, bond price, mortgage and
risk.96 Financial knowledge measured by such basic questions seems to not be relevant for
the supporting argument, considering that financial sophistication in the regulatory context
requires much higher level of knowledge and experience in business and financial matters.

(b) Wealth in terms of sophistication
If correlation between wealth and sophistication could not be clearly shown by
empirical evidence, we need to take a different approach. One of the most convincing
reasons against wealth as a proxy may be, as one commentator explains, that people can
accumulate wealth through diverse methods which are not related with investing
activities.97 Analyzing this aspect, commentators have long criticized that the wealth test
could capture wrong targets such as “a high school dropout who has inherited a family
farm”98 and “a senior retiree who has accumulated over $1 million in his or her retirement
account.”99 This criticism seems to be more compelling under financial thresholds of the

95

Accredited Investor Study, supra note 23, at 45.

96

2012 NFC Study, supra note 94, at 27.

Haq, supra note 5, at 69 (explaining that “wealth may be accumulated by windfall” or “incremental
process” such as savings).
97

98

Manning Gilbert Warren III, An Essay on Rule 506 of Regulation D: Its Questionable Origin,
Regulatory Oblivion and Judicial Revitalization, 38 SEC. REG. L.J. 5, 8 (2010).
99
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Comm’r, Luis A. Aguilar, Public statement: Revisiting the "Accredited
Investor" Definition to Better Protect Investors (Dec. 17, 2014).
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current net worth and income tests, which qualify over 10% of U.S. households as
accredited investors.100
Commentators have also criticized that the wealth test does not embrace certain
potential investor groups that ought to be included in light of their knowledge and
experience in financial matters. 101 Accrediting this type of investors is expected to bring
certain positive effects into the private placement markets. To illustrate, let’s assume three
wealthy friends with no financial background who, nevertheless, qualify as accredited
investors under the current standard, are preparing for startup investments. Assume that
they know one friend who is not wealthy, but has a financial background as well as
experience in a startup business. Though he is unable to invest sizable money due to
financial restraint, his participation as a co-investor may benefit other co-investors by
utilizing his knowledge and experience in the investment process and in monitoring their
investment. Further, his participation could also benefit the startup company since he may
give counsel on the business perspectives to young and inexperienced entrepreneurs. The

100

Accredited Investor Study, supra note 23, at 48 (reporting that in 2013, 6.6% and 7.5% of U.S.
households are qualified as accredited investors on the basis of net worth and income tests respectively, and
10.1% on combined basis).
101
E.g., Wallis K. Finger, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited Investor”
definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 748 (2009); see also Larissa Lee, The Ban Has
Lifted: Now Is the Time to Change the Accredited-Investor Standard, 2014 Utah L. Rev. 369, 382 (2014).

Finger pointed out that the wealth-based standard does not correctly capture sophisticated investors by
comparing fictitious Sheryl with Parris Hilton who would be certainly accredited despite her limited “training
and sophistication in the field of high-stakes financial transactions.”
[A]ssume Sheryl has an M.B.A. from Harvard and is a graduate of one of the country's leading
Ph.D. programs in financial systems analysis. After all of this schooling, Sheryl is long on debt
and short on assets. She has several offers to work at the nation's most prestigious investment
brokerages. But if Sheryl wants to invest in a private offering, the SEC regulations will not allow
it. Sheryl is barred from investing in private offerings because, unlike Paris Hilton, Sheryl does
not have sufficient income or net worth to be an “accredited investor.”
See Finger, at 733.
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company may make use of his business networks for product marketing and future rounds
of financing.102

(c) Wealth in terms of risk bearing
Let’s turn our focus to whether wealth appropriately considers an investor’s risk
bearing. Though wealth, per se, appears to be superior to other conceivable proxies in
measuring an investor’s risk tolerance, 103 several issues with the current tests still need to
be addressed. An ability to bear investment risks is more critical for individual accredited
investors than institutional investors under current resale limitation. Large institutional
investors, so-called “qualified institutional buyers” (QIBs) can resell securities acquired in
the private placement immediately after the issuance on the PORTAL market, which is the
trading platform for OIBs.104 On the contrary, individuals are not allowed to resell shares
by using such trading market.105 Thus, individual investors are more vulnerable to the
illiquidity risk than institutional investors.106

102
Jason B. Brinlee, Geralyn McClure Franklin, Joseph R. Bell and Charles A. Bullock, Educating
Entrepreneurs on Angel Venture Capital Financing Options, Journal of Business and Entrepreneurship 141,
148, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2004) (stating that angels assist ventures “either through external contacts or their own
previous experiences”); see also Cable, supra note 82, at 130.
103
As summarized in the SEC study, potential new criteria suggested by commentators (e.g., education,
business experience and professional certifications) primarily focus on the qualitative aspects to measure an
investor’s sophistication more accurately. Investment-based tests (e.g., $750,000 investments-owned
standard) suggested as an alternative to the net worth test may be relevant to an investor’s ability to bear the
economic risk, but it can be categorized into broad wealth-based tests. Accredited Investor Study, supra note
23, at 55-67.
104

17 C.F.R. § 230.144A; see generally William K. Sjostrom, Jr. The Birth of Rule 144A Equity
Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV. 409, 422-29 (2008).
105
Friedman, supra note 6, at 307 (“[w]hen the needs for capital formation is removed, as it is in the
secondary trading under Rule 144A, the SEC recognizes clearly that it is inappropriate to sell to these
individuals . . . .”).

E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. Congress recently amended the Securities Act “to increase market
liquidity and resolve legal uncertainty that impedes employees of private companies from selling their
company-issued securities” by providing new resale exemption. See supra note 7.
106
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Nonetheless, the wealth test does not consider the danger that individual investors
have undiversified portfolios “heavily weighted with” risky investments. 107 Professor
Howard M. Friedman argued that there exists a structural incentive for broker-dealers to
encourage individual investors to hold undiversified portfolios.108 Under SEC Rule 506(b),
which prohibits general solicitation, an issuer can have a pre-existing relationship with
investors by using a broker or dealer’s precedent relationship with those investors.109 To
establish such a triangular relationship, “broker-dealer firms developed a procedure” to
create and manage “the pool of pre-existing contacts” among their clients for future private
placement deals.110 Thus, broker-dealers have an incentive to sell securities to investors in
the pool whenever they undertake private offerings on issuer’s behalf. 111 This brokerdealers’ effort can lead investors’ portfolios to lean too much toward private securities
“displaying similar investment risks.” 112

Professor Friedman also pointed out that

suitability rules applicable to broker-dealers are unlikely to relieve this concern.113
In addition, methods in which net worth is calculated can amplify the criticism. Since
only investor’s primary residence is excluded from his assets in calculating net worth,
certain assets constituting net worth might not be suitable for assuring the investor’s risk

E.g., Lee, supra note 101, at 382 (criticizing that the net worth test “fails to consider diversification”);
see also Oguss, supra note 65, at 294-95; Friedman, supra note 6, at 298.
107

108

Friedman, supra note 6, at 306-07.

109

For the pre-existing relationship doctrine, see infra Part IV.B.1

110

Friedman, supra note 6, at 306 (citing J. WILLIAM HICKS, LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTIONS:
REGULATION D at 3-46 to 3-53 (1993-94 ed.)).
111

Friedman, supra note 6, at 306.

112

Friedman, supra note 6, at 307.

See Friedman, supra note 6, at 307-13 (“. . . neither ex ante mechanisms nor ex post remedial rules
encourage the application of suitability standards in a way that protects wealthy accredited investors from
recommendations that ignore diversification concerns.”).
113
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tolerance. For example, the elderly who are accredited primarily based on their retirement
funds are likely to be more vulnerable to investment failure.114 This would be similar in
cases where an investor retains remaining wealth in the form of illiquid assets which cannot
be easily converted into cash or cash equivalent in short term or can cause losses in value
by selling them in haste.

1.2.2. UNBALANCED SAFEGUARDS AGAINST MISCLASSIFICATION OF INVESTOR STATUS
a. Overview
SEC Rule 506 is grounded in the different treatment of investor status. In other words,
investor status- accredited or non-accredited- determines conditions for investor protection
that an issuer must satisfy to claim the Section 4(a)(2) exemption. Thus, misclassification
of investor status affects legal interests of issuers and investors. Such misclassification,
which places investors in a legal position where they ought not to be, arise from two
different types of errors in a realistic sense. One type of errors occur when an issuer
classifies an unqualified investor as an accredited investor.115 These kind of errors, in most
cases, would arise from the issuer’s negligence in identifying investor status without
supposing egregious cases where an issuer intentionally disguises average investors as
accredited investors. The other type of errors occur when the investor classification
standard itself fails to correctly capture actually qualified investors. These types of errors

Haq, supra note 5, at 76 (“[t]here may not be an issue where an individual is young and can recoup
a large portion if not all of their losses. However, elderly individuals do not have such a luxury.”)
114

115

Conversely, we may imagine a situation where an issuer may mistakenly classify an accredited
investor as an unaccredited investor. However, this type of misclassification is not likely to cause much
concern because the issuer may still claim the Rule 506(b) exemption unless the number of unaccredited
investors exceeds 35 and also the misclassified investor is given the higher level of protection. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506(b).

153

seem to be inevitable, to some extent, in cases where the investor standards employ the
proxies which can be over-inclusive or under-inclusive or both.
Misclassification of investor status is followed by issuers and investors’ concerns:
Issuers would be concerned about the possibility that their own misclassification leads to
violation of the federal securities laws.

Concerns also may be raised about

misclassification by rule-makers that could deprive investors of regulatory protections that
should be afforded to them. In this regard, the current regulation needs to be reviewed for
how it addresses these concerns. In short, it seems that current regulation does not properly
address the investors’ concerns for misclassification, contrary to those of the issuers.

b. Safeguards for issuers
Regulation D expressly retains certain provisions to address issuers’ concerns. First,
the accredited investor definition of Rule 501(a) protects an issuer from the risk of
misclassifying non-accredited investors as accredited investors by adopting the reasonable
belief standard in identifying investor status of potential purchasers.116 Thus, even though
a purchaser of privately placed securities is found to be an unaccredited investor after sale,
this fact does not deprive the issuer of privilege to rely on 4(a)(2) exemption if the issuer
had a reasonable belief that a purchaser is an accredited investor at the time of sale. Further,
Rule 508 provides issuers with an additional safeguard from a violation of Section 5 of the
Securities Act and subsequent civil liability.117 SEC Rule 508 states that “failure to comply
with a term, condition or requirements” of Regulation D offerings does not necessarily

116

Id. § 230.501(a).

117
Friedman, supra note 6, at 301 (describing Rule 508 as “the seller’s safe harbor from civil liability
to investors for unintentional and insignificant violations of Regulation D.”).
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“result in the loss of the exemption” if such failure is insignificant. 118 Thus, the issuer’s
concerns for misclassifying investor status can be relieved by these provisions of
Regulation D.

c. Absence of safeguards for investors
On the contrary, Regulation D is silent on how it can protect investors from
misclassification. First of all, it should be noted that SEC Rule 506 indiscriminately divests
accredited investors of the benefit and protection of mandatory disclosure regardless of
their intention. This approach is premised upon the belief that accredited investors can
fend for themselves without relying on statutory protection. Therefore, deprivation of ex
ante investor protection can be justified only if the accredited investor standard correctly
identifies investors appropriate for such premise. If an accredited investor is not actually
sophisticated, he should be able to regain protection that should have been afforded him
without such an imprecise proxy. However, the current regime does not give investors a
chance to deny his accredited investor status voluntarily and enjoy benefit of mandatory
disclosure. Under the current regime, an issuer or any person on its behalf does not have
any motive to furnish purchasers of the securities with information even though they knew
purchasers are ostensibly accredited but actually not sophisticated. Accordingly, lack of
protections for misclassified investors could bring a result that innocent investors have to
bear potential damages that would be caused by flaw of the regulatory scheme.

118

17 C.F.R. § 230.508(a).
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d. Other regulatory regimes
In this respect, it is worth noting that regulatory regimes of other countries take a more
flexible approach on investor classification. For example, the EU’s Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive, which primarily governs investment services and activities by
investment firms, classifies investors as “professional clients” and “retail clients.”119 As a
general rule, all individual investors are deemed “retail clients” who benefit full protections
of the Directive.120 However, they can be, on request, treated as “professional clients”
(“opt-in” or “opt-up”) if certain qualification standards are satisfied.121 Once individual
investors are classified as professional clients, they also fall within the definition of
“qualified investors” under the Prospectus Directive, which governs securities offerings.122
The Prospectus Directive exempts issuers from the obligation to publish a prospectus in
cases where offers of securities are made “solely to qualified investors.” 123 More
discussion on investor classification will be addressed in later section.

119

Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets
in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (“MiFID II”),
Article 4.1(10)-(11).
120

MiFID II, Section I of Annex II. Section I enumerates the categories of professional clients such as
institutional investors, governments and public entities, but it does not contain private individuals.
MiFID II, Section II of Annex II. On the other hand, professional clients are also allowed to “request
non-professional treatment” to investment firms (“out-out” or “opt-down”).
121

122
Directive 2010/73/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010
amending Directives 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public
or admitted to trading and 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to
information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (“Prospectus
Directive”), Article 2.1(e).
123

Prospective Directive, Article 3.2(a).
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1.2.3. ONE SIZE CANNOT FIT ALL: COMPLEXITY OF SECURITIES PRODUCTS
Complex and highly risky nature of certain securities may increase the concern for the
current accredited investor definition. Rule 506’s safe harbor has a general application
regardless of the types of securities involved in the transactions. So does the accredited
investor definition. This means that, no matter the complexity of the securities offered,
accredited investors are deemed to fend for themselves and, accordingly, the regulatory
protection is unnecessary for those investors only if the securities are offered in private.
This kind of approach might have been natural at the time when Regulation D was adopted
because the securities were not as diverse and complex as today and the primary purpose
of Regulation D was to assist capital raising of small businesses which rely on the
traditional financing instruments such as common stocks, preferred stock and convertible
bonds.
However, since the time when Regulation D was adopted and the definition of
“security” in the Securities Act was amended to encompass options on securities, 124 the
landscape of capital markets has dramatically changed. In specific, structured products
manufactured and sold by investment banks have evolved to satisfy diverse financial needs

124
The Securities Act was enacted to clarify the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the definition of security, and for other purposes, § 1, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)) (inserting in the definition of security “any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any
security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange
relating to foreign currency,”).

This amendment was made to resolve the disputes between the SEC and CFTC regarding jurisdictions
over security-based derivatives. To eliminate the jurisdictional uncertainties, two agencies reached an
agreement in December, 1981 to “propose jointly legislative amendments to the statutes administered by the
agencies, in order to codify the interpretations agreed upon by the agencies” (called the “Shad-Johnson
Jurisdictional Accord”). Further, the amendment was avoidable by the 7th circuit court’s decision that
options on exempted securities were not securities. See Bd. of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982). For backgrounds of the amendment, see generally, S. Rep. No. 97390, at 2-5 (1982).
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of market participants. 125 Structured products are growing in popularity with investors as
alternative investments in an investment climate where traditional financial instruments
become less attractive due to market conditions such as persistent low level of interest rates
and stagnated stock markets. 126 Despite criticism that structured products contributed to
financial crisis in 2008, sales of structured products are bouncing back in recent years with
a more distinct upward trend in retail markets.127
As sales of structured products to retail investors increase, regulatory concerns are
also growing in terms of investor protection. Since structured products have unique
features, different from traditional investments in their terms (e.g., complex payoff
structures, embedded fees, call provisions, illiquidity) and risk factors, 128 the investor
sophistication required in those investments also would be different from traditional
investments. For example, business experience would be a relevant factor in investing in

125

Though structured products are not currently defined in the federal securities statutes and SEC rules,
FINRA defines as “securities derived from or based on a single security, a basket of securities, an index, a
commodity, a debt issuance and/or foreign security.” See Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Structured Products:
NASD Provides Guidance Concerning the Sales of Structured Products, Notice to Members 05-59 (Sep. 2005)
(NASD was succeeded by the FINRA in 2007).
Structured products typically have mixed characteristics of traditional instruments (e.g., bonds, notes,
CDs) and derivatives (e.g., options), and can be structured in a variety of forms representing different payout
patterns and risks. According to the SEC, structured products sold to retail investors can be classified into
five categories: principal protected notes, enhanced-income notes, performance/market participation notes,
leveraged/enhanced participation notes, and reverse convertibles. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Office of
Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Staff Summary Report on Issues Identified in Examination of
Certain Structured Securities Products Sold to Retail Investors 1, 3-5 (July 27, 2011) [hereinafter OCIE 2011
Report].
126
JENNIFER BETHEL & ALLEN FERRELL, POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY STRUCTURED PRODUCTS 1, 2-3,
HARVARD LAW AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 560 (2006) (explaining reasons why structured
products are attractive to wealthy investors), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=941720.

Id. at 2 (reporting that sales of structured products to retail investors increased “from $34 billion in
2009 to $45 billion in 2010.”).
127

For basic structure and terms of structured notes, see generally Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Office of Inv.
Eudc. & Advocacy, Investor Bulletin: Structured Notes (Jan. 12, 2015); see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Office of Inv. Eudc. & Advocacy, Investor Alerts and Bulletins: Structured Notes with Principal Protection:
Note the Terms of Your Investment (June 2, 2011); Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Investor Alerts: Reverse
Convertibles-Complex Investment Vehicles (July 29, 2011).
128

158

startup companies, but may not in investing in complex financial products. To be
sophisticated in these investments, an investor should correctly understand how the
products are structured, predict movements of underlying assets or macro-economic
variables, and how payoffs would be turned out in each scenario.

However, past

experiences have shown that even institutional investors, such as Orange County, P&G
and Gibson Greetings, were not sophisticated in financial transactions, which are complex
and highly structured.129 In these transactions, even broker firms or their representatives
often sell without sufficiently understanding the risks associated with the products they sell
and investors naively rely on their sales pitches and sales documents they furnish. 130 It
also should be noted that structured products are typically issued by financial institutions
and sold by their affiliate broker-dealer firms. This means that significant level of conflict
of interests exists in these transactions. Further, structured products have a characteristic
as a zero-sum game between financial institutions and their customers: One party’s gains
mean the other party’s losses. 131 Things may be even worse when complex products are
placed private to investors who marginally satisfy the current accredited investor standard.

129

All these institutional investors suffered massive losses from derivatives transactions. See generally,
Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor-Jungle Predator or Shorn Lamb? 12 YALE J. ON
REG. 345, 358-363 (1995); see also Oguss, supra note 65, at 301-310.
130

Jennifer J. Johnson, Fleecing Grandma: A Regulatory Ponzi Scheme, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
993, 1007 (2012). In taking the Medical Capital’s $2 billion Ponzi Scheme for example, professor Johnson
vividly described how easily the broker failed its due diligence. In conducting due diligence on Medical
Capital’s promissory notes which were privately placed, the in-house committee of Securities America, a
broker firm which sold approximately 37% of the notes to investors, relied on information obtained from two
promoters of the corporation who planned the fraudulent scheme. Though the firm also hired the outside due
diligence expert, this expert, who was paid by the seller, did not emphasize red flags he actually found and
relied too much on assurances from two promoters without sufficiently making use of his own analysis.
Consequently, individual broker representatives, who generally rely on the due diligence conducted by their
main office, did not understand what they sold and they also invested their own funds in this notes.
131
However, this may not be accurate because issuing financial institutions would limit their losses
through other hedge transactions when they structure the products.
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Though broker-dealer regulations may serve to maintain a level playing field and
protect investors in these transactions, evidence seems not to be sufficient to relieve the
concerns. Though the FINRA has sounded repeated warnings to its members on sales
practices concerning structured products and other complex products sold to retail
investors, 132 the SEC and FINRA’s examinations and enforcement actions over sales
practices of broker-dealer firms show that problems are lasting and repeated.

133

Considering the growing complexity in the modern financial markets and practical
limitation of our broker-dealer system for investor protection, current one-size-fits-all
standard to identify accredited investors seems be inappropriate. To properly address the
concerns associated with the complex securities, a different standard for sophistication or
other measures should be considered.

132

FINRA released a series of notices to assure appropriate sales practices for structured products.
Through these notices, the FINRA demanded members to strengthen such factors as customer suitability,
internal control systems, accurate disclosure and training of representatives. E.g., Notice to Members 03-71
(Nov. 2003) (NASD Reminds Members of Obligations When Selling Non-Conventional Investments);
Noticed to Members 05-36 (April 2005) (NASD Recommends Best Practices for Reviewing New Products);
Notice to Members (Sep. 2005) (NASD Provides Guidance Concerning the Sale of Structured Products);
Regulatory Notice 09-73 (Dec. 2009) (FINRA Reminds Firms of Their Sales Practice Obligations Relating
to Principal-Protected Notes); Regulatory Notice 10-09 (Feb. 2010) (FINRA Reminds Firms of Their Sales
Practice Obligations With Reverse Exchangeable Securities (Reverse Convertibles)); Regulatory Notice 1203 (Jan. 2012) (Heightened Supervision of Complex Products).
E.g., OCIE 2011 Report, supra note 124; see also Sec. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Office of Compliance
Inspections and Examinations, Risk Alert: Broker-Dealer Controls Regarding Retail Sales of Structured
Securities Products (Aug. 24, 2015) [hereinafter OCIE 2015 Report]. See also Barbara Black, Curbing
Broker-Dealers’ Abusive Sales Practices: Does Professor Jensen’s Integrity Framework Offer A Better
Approach?, 48 Wake Forest L. Rev. 771 (2013) (examining broker-dealer firms’ failures of due diligence
and supervisory systems in complex and high-risk investment products from the SEC and FINRA’s recent
enforcement actions).
133
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2. SOUTH KOREA
2.1. INTRODUCTION
As explained in Chapter III, Korean securities regulation solely relies on the numerical
test to define the private placement. 134 An issuer can make an offer of securities to the
maximum forty-nine investors without any inquiry about the qualification of investors.
Regardless of the foregoing limitation, the issuer can also include certain professionals and
persons closely related to the issuer who are deemed to have sufficient knowledge on the
issuer’s financial and business matters.135 These investors are not included in calculating
the number of investors involved in the private placement. Specific types of investors
qualified as professionals and related persons of the issuer are enumerated in the
Enforcement Decree of the FSCMA and the FSC Disclosure Rules. 136 This section reviews
specific categories of investors qualified in the private placement and discusses on potential
problems of the current regulatory requirements for investor qualifications.

2.2. PERSONS HAVING CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ISSUER (“RELATED PERSONS”)
Subparagraph 2 of Article 11(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the FSCMA
enumerates the categories of persons who are deemed to have or can have access to the
information about the issuer and its securities based on their relationship with the issuer. 137
Related persons include: (i) the largest shareholder of the issuer and shareholders who hold

134

See supra Chapter III.B.

135

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 11(1) subpars. 1-Ba, 2-Sa.

136

Id. Arts. 10-11; FSC Disclosure Rules, Art. 2-1.

137

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 11(1) subpar. 2.
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at least five percent of the total number of shares issued by the issuer; (ii) Directors of the
issuer (including de facto directors under the Commercial Act §401-2(1)) and members of
the employee stock ownership association established pursuant to the Framework Act on
Labor Welfare; (iii) Companies affiliated with the issuer and their directors (including de
facto directors); (iv) Shareholders of a company whose stock is not traded in the exchange
and whose securities are not publicly offered or sold; (v) Directors and employees of a
domestic company affiliated with a foreign issuer who sells its stock to such persons as an
employee welfare program; (vi) Promoters of a company; or, (vii) Persons provided in the
FSC rules.138
The FSC provides additional categories of related persons in its rules. Persons
enumerated in the FSC Disclosure Rules include, (1) companies having a close business
relationship with the issuer in production or distribution of the products (and directors of
such companies), (2) members of an organization in case where they co-invest in the
company established to promote common interest in business, and (3) persons who acquire
securities in certain business combination. 139 With respect to category (2), the FSS made

138

Id. Art. 11(1) subpar. 2 (Ga-Sa).

139

Each category of persons enumerated in the FSC Disclosure Rules include:
1. A company that uses products of an issuer (excluding a company in the process of
incorporation) directly as raw materials or that supplies its products to an issuer (excluding a
company in the process of incorporation), or an executive of such company;
2. A person engaging exclusively in distribution of products of an issuer (excluding a company
in the process of incorporation) under a distributorship contract with the issuer, or an executive
of such person;
3. A member of an organization, such as an association, etc., if an issuer is a company
(including a company still in the process of incorporation) in which members of the
organization have jointly invested to engage in business activities for public purposes or public
interest, such as the press, academic activities, and research;
4. A member of a specified local organization, such as a local chamber of commerce and
industry, a local merchants' association, and a local farmers' or fishers' organization, if an issuer
is a company (including a company still in the process of incorporation) in which members of
such organization have jointly invested to engage in joint business activities, such as disposing
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clear that for members of the organization to be excluded in calculating the number of
offerees, the purpose of the organization must be related to the business of the issuer and
investments must be made by its members based on predetermined criteria. 140 In this
respect, the FSS interpreted where an “angel club,” which aims simply to share information
on investment opportunities among individual investors, is offered as a group, individual
members of the angel club should be counted respectively. 141
2.3. PROFESSIONALS
Subparagraph (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the FSCMA enumerates certain
“professionals” who are excluded in the calculation of the number of offerees in light of
knowledge and expertise in investment. 142 The term “professional” has been expanded in
its scope since its adoption. When the term “professional” was first introduced in 1997, its
scope only covered the institutional investors, persons with professional credentials who

of industrial waste, providing financial or insurance services, or manufacturing, processing or
distribution of agricultural, fishery, or livestock products in the locality;
5. A member of an organization, such as an alumni association or clan association, if an issuer
is a company (including a company still in the process of incorporation) in which members of
such organization have jointly invested in accordance with a consensus to have the company
engage in joint business activities;
6. A stockholder of a corporation that is not obligated to submit business reports pursuant to
Article 159 (1) of the Act (hereinafter referred to as "corporation exempted from submission
of business reports" in this Article), if the stockholder receives securities issued by another
corporation exempted from submission of business reports in consideration for a merger with
the former corporation exempted from submission of business reports, all-inclusive exchange
or transfer of stocks, division or divided merger;
7. Any other person similar to a related person under subparagraphs 1through 6 above or any
item of Article 11 (1) 2 of the Decree, who is specified by the FSS Governor as a speciallyrelated person with special knowledge of financial status or business prospects of an issuer.
FSC Disclosure Rules, Art. 2-1(3).
140

FSS, Gieobgongsi Silmuannae 2016 [Corporate Disclosure Handbook 2016], at 275-276.

141

Id.

142

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 11(1) subpar. 1.
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can have a sufficient knowledge of the issuer’s financial status or business, accounting
firms, and credit rating agencies. 143 When the Enforcement Decree of the FSCMA was
enacted, it broadened the scope of professionals by adding several categories of investors
including the State, the Bank of Korea, public organizations in the financial sector, and
collective investment schemes. 144
As fully discussed below, the FSCMA, in its enactment, newly defined the term
“professional investor.” 145 The term “professional investor” was adopted to identify
investors whose ability to bear investment risks renders various kinds of investor protection
schemes provided by the FSCMA unnecessary.

Prior to June 2016, the scope of

professional investors and professionals was overlapped in many categories but was not
perfectly matched. For example, the term “professional investor” included natural persons
who own at least five billion won (approximately $4.14 million as of December 31, 2016)
(currently 500 million won) of financial investment assets, whereas the term “professional”
did not. In reverse, the term “professional” included accounting firms, credit rating
companies, venture capital firms, and persons with certain professional credentials (e.g.,
lawyers and accountants) who provide the issuer advisory service, 146 whereas the term
“professional investor” did not. However, the government amended the Decree of the
FSCMA to include all categories of professional investors into the scope of the professional

143

Jeunggwongeograebeobsihangryeong [Enforcement Decree of the Securities and Exchange Act],
Presidential Decree. No. 15312, March 22, 1997, Art. 2-4(3) subpars. 6-7 (repealed); Regulation on Securities
Issuance and Disclosure, Art. 11 subpars. 6-7 (repealed).
144

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Presidential Decree No. 20947, July 29, 2008, Art.
11(1) subpar. 1.
145

See infra Chapter IV.A.2.4.

146
Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 11(1) subpar. 1 (Da-Ba); FSC Disclosure Rules,
Art. 2-1(2).
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in June 2016.147 The FSC stated in its press release that there is no reason to exclude some
categories of professional investors from professionals, considering that the professional
investor concept assumes that the professional investors can make an independent
investment decision.148 Therefore, the term “professional” is inclusive of, but is broader
than the professional investors as illustrated in Figure 6.149

FIGURE 6. SCOPE OF PROFESSIONALS
<Prior to FSCMA enactment>

• Institutional Investors (financial
institutions, various funds, etc.)

<Prior to June 2016>
• Government
• Bank of Korea
• Financial institutions (excluding
foreign institutions)
• Public organizations in financial
sector
• Collective investment schemes
• Funds and corporations managing
such funds or mutual aid biz
pursuant to relevant laws (limited
to those designated by the FSC
rules)

<Present>

Professional
Investors

• Accounting firms

• Accounting firms

• Accounting firms

• Credit rating companies

• Credit rating companies

• Credit rating companies

• Persons with professional credentials

• Persons with professional creden-

• Persons with professional creden-

who can have a sufficient knowledge

tials (attorneys, CPAs, etc.) who

tials (attorneys, CPAs, etc.) who

of an issue’s financials or business

provide an issuer advisory service

• Venture capital firms

• Venture capital firms

provide an issuer advisory service
• Venture capital firms

147

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Presidential Decree No. 27291, June 28, 2016, Art.
11(1) subpar. 1-Ga.
148

FSC, press release, Geumyungtujaeobjaui gieobgeumyung gineung ganghwa deung
gyeongjaenglyeog ganghwabangan chujin [Initiatives to enhance the competitiveness of the financial
investment businesses] at 17 (Oct. 13, 2015).
149

With respect to the scope of the professionals, a special rule applies where the issuer is a KONEXlisted company. For more information on the KONEX, see supra Chapter II.B.1.3.3. The scope of the
professionals applicable to the offering of the KONEX company is even broader. See Enforcement Decree
of the Capital Market Act, Art. 11(2) (recognizing as professionals additional categories of investors such as
certain collective investment schemes, private investment associations established for the purpose of
investing in venture businesses, angel investors, and persons who has satisfied the basic deposit requirement
provided in the KONEX rules, etc.).
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2.4. PROFESSIONAL INVESTORS
As the traditional term “professional” embraces professional investors, the term
“professional investor” now plays a central role in the private placement. This section
overviews the investor classification system under the FSCMA and examines the
categories of professional investors.
2.4.1. INVESTOR CLASSIFICATION: PROFESSIONAL INVESTOR V. ORDINARY INVESTOR
The FSCMA adopted the investor classification system to differentiate extent of
investor protection to the investor’s expertise in investment and allocate regulatory
resources efficiently. 150 It categorizes investors into “professional investors” and “ordinary
investors.” 151 The term “professional investor” is defined as “an investor who has an
ability to assume investment risks in light of his expertise in financial investment
instruments, the size of assets he owns, etc.” 152 The FSCMA and subordinate statutes
enumerate categories of professional investors. 153 The term “ordinary investor” is defined
as “an investor who is not a professional investor.”154 Under the investor classification
system, certain investor protection schemes that are superfluous in terms of the investor’s
expertise do not apply to professional investors. 155 For example, financial investment

150

Hyun-Cheol Lee, Problems Regarding Classification of Investors in FSCMA & Methods for
Improvement, 26 ILKAM LAW REVIEW 391, 392 (citing Jung-Soo Kim, J ABONSIJANGBEOB WONLON
[INTRODUCTION TO C APITAL M ARKET ACT] 1, 104 (SFC Group, 2011)).
151

It is known that the investor classification under the FSCMA follows the categorization under the
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (Directive 2004/39/EC, “MiFID”) of the EU. Choi, Young-Joo,
A Study on the Classification of Investors, 61 DONGA BUBHAK [DONGA JOURNAL OF LAW] 375, 387 (2013);
see also supra Chapter IV.A.1.2.2.d.
152

Capital Market Act, Art. 9(5).

153

Id. Art. 9(5); Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 10(3).

154

Capital Market Act, Art. 9(6).

155

See generally Hyun-Cheol Lee, supra note 150, at 401-07.
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businesses who deal with professional investors do not have to comply with the investment
recommendation principles required in the FSCMA. 156 The requirement of prospectus
delivery does not extend to professional investors either. 157
2.4.2. CATEGORIES OF PROFESSIONAL INVESTORS
Professional investors cover a wide range of investors from the State to individual
investors. While most categories of investors are given professional investor status without
additional requirements, natural persons and legal entities or organizations qualify for a
professional investor only if they meet minimum qualification standards.
TABLE 6. CATEGORIES OF PROFESSIONAL INVESTORS

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Professional Investors

Reclassification to
ordinary investors1

State
Bank of Korea
Financial institutions
Stock-listed Companies2
Certain public financial organizations
Collective investment schemes
Korea Credit Guarantee Fund
Korea Technology Credit Guarantee Fund
Funds established pursuant to a relevant Act and corporations managing such funds2
Corporations managing any mutual aid business pursuant to a relevant Act 2
Local governments2
Domestic corporations having issued stocks listed in a foreign exchange2
Legal entities or organizations that own at least 10 billion won (5 billion won
for corporations whose financial statements are audited by an independent
auditor) of financial investment instruments (FIIs)2
Natural persons who own at least 500 million won of FIIs and satisfies
wealth or income requirements2
Foreign governments, international organizations, and foreign central banks
Foreigners similar to categories 5-14

N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
3

1) Investors may request in writing to be categorized as ordinary investors (see Chapter IV.A.2.4.3.d.)
2) Investors are classified as ordinary investors in derivatives transactions
3) Allowed if a domestic investor of the same category as the foreigner is allowed to be reclassified as ordinary investor

156

E.g., Capital Market Act, Art. 46 (principle of suitability, a.k.a. know your customer rule), Art. 462 (principle of appropriateness), Art. 47 (duty to explain).
157

Id. Art. 124(1).
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2.4.3. QUALIFICATION STANDARDS FOR NATURAL PERSONS AND ENTITIES
a. Natural persons
To qualify for a professional investor status, a natural person must satisfy all the
requirements provided in subparagraph 17 of Article 10(3) of the FSCMA Enforcement
Decree. First, the balance of financial investment instruments as of a date, immediately
preceding the date of submission of relevant documents, should be at least 500 million won
(approximately $414,000 as of December 31, 2016).158 The threshold amount was five
billion won in the past, but the FSC lowered the amount to one tenth of the initial amount
in June 2016,159 recognizing that the threshold level was too high in comparison with that
of major countries. 160 The term “financial investment instrument” is defined in Article 3
of the FSCMA and includes securities and derivatives. 161 Since the FSCMA and the
subordinate statutes do not specify eligible financial investment instruments, any type of
financial investment instruments can be included in the calculation of the investor’s
balance of financial investment instruments.

Second, the investor’s account with a

financial investment company must be at least one year old. 162 Third, the investor must
either have an income of at least 100 million won (approximately $82,800 as of December
31, 2016) as of the year immediately preceding the year of submission of relevant

158

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 10(3) subpar. 17-Na.

159
Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Presidential Decree No. 27291, June 28, 2016, Art.
10(3) subpar. 17.
160

The FSC reported that only 133 individuals (437 legal entities or organizations) were designated as
professional investors as of the end of June, 2015. FSC Press Release, supra note 15, at 16.
161

Capital Market Act, Art. 3; see also Chapter II.1.2 n156.

162

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 10(3) subpar. 17-Da.
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documents, or at least one billion won (approximately $828,000 as of December 31, 2016)
in assets as of the date immediately preceding the date of submission of relevant
documents.163 The FSC adopted the income and wealth standards in June 2016 when it
lowered the threshold amount to 500 million won(approximately $414,000 as of December
31, 2016).164 Fourth, the investor must submit to the FSC relevant documents to prove that
he satisfies requirements listed above. 165 Finally, the documents submitted to the FSC must
not be more than two years old. 166 Thus, a natural person is required to update supporting
documents every two years to maintain the professional investor status.

b. Legal entities and organizations
Similarly, Paragraph 16 under Section 10(3) of the FSCMA Enforcement Decree
provides qualification standards for legal entities or organizations. To obtain a professional
investor status, a business entity must satisfy the following requirements. First, the balance
of financial investment instruments as of the date, immediately preceding the date of
submission of relevant documents, should be at least 10 billion won (approximately $8.28
million as of December 31, 2016).167 However, the threshold amount is lowered to five
billion won (approximately $4.14 million as of December 31, 2016) if the entity is a
corporation whose financial statements are audited by an outside, independent auditor

163

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 10(3) subpar. 17-Ra; Regulations on Financial
Investment Business, Art. 1-7-2(1).
164
Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Presidential Decree No. 27291, June 28, 2016, Art.
10(3) subpar. 17.
165

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 10(3) subpar. 17-Ga.

166

Id. Art. 10(3) subpar. 17-Ma.

167

Id. Art. 10(3) subpar. 16-Na.
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pursuant to the relevant statute. Second, the entity must submit relevant documents to the
FSC.168 Finally, the submitted documents must not be older than two years.169

c. Verification of the professional investor status
The FSC delegated to the Korea Financial Investment Association (KOFIA) the
authority to specify details necessary to verify the professional investor status of natural
persons and legal entities, including calculation of an individual’s income or assets and
submission of documents.170 To be designated as a professional investor, an individual or
legal entity must submit the application form and supporting documents to the KOFIA. 171
If all relevant documents are properly submitted and all the requirements are satisfied, the
KOFIA issues the “professional investor certificate” with an identification number. 172
Once the certificate is issued, the investor can request a financial investment company to
treat him or her as a professional investor by presenting the company with the certificate. 173
On request, the financial investment company must confirm with the KOFIA his or her
professional investor status and the effective date of the certificate. 174 The company must
inform the investor that he or she will not receive any notice or explanation on investment

168

Id. Art. 10(3) subpar. 16-Ga.

169

Id. Art. 10(3) subpar. 16-Da.

170

Regulations on Financial Investment Business, Arts. 1-7-2(2), 1-8.

171
Regulations on Business Conduct and Services of Financial Investment Companies [hereinafter
KOFIA Business Conduct Rules], Art. 2-12(1).
172

Id. Art. 2-13(1).

173

Id. Art. 2-14(1).

174

Id. Art. 2-14(2).

170

risks after he or she is classified as the professional investor. 175 The KOFIA rules also
requires financial investment companies to keep a professional investor ledger. 176

d. Reclassification of the investor status
Since the current investor classification system identifies certain categories of
investors as professional investors regardless of actual financial sophistication of investors,
the FSCMA allows certain professional investors to request in writing a financial
investment company to treat themselves as ordinary investors (see Table 6 above).177 Once
requested, the financial investment company may not refuse to reclassify such investor as
an ordinary investor without good cause. 178 However, an ordinary investor is not permitted
to request to classify himself as a professional investor. In light of complexity and risks of
derivatives products, certain categories of professional investors are treated as ordinary
investors in the derivatives transactions unless, they notify a financial investment company
in writing that they will be treated as professional investors nonetheless (see Table 6
above).179

175

Id. Art. 2-14(3).

176

Id. Art. 2-15. The ledger should contain information including (1) the name of the professional
investors; (2) the date of designation of the professional investors; (3) the effective period of designation of
the professional investors; and (4) the date of dismissal and the reason thereof of the professional investors,
etc.
177

Capital Market Act, Art. 9(5); Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 10(1).

178

Capital Market Act, Art. 9(5); KOFIA Business Conduct Rules, Art. 2-14(4).

179

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 10(3).
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2.5. ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT REGULATION
2.5.1. LACK OF QUALIFICATION STANDARDS FOR ORDINARY INVESTORS
The private placement may involve up to 49 ordinary investors except related persons
and professionals. Unlike the U.S. regulation, the securities regulation in Korea does not
set forth any qualification standard for ordinary investors who participate in the private
placement. However, it seems that the lack of investor qualification standards would
increase the concern for investor protection under the current disclosure regime.

a. Unguaranteed sophistication
It should be noted that private placements involving individual investors are generally
made by startups and small-sized businesses whose informational availability is very
limited to the public. This is mainly because the issuer’s capital needs or business stage
may not justify involvement of institutional investors, or investment policies may not allow
the investment. Moreover, small-sized private offerings are often made without a broker’s
intermediation. Without available information and assistance of intermediaries, individual
investors should be able to fend for themselves by asking relevant questions and assessing
risks of the private placement. However, this is not guaranteed because an investor’s
financial sophistication or ability to access information on the issuer is not a prerequisite
to participation in the private placement.

b. Private placements by distressed companies
The fact that financially-troubled companies heavily rely on the private offerings
implicates that unsophisticated investors can be primary victims of the most unpromising
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private placement deals. The FSS report indicated that private offerings have been
extensively used by stock-listed companies shortly before their stock was delisted. 180 In
this report, the FSS analyzed securities offerings conducted by 39 stock-listed companies
between 2011 and 2013. In 2014, certain delisting events (e.g., disclaimer opinion on the
issuer’s financial statements for the most recent year by an independent auditor) occurred
in these companies.181 The result of the study showed the total amounts of securities sold
by 39 companies in reliance on private placements increased 269% from 2012 to 2013—a
stark contrast with 69% decrease in registered offerings during the same period. 182 The
FSS emphasized that financial conditions and other circumstances of these companies
made registered offerings virtually impossible and the companies could not help seeking
the private placements to fill the capital deficiency. 183

c. Susceptibility to fraudulent schemes
The current system, which allows ordinary investors to participate in private
placements, can be exploited to commit certain fraudulent schemes. Typical cases involve
the scheme to inflate the capital amount on the balance sheet without actual cash inflow.
In devising such fraud, ordinary investors play a key role in disguising the fraudulent
scheme as a normal private placement. 184 Though the names of investors are disclosed in

180

FSS, press release, Sangjangpyejisayu deung balsaenggieopui teukjing [Characteristics of
Companies in which Delisting Events Took Place] (June 16, 2014).
181

Id. at 5

182

Id. at 5.

183

Id. at 5.

184
The scheme typically proceeds with the following steps: (1) A person who plans the scheme (usually
a person in control of the company) borrows money from a lender (e.g., loan shark) in the short term; (2) He
or she procures a list of persons who will play as investors in the private offering; (3) All documents are
prepared and contributions are paid in the name of these investors to feign the normal private placement; (4)
New shares and paid-in-capital are recorded in the Registrar and transactions are also entered in the journal;
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the company’s current report on the new stock issue, 185 it is difficult for the FSS staff to
ascertain whether or not the persons involved in the private placement are actual investors,
due to absence of formal review process and limited authority to investigation for the
private placement. Though some cases are uncovered in the criminal investigation,
shareholders are likely to have already sustained damages from overstated financial
statements and dilution of stock prices. It would be more difficult to commit such
fraudulent schemes without ordinary investors in the private placement.

d. Conflict with professional investor registration
Accepting ordinary investors in the private placement can diminish the qualified
individuals’ motive for registration of the professional investor. The current regime does
not distinguish ordinary investors from professional investors, except in the difference in
the number of persons who can be offered in the private placement. An issuer may find it
difficult to persuade a particular individual to register as a professional investor so that it
can make offers to more investors. Without an apparent incentive, qualified individuals

(5) Soon after, the company invests in the shell company that the person in control beneficially owns to
siphon off money; (6) Invested capital finally flows back to the controlling person and he or she repays a
loan to the lender; and finally,(7) , the capital on the financial statements increases and the person in control
acquires newly issued shares.
185

A reporting company is required to file a current report with the FSC immediately after the company
decides (generally by approval of the board of directors) to increase or decrease capital, or increase liability
by issuing contingent capital (e.g., convertible bond, bond with warrant), except the company files a
registration statement in connection with foregoing change of capital or liability. Capital Market Act, Art.
161(1) subpar. 5; Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 171(1) subpars. 1-2.
When the company issues new shares to pre-selected persons, Disclosure Form 38-6 requires that the
issue must disclose in the current report specific information on each selected person including the name of
the person, relationship with the company or the largest shareholder, reason to select the person, past
transactions (or contemplated transactions) with the person within six months prior to (or after) the
determination of new issue of shares, and the number of shares allotted.
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have no reason to go through a cumbersome registration process and disclose their financial
information to take part in the private placement.

2.5.2. RELATED PERSONS
As demonstrated above, the 50-person test does not count various categories of
persons who appear to have certain kinds of relationships with the issuer. These “related
persons” are excluded from the 50-person count on the belief that they can have sufficient
knowledge of the issuer’s financial status or business prospects without the registration
process.186 However, this belief is not likely to hold true for some categories of persons.

a. Persons having an employment or business relationship with the issuer
For example, related persons include members (employees) of an Employee Stock
Ownership Associations (ESOA) or employees of a domestic company who are offered to
buy affiliated foreign issuer’s stock as an employee welfare program. 187 These employees
are not counted toward the 50-person threshold, regardless of their title or position within
the company. Accordingly, the registration process does not apply where securities of the
company are offered solely to its employees. 188 However, as the U.S. Supreme Court ruled

186

In addition to six categories of related persons, subparagraph 2 of Article 11(1) of the Enforcement
Decree of the FSCMA provides that the FSC may designate as related persons “those who can have sufficient
knowledge of financial status or business prospects of an issuer.” Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market
Act, Art. 11(1) subpar. 2.
187

Id. Art. 11(1) subpar. 2-Na, Ma.

188

In some cases, listed company concurrently make offers to members of the ESOAs while they make
a public offering or a public sale to existing shareholders or the general public. In particular, for KOSPIlisted companies and IPO companies, they must give to members of the ESOA an opportunity to purchase
up to twenty percent of a total number of shares offered in a public offering or a public sale. Capital Market
Act, Art. 165-7. If members of the ESOA are offered in the public offering, they also can be protected by
the registration process.
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in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., “corporate employees, as a class” need to be protected by
the securities laws to the same extent as the general public need. 189 In particular, the
ESOAs are generally established by stock-listed companies or companies that prepare for
an initial public offering (IPO). For companies at these levels, employees are generally
not likely to have sufficient knowledge on their company to the extent that a registration
statement would disclose. Rather, their investments are often led by cognitive bias, such
as familiarity or affinity with the company, not by rational investment decision. 190 The fact
that employees do not have the informational advantage was well evidenced by the Enron
scandal. Like other shareholders of the Enron Corporation, Enron employees who had
their 401(k) retirement savings plans heavily invested in the Enron stock suffered severe
losses when the company went into bankruptcy. 191 On the contrary, some senior executives
of Enron made profits by having sold the company stock before the scandal was
publicized. 192 In addition, the ESOA’s source of funds also increases the investor
protection concern. On average, approximately 80 percent of stock purchased by each
ESOA is funded by employees. 193 Thus, the nature of ‘investment’ is more evident in the
ESOAs than other types of employee benefit plans. A similar criticism applies to other

189

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953); see supra Chapter III.A.2.3.2.

190

Gur Huberman, Familiarity Breeds Investment, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 659, 663-664 (2001) (analyzing
the familiarity-based investment in the employee investment setting).
191
Richard A. Oppel Jr., Employees’ Retirement Plan Is a Victim as Enron Tumbles, N.Y. TIMES,
November 22, 2001 (reporting that the total assets of the 401(k) in the end of 2000 were $2.1 billion and
more than half was invested in the Enron stock whose value dropped by 94 percent since then), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/22/business/employees-retirement-plan-is-a-victim-as-enrontumbles.html.
192
Id (reporting that “Enron’s chairman, Kenneth L. Lay, made $20.7 million during the first seven
months of 2001 by exercising stock options -- and more than $180 million by exercising options during the
three prior years”).
193
Sun-Suk Kim, A Study on the Trust System of Employee Stock Ownership Plan, THE JOURNAL OF
LEGAL STUDIES 201, 202, VOL. 21-4 (Oct. 2013).
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related persons, such as suppliers who furnish the issuer with raw materials and distributors
who are solely committed to sell the issuer’s products. However, the mere fact of
employment or close business relationship with the issuer is not sufficient to determine the
need for a registration statement.

b. Intentional distortion of the issuer-offeree relationship
The Enforcement Decree and the FSC Disclosure Rules under the FSCMA enumerate
12 categories of related persons and excludes them from the 50-offeree count.194 On the
contrary, Regulation D under the Securities Act excludes only those who perform policymaking functions for the issuer (e.g., directors, executive officers, or general partners) from
the 35-purchaser count, in light of a relationship with the issuer, as one category of
accredited investors.195 One might wonder why Korean securities laws encompass such
wide categories of related persons in addition to professionals. This question may be
answered in terms of the current 50-person test.
First of all, it should be noted many of the enumerated categories involve a group of
persons within a particular organization or association. In addition, some categories
involve organizations or associations which are not legal entities (e.g., alumni association,
family, various forms of partnerships). When a security offering is directed toward
members of such organization or association, each member would be counted respectively
toward the 50-person threshold because each member has an individual or undivided
interest on the securities acquired in the offering. Therefore, unless otherwise exempted,

194

See supra Chapter IV.A.2.2.

195

17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4).
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these offerings would be subject to registration requirements under the 50-person test. The
government seems to have intended to exempt these types of special offerings, which are
often found in the actual transactions from registration, although the specific reason of why
each category of persons does not need registration protection was not stated. The easiest
way for the government to achieve this goal might be to exclude persons involved in these
offerings from the 50-person count by defining the term “related person” broadly.
However, this approach distorts the relationship between the issuer and those who are
classified as related persons. In many categories, it is questionable whether these persons
are actually related with the issuer closely enough to make the registration process
unnecessary. Instead of having disguised these persons as related persons, the government
should have found another avenue if the full-blown registration protection had been
deemed unnecessary for these persons.

2.5.3. PROFESSIONAL INVESTORS
As previously discussed, the scope of professionals was previously centered on the
institutional investors. In June 2016, its scope was dramatically expanded by incorporating
professional investors and encompassing certain investors who had not been previously
recognized as professionals. However, a closer examination needs be made to determine
whether those who are newly recognized as professionals can actually fend for themselves
without the benefit of a registration statement.
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a. Relationship with the financial investment business regulation
The question first to arise is whether or not the “professional investor” concept can be
incorporated into disclosure regime without any modification.

The FSCMA

conceptualized the “professional investor” as a person whose ability to assume investment
risks in light of size of assets he owns and expertise on the investment renders investor
protection provided by the FSCMA unnecessary. 196 However, the FSCMA did not replace
the term “professional” which had been used in connection with the disclosure regulation
under the old securities laws with the “professional investor” concept. Instead, the new
concept was applied only to the financial investment business regulation.

The

government’s proposal for the FSCMA indicated that the existing securities business
regulation failed to consider the differences in characteristics between investors and
unnecessarily protected highly-qualified investors. 197 The government viewed that various
requirements and procedures imposed on the financial investment businesses to protect
retail investors (e.g., suitability check, duty to explain) would be unnecessary and vexing
to certain professional investors.198 It also expected that removing superfluous regulation
would benefit the financial investment business community by reducing compliance
costs.199 Accordingly, the government was most likely eager to identify investors who
were suited to this purpose in drafting the term “professional investor.”

Besides

institutional investors, active traders, such as day traders or swing traders, might be persons
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Capital Market Act, Art. 9(5).

197

Jabonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeobe gwanhan beomnyuran [Proposed Bill on Financial Investment
Services and Capital Markets Act] at 5, Bill No. 175896 (Dec. 29, 2006).
198

Jabonsijanggwa geumyungtujaeobe gwanhan beomnyuran [Proposed Bill on Financial Investment
Services and Capital Markets Act] at 5, Bill No. 175896 (Dec. 29, 2006).
199

BYUN, JEHO ET AL., J ABONSIJANGBEOB [C APITAL MARKET ACT] 34 (1st ed. 2009).
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whom the government intended to encompass in the professional investor definition. In
respect to the financial investment business regulation, ordinary procedural protection may
not be necessary for investors who frequently trade stock or other instruments with sizable
money. However, there is no guarantee that these investors are also suited for securities
transactions lacking disclosure of material information on the issuer and its securities.
Technical analysis on which active traders rely may not be an important factor in the
investment decision for the private securities.
The evidence that the “professional investor” concept presumes intermediation of
financial investment businesses is found elsewhere. The FSCMA imposes an obligation to
verify a professional investor status solely on financial investment businesses. 200 This
remains the same even after the “professional investor” concept expanded to disclosure
regulation. The FSCMA is silent on the professional investor verification when an issuer
makes a direct offering of securities without a broker’s intermediation. Though such
omission of verification process is believed inadvertent, it suggests the “professional
investor” concept settled in the financial investment business regulation. It needs a careful
examination to determine whether this concept was successfully transplanted into the
disclosure regulation.

b. Review on the professional investor categories
Among various categories of professional investors, some categories of investors
appear to be particularly problematic from the aspect of the disclosure regulation. These

200

Capital Market Act, Art. 46(1).
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categories include stock-listed companies, natural persons, and legal entities qualified
solely by the size of financial investment assets.

(1) Stock-listed companies
The term “professional investor” includes stock-listed companies among various
categories of investors. 201 It qualifies any listed company irrespective of the company size
or types of exchange where stock is listed. However, the fact that a company’s stock is
traded in the exchange has no direct relation to the company’s financial capability. As one
can easily imagine, many companies listed in the KOSDAQ or KONEX are staffed with a
small number of employees, and do not retain financial experts who are committed to
manage corporate funds. They typically deposit excess cash in savings accounts or highlyliquid investment assets (e.g., money market funds, certificate deposits, commercial
papers).
KIKO (Knock-In Knock-Out) currency options crisis in 2008 increased a doubt about
the adequacy of qualifying stock-listed companies as professional investors. Between 2006
and 2007 when the Korean won was steadily appreciating in value against major foreign
currencies, many export companies entered into currency derivatives contracts, more
famously known as “KIKO currency options contracts,” with commercial banks to hedge
foreign exchange risk. 202 In essence, KIKO currency options are designed to give only

201

Capital Market Act, Art. 9(5) subpar. 4.

A “knock-out” option (put option) gives exporters the right to sell foreign currency at a designated
rate (exercise rate), but extinguishes once the spot rate reaches or drops below the certain rate (low barrier).
Instead of paying an option premium to the bank, exporters typically agree to give the bank two “knock-in”
options per one knock-out option. A knock-in option (call option) gives a bank the right to buy foreign
currency at the exercise rate once the spot rate reaches or exceeds the certain rate (high barrier). See generally
Ko, Haksoo and Moon, William J., How Koreans Deal with Foreign Exchange Rate Risk: A Behavioral Law
and Economics Perspective on the KIKO Forward Contract, at 1-9 (October 2, 2011), available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1937254.
202
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partial protection from the foreign currency risk. 203 KIKO currency options would be
advantageous to the exporters if the exchange rate (e.g., Korean won to the U.S. dollar)
moves between the lower and upper barriers during the contract period. 204 However,
companies were expected to suffer losses if the exchange rate moves beyond the barrier.
In 2008 when the global financial crisis swept over financial markets, the exchange rate
sharply increased (Korean won depreciated in value) and exceeded the upper barrier under
KIKO contracts. The triggered events made it difficult for hundreds of companies to carry
out their contractual obligations.

Total losses form KIKO contracts amounted to

approximately 3.3 trillion won (approximately $26.24 billion as of December 31, 2008),
and most of the losses (2.4 trillion won, which is approximately $19.08 billion as of
December 31, 2008) were born by small and mid-sized companies, including over 70 stocklisted companies.205 Hundreds of civil lawsuits ensued and it appeared that the companies
did not actually understand or overlooked the risks involved in the KIKO contracts since
they did not prepare for the possibility that the exchange rate would move outside the
barriers.
The KIKO crisis had an immediate impact on the FSCMA which had already passed
the National Assembly in 2007 and was scheduled to go into effect in February 2009.
When originally adopted, the FSCMA recognized stock-listed companies as professional
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Id. at 6.
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Compared to F/X forwards contracts, KIKO currency options appeared more attractive to exporters
because the companies did not have to pay hedging costs (premium) up front; instead, they would give the
bank call options to buy foreign currency when the Korean won depreciates in value and the exchange rate
reaches or exceeds the knock-in barrier (upper limit). The exporters also could expect gains if the exchange
rate increases within the knock-in barrier.
205
Floyd Norris, Korean Courts See a Swindle Where Banks Saw a Contract, N.Y. TIMES, April 2,
2009, at B1.
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investors, regardless of the types of financial investment instruments including
derivatives.206 In the aftermath of the global financial crisis and KIKO incident, however,
concerns were raised that the new securities law would not be sufficient to address investor
protection concerns for derivatives transactions. The National Assembly amended the
FSCMA just before it went into effect in order to address the concern. 207 In particular, the
amendments to the FSCMA excluded stock-listed companies, as well as other categories
of investors from definition of the term “professional investor” when they enter into
derivatives contracts with financial investment businesses. However, despite the FSCMA
amendments, stock-listed companies still remain as professional investors in other
securities transactions regardless of levels of risk associated with the investment.
In the meantime, the definition of the term “professional investor” also qualifies a
legal entity having at least 5 billion won (approximately $4.14 million as of December 31,
2016) of financial investment instruments (10 billion won for the company whose financial
statements are not audited by an independent auditor). 208 This qualification standard cast
doubt on the validity of the “stock-listing” test. In reality, many companies listed in the
KOSDAQ or KONEX do not meet the “financial investment instruments-owned” test.
Such companies are not active participants in the capital market either. Therefore, it would
be unconvincing to accredit all stock-listed companies for professional investors regardless
of the objective standard.
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Capital Market Act, Act. No. 8635, Aug. 3, 2007, Art. 9(5) subpar 4.
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Capital Market Act, Act. No. 9407, Feb. 3, 2009, Art. 9(5) subpar. 4.

208

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 10(3) subpar. 16-Na.
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(2) Persons with large amounts of financial investment assets
Unlike the term “accredited investor” in the U.S. which measures an investor’s
income or overall wealth to qualify natural persons, the term “professional investor” in
Korea employs financial investment assets to qualify as legal entities and natural persons.
The amount of financial investment assets an investor owns may better represent his
interest, knowledge, or experience in investments than the amount of income or overall
wealth. However, it does not necessarily mean that he or she is suitable for the private
placement. Though the “financial investment asset” standard does not include noninvestment financial assets such as bank deposits, CDs, and insurance contracts, it still
includes various kinds of financial investment instruments. For example, a particular
investor holds more than 500 million won (approximately $414,000 as of December 31,
2016) of financial investment assets along with more than one billion won of total assets.
Financial investment assets he owns consists of pension fund and mutual fund accounts,
blue chip stocks, government bonds, AA-rated commercial papers, and other short-term
investment assets. Though the size of his investment assets, by itself, is large enough to
render him a professional investor, his investment portfolio is not likely to show that he is
financially sophisticated. Most of his investment assets involve relatively low investment
risks and do not require an investor’s own, in-depth investment analysis.
In addition, legal entities often hold equity interest in a subsidiary or other affiliate
companies. Such equity interest is a security and would be included to calculate amount
of financial investment instruments. In many case, however, such equity interest is
obtained in connection with their own business activities and, thus, is arguably irrelevant
to measurement for financial sophistication. The financial investment asset standard has
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its merits as a proxy for investor sophistication. This standard is intuitively persuasive and
also easily measured. However, some financial investment instruments are not appropriate
for measurement of financial sophistication. As a result, the current “all-inclusive”
approach may be over-inclusive of professional investors.
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B. MANNER OF OFFERING

1. UNITED STATES
1.1. INTRODUCTION

Rule 502(c) of Regulation D specifies the manner of offering in Rule 506(b) offerings.
Generally speaking, Rule 502(c) prohibits the issuer from making offers of securities by
means of mass communication. Though the anti-solicitation rule appears to be “procedural”
on surface, the SEC staff construed Rule 502(c) as “substantive” by requiring an issuer or
any person on its behalf to have a “pre-existing, substantive relationship” with offerees
through a series of no-action letters. Despite controversy on legal significance of such staff
interpretations,208.5 the “pre-existing, substantive relationship” requirement has imposed a
significant limitation on small businesses’ ability to raise capital in reliance on Rule 506(b)
of Regulation D. To facilitate equity financing of small businesses, the U.S. Congress
passed the JOBS Act in 2012 to mandate the SEC to adopt new exemption under
Regulation D, which allows the issuers to engage in the general solicitation and advertising.
Thus, two safe harbors for the non-public offering exemption in Section 4(a)(2) of the
Securities Act are on the very opposite ends in terms of the manner of offering. This section
reviews the historical development of the manner of offering requirements for private
placement.

208.5

This pre-existing relationship requirement appears nowhere in SEC rules or release but is drawn
instead from SEC no-action letters. There is some debate as to how much weight should be accorded to SEC
staff positions. See Donna M Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action
Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 921, 923-28 (1998) (arguing that
unofficial, informal interpretations or enforcement positions should not be binding law).
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1.2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTI-SOLICITATION RULE
1.2.1. PRIOR TO REGULATION D
a. Administrative and judicial interpretations
The 1935 interpretive release by the SEC’s General Counsel could serve as a starting
point for discussions on the general solicitation ban. 209 The 1935 release put great
importance on the way that offerees are selected to determine whether transactions involve
a public offering.210 In the release, the General Counsel stated that “an offering to a larger
number of persons who are all the members of a particular class, membership in which
may be determined by the application of some preexisting standard, would be a non-public
offering.”211 In other words, “[r]andom selection was considered inconsistent with a claim
of private offering.” 212

The General Counsel also noted that existence of “direct

negotiation by the issuer” would give salience to private nature of the offering. 213
Though emphasis on the offeree selection process was succeeded by lower courts, 214
the U.S. Supreme Court in Ralston Purina shifted the focus of inquiry to “the nature and
characteristics of the offerees” by stating that “the exemption question turns on the

209
Letter of General Counsel Discussing Factors to be Considered in Determining the Availability of
the Exemption From Registration Provided by the Second Clause of Section 4(1), Securities Act Release No.
285, 1935 WL 27785 (Jan. 24, 1935) [hereinafter 1935 Interpretive Release].
210
Id. at *1 (“Any such preliminary negotiations or conversations with a substantial number of
prospective purchasers would . . . cause the offering in question to be a public offering . . . Again, in
determining what constitutes a substantial number of offerees the basis on which the offerees are selected is
of the greatest importance.”).
211

Id. at *1.

212

Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38 EMORY L. J. 67, 73 (1989).

213

1935 Interpretive Release, supra note 209, at *2.

214

E.g., SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1938); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co,
102 F. Supp. 964, 968-969 (E.D. Mo. 1952); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co, 200 F.2d 85, 91 (8th Cir. 1952). See
also supra Chapter III.A.2.2., 2.3.1, 2.3.2.
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knowledge of the offerees.” 215 The SEC’s 1962 interpretive release followed Ralston
Purina by stating that the relevant question is whether or not offerees “have the requisite
association with and knowledge of the issuer.” 216 Lower courts also paid attention to such
factors as offerees’ sophistication, personal contact or prior business relationship between
the issuer and offerees, as well as the number of offerees to find securities offerings
private.217

b. Rule 146
Earlier judicial and administrative interpretations resulted in the promulgation of Rule
146 which was the first safe harbor rule with respect to Section 4(a)(2) exemption. 218
Among various requirements, Rule 146 contained certain limitations on the manner of
offering. In proposing Rule 146 in 1972, the SEC stated that such limitations are required
to “assure that persons to whom such securities are offered have the necessary access to
information concerning the issuer and can fend for themselves.” 219 Thus, the SEC required
the securities to be “offered and sold only in a negotiated transaction,” which means, “terms
and conditions of the deal were negotiated [directly] between the issuer [or its
representative(s)] and the offeree [or his representative(s)].” 220 Though the requirement
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SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953); Daugherty, supra note 212, at 73-75 (stating
that “the Supreme Court refined the SEC’s six-factor “test” by shifting the focus away from the nature of the
offering and toward the nature of the offerees”). See also supra Chapter III.A.2.3.3.
216

Non-public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 1662 WL 69540, at *1 (Nov. 6,
1962); see also supra Chapter III.A.2.4.1.
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See generally Daugherty, supra note 212, at 75-83.
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17 C.F.R. § 230.146(c) (1974) (repealed).
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Notice of Proposed Rule 146 Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release No. 5336
1972 WL 121503, at *10 (Nov. 28, 1972) [hereinafter Rule 146 Proposing Release].
The term “negotiated transaction” was defined as “a transaction in which securities are offered and
the terms and arrangements relating to any sale of securities are arrived at through direct communication
220
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of negotiated transaction was not adopted in the final rule, 221 the concept of “direct
communication” was still retained through paragraph (e) of the Rule. 222
Rule 146 prohibited an issuer or its agents from employing “any form of general
solicitation or general advertising” in a private offering.

223

Prohibited forms of

communication to potential investors include, but are not limited to (1) “[a]ny
advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in any newspaper,
magazine or similar medium or broadcast over television or radio;” (2) “[a]ny seminar or
meeting;” (3) “[a]ny letter, circular, notice or other written communication.”224 However,
when it comes to means listed in subparagraph (2) and (3), it is not deemed as general
solicitation or general advertising to limit such communication to certain qualified offerees
who have sophistication alone or with their representatives pursuant to paragraph (d) of
Rule 146.225

between the issuer or any person acting on its behalf and the purchaser or his investment representative.”
Rule 146 Proposing Release, supra note 219, at *10.
As to deletion of the concept of the negotiated transaction, the SEC explained that it “would interfere
with certain legitimate prevailing practices, such as where a financial institution acts as a “lead purchaser.”
Notice of Revision of Proposed Rule 146 Under the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act Release No. 5430,
1973 WL 150950, at *6 (Oct. 10, 1973) [hereinafter Rule 146 Revision Release].
221

222

Paragraph (e)(2) of Rule 146 provides:
The issuer shall make available, during the course of the transaction and prior to sale, to each
offeree or his offeree representative(s) or both, the opportunity to ask questions of, and receive
answers from, the issuer or any person acting on its behalf concerning the terms and conditions
of the offering and to obtain any additional information, . . . (Emphasis added).

17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(2) (repealed).
223

17 C.F.R. § 230.146(c) (1974) (repealed).
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17 C.F.R. § 230.146(c).
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Id.
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1.2.2. RULE 502(C) OF REGULATION D
a. Overview
In comparison to the previous Rule 146, one of the most significant changes in
Regulation D is the elimination of the offeree qualifications with respect to Rule 506(b)
offerings.226 Despite elimination of offeree requirements, the manner of offering under
Rule 146(c) was succeeded by Rule 502(c) of Regulation D. 227 The terminology of Rule
502(c) in its adoption is very much the same as that of Rule 146(c), exclusive of an
exception recognized under Rule 146(c) as to certain communications solely limited to
qualified offerees. 228 Rule 502(c) was amended to provide exceptions relating to the
offshore press conference and the Form D filing in 1997 and 2008, respectively. 229 Thus,
aside from two instances, neither the issuer nor its agents is allowed to “offer or sell the
securities by any form of general solicitation or general advertising.” 230

b. Staff interpretations on Rule 502(c)
According to the SEC staff, Rule 502(c) would apply when (1) “the communication
in question [is] a general solicitation or general advertisement” and (2) “[it is] being used

226

See supra Chapter III.A.3.

227

As Professor Hicks indicated, elimination of offeree qualifications with respect to Rule 506(b)
offerings might raise a question of why the SEC decided to maintain a manner of offering in a situation where
“Rule 506 does not prohibit an issuer from making offers to the whole world.” Professor Hicks suggested
two possible explanations from the viewpoint of the SEC’s rulemaking power and its enforcement policy.
See 7B J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 § 11:157 (2016).
228

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (1982).

229

Id. § 230.502(c) (2016). See also 62 Fed. Reg. 53954 (Oct. 17, 1997); 73 Fed. Reg. 10615 (Feb. 27,

2008).
230

Id. § 230.502(c) (2016).
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by the issuer or by someone on the issuer’s behalf to offer or sell the securities.” 231
However, such a broad two-prong test is not sufficient to shed light on the meaning of
general solicitation or general advertising in specific situations. 232 Furthermore, the SEC
staff is of the view that Rule 502(c) differentiates “limited” solicitation or advertising from
general solicitation or advertising. 233 The SEC staff has specified what constitutes general
solicitation or general advertising through a series of no-action letters.

(1) General solicitation
(a) In general
In determining what constitutes a general solicitation within the meaning of Rule
502(c), the SEC staff focused on offeror’s relationship with offerees. Specifically, the SEC
staff have developed a pre-existing, substantive relationships doctrine through a series of
no-action letters. In E.F. Hutton, the SEC staff clearly stated that “it is important (i) that
substantive relationships be created with offerees, and (ii) the relationships be pre-existing”
to demonstrate that general solicitation is not made.234 However, the SEC staff recognized
a possibility that the issuer may show the absence of general solicitation without
establishing a pre-existing, substantive relationship with particular offeree under the
special circumstances. 235

231
Interpretive Release on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 6455 1983 WL 409415, Part III.C.
(March 3, 1983) [hereinafter 1983 Interpretive Release]
232

7B Hicks, supra note 227, § 11:133.

233

Id.

234

E.F. Hutton & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55680, at *1 (Dec. 3, 1985).

C&DIs, supra note 49, Question 256.26 (“The existence of such a pre-existing, substantive
relationship is one means, but not the exclusive means, of demonstrating the absence of a general solicitation
in a Regulation D offering.”). As an example of special circumstances, the staff posited a situation where
angel investors “who have a relationship with a particular issuer may introduce that issuer to other members”
of their group. See C&DIs, Question 256.27.
235
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(b) Pre-existing relationship
According to the SEC staff, a “pre-existing” relationship with a prospective offeree
can be formed in either of two ways. 236 First, the issuer can create such relationship with
an offeree “prior to the commencement of the securities offering.” 237 For example, the
SEC staff recognized such relationship in Woodtrails where the general partner of the
issuer had a prior business relationship with the offerees.238 Alternatively, a pre-existing
relationship can “be established through either a registered broker-dealer or investment
adviser prior to the registered broker-dealer or investment adviser participation in the
offering.”239 Broker-dealers have made efforts to develop the procedure to establish preexisting relationships with sophisticated investors whom they can solicit without violating
Rule 502(c) in future private offerings in which they would be involved. For example, in
Bateman Eichler, a broker-dealer firm requested the no-action letter to establish a preexisting relationship through the following procedure:

The program would be limited to Bateman Eichler account executives who . . . would be
permitted to make a limited mailing to a list of not more than 50 local professionals and

236

Id. Question 256.29.

237

Id. Question 256.29.

238

Woodtrails-Seattle, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 1982 WL 29366 (July 8, 1982) (concluding that
the scheme proposed by the requester would not constitute general solicitation when the limited partnership
interests of the company was to be offered to those “who have previously invested in other limited
partnerships sponsored by the general partner of” the company).
239

C&DIs, supra note 49, Question 256.29. Concerning the rationale as to use of broker-dealers or
investment advisers in establishing a pre-existing, substantive relationship, the SEC explains as follows:
Generally, staff interpretations of whether a “pre-existing, substantive relationship” exists have been
limited to procedures established by broker-dealers in connection with their customers. This is
because traditional broker-dealer relationships require that a broker-dealer deal fairly with, and
make suitable recommendations to, customers, and, thus, implies that a substantive relationship
exists between the broker-dealer and its customers.
Id. at Question 256.31.
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businessmen . . . each month. The mailings would consist of a letter and a questionnaire,
the forms of which are enclosed. After reviewing all responses to the questionnaire, each
participating account executive would follow up for the purpose of obtaining additional
personal and financial information about the respondent. Those respondents who
satisfactorily complete the follow-up stage would then be placed on a list of prospective
offerees for programs of the type in which the respondent indicated an interest and for
which the respondent was deemed suitable in light of the program’s suitability
standards.240

The SEC staff opined that “the proposed program of contacting prospective offerees
does not constitute an offer to sell securities,” noting that initial solicitation “would be
generic in nature” without referring to any specific investment. 241 Furthermore, the staff
opined that “later offers to persons who respond to the mailings would not be deemed by a
general solicitation as a result of the initial solicitation provided a substantive relationship
has been established with the offeree between the time of the initial solicitation and the
later offer”242

(c) Substantive relationship
A “substantive” relationship means that “the issuer (or a person acting on its behalf)
has sufficient information to evaluate, and does, in fact, evaluate, a prospective offeree’s
financial circumstances and sophistication, in determining his or her status as an accredited
or sophisticated investor.”243 The SEC staff stated that the sufficiency of information to

240

Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55679, at *2 (Dec. 3, 1985).

241

Id. at *1.

242

Id. at *1. See also E.F. Hutton & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55680, at *1 (Dec. 3, 1985)
(“it is important that there be sufficient time between establishment of the relationship and an offer so that
the offer is not considered made by general solicitation or advertising.”).
243

C&DIs, supra note 49, Question 256.31.
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evaluate an offeree’s sophistication “depends on the facts and circumstances.” 244 However,
a prospective offeree’s “self-certification” alone is not sufficient to establish a substantive
relationship.245
Broker-dealers often use a suitability questionnaire to collect information necessary
to establish a substantive relationship with a prospective offeree. In H.B. Shaine, the SEC
staff opined that “a satisfactory response by a prospective offeree to a questionnaire that
provides a broker-dealer with sufficient information to evaluate the respondent’s
sophistication and financial situation will establish a substantive relationship.” 246 The SEC
staff usually takes no position as to sufficiency of information obtained from the
questionnaire in no-action letters, even in cases where the questionnaire contains a broad
range of information to evaluate the respondent’s qualification. 247 In Bateman Eichler,
however, the SEC staff noted that “a mere response to the attached questionnaire does not
appear to provide sufficient information to make the specified evaluation.” 248 In E.F.
Hutton, the SEC staff indicated that “the Suitability Questionnaire and New Account Form”
used by Hutton does not seem to extract information necessary to evaluate an offeree
qualification.249

244

E.g., Citizen VC, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 4699193, at *1 (Aug. 6, 2015).

245

C&DIs, supra note 49, Question 256.31.

246

H.B. Shaine & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108648, at *1 (March 31, 1987).

247

E.g., H.B. Shaine & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108648 (March 31, 1987); IPONET,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 431821 (July 26, 1996). The six-page questionnaire used by Shaine
contained “specific information concerning the respondent’s employment history, business experience,
business or professional education, investment experience, income and net worth.” It also requests the
respondent “to express their own opinion as to their ability to evaluate the merits and risks of venture capital
investments.” In addition, Shaine suggested that the questionnaire would be “updated annually.”
248

Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55679, at *1 (Dec. 3, 1985).

249

E.F. Hutton & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55680, at *1 (Dec. 3, 1985).
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(d) Use of electronic media
The advancement of information and communication technologies in the 1990s served
as a momentum for the SEC to recognize the importance of electronic media as means of
information delivery in securities offerings. In the 1995 Interpretive Release, though the
SEC, overall, encouraged the use of electronic media in the context of federal securities
laws,250 it also made clear that the “placing of the offering materials on the Internet would
not consistent with” a general solicitation ban of Rule 502(c). 251 In other words, “the use
of an unrestricted, publicly available website” would not be allowed under Rule 502(c) “if
the website contains an offer of securities.” 252
In 1996, however, the SEC staff recognized that a broker-dealer may employ internet
website in private offerings. In IPONET, a registered broker-dealer (W.J. Gallagher &
Company, Inc.) and its affiliate (IPONET) contemplated that the procedure was
substantially same as Shaine, except that such procedure would be conducted electronically
through the IPONET website. 253 Under this procedure, a prospective offeree would be
required to complete a questionnaire in the IPONET website and a broker-dealer would
verify whether he or she is an accredited or sophisticated investor within the meaning of
Regulation D.254 Once verified, prospective offerees could access a password-protected

250

Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities Act Release No. 7233, 1995 WL 588462
[hereinafter Use of Electronic Media (1995)], at *1 (Oct. 6, 1995) (“Given the numerous benefits of electronic
media, the Commission encourages further technological research, development and application. The
Commission believes that the use of electronic media should be at least an equal alternative to the use of
paper-based media.”).
251

Id. at *11.

252

C&DIs, supra note 49, Question 256.23; SEC Interpretation: Use of Electronic Media, Securities
Act Release No. 7856, 2000 WL 502290, at *12 (April 28, 2000) [hereinafter Use of Electronic Media
(2000)].
253

IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 431821 (July 26, 1996).

254

Id. at *3.
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IPONET webpage and purchase securities in private offerings posted after their access has
been authorized. 255 The SEC staff concluded that such procedure “would not involve any
form of ‘general solicitation’ or ‘general advertising’ within the meaning of Rule
502(c).”256 Similar to IPONET, the SEC staff granted the no-action letter request to a law
firm on behalf of the websites operating company which proposed to provide qualified
investors with private fund information on the access-limited website. 257 In Lamp
Technologies, the Division of Corporate Finance opined that “the posting of a notice
concerning a private fund on a web site that is password-protected and accessible only to
subscribers who are pre-determined by Lamp to be accredited investors would not involve
a ‘general solicitation’ or ‘general advertising’ [by any participating fund] within the
meaning of rule 502(c) of Securities Act Regulation D.”258
In 2000, the SEC released an Interpretive Release to clarify previous no-action letters
as websites operated by third parties emerged to invite prospective investors “on an accessrestricted basis.”259 In the Interpretive Release, the SEC pointed out that some website

255

Id. at *3.

256

Id. at *1. In reaching the conclusion, the SEC staff noted following three factors:
(a) both the invitation to complete the questionnaire used to determine whether an investor is
accredited or sophisticated and the questionnaire itself will be generic in nature and will not
reference any specific transactions posted or to be posted on the password-protected page of
IPONET;
(b) the password-protected page of IPONET will be available to a particular investor only after
Gallagher has made the determination that the particular potential investor is accredited or
sophisticated; and
(c) a potential investor could purchase securities only in transactions that are posted on the
password-protected page of IPONET after that investor’s qualification with IPONET.

257

Lamp Technologies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 282988 (May 29, 1997).

258

Id. at *4.

259

Use of Electronic Media (2000), supra note 252, at *12.
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operators “engaged in practices that deviate substantially from the facts” in the IPONET.260
It also objected to interpreting Lamp Technologies as “extending the ‘pre-existing,
substantive relationship’ doctrine to solicitations conducted by third parties other than a
registered broker-dealer.”261 The SEC was particularly concerned of those operators who
were not registered broker-dealers and did not require prospective investors to complete
questionnaires, but still allowed investors to self-certify themselves “merely by checking a
box.”262 The SEC noted that such activities by third-party operators may involve general
solicitation or “require them register as broker-dealers.”263
In Citizen VC, however, the SEC staff again endorsed the use of the online offering
platform of a venture capital firm that was not a registered broker-dealer or investment
adviser.264 Similar to its predecessors, Citizen VC also employed a website containing the
online questionnaire and the password-protected section.

To establish substantive

relationship with prospective investors who self-certify themselves as accredited investors
in response to the online questionnaire, Citizen VC suggested various policies and
procedures it would implement during the “relationship establishment period.” 265 Granting
no-action relief, the SEC staff emphasized particularly that “the quality of the relationship”

260

Id.

Id. at *12 n88 (stating that “the staff . . . recognized a separate means to satisfy the “no general
solicitation” requirement solely in the context of offerings by private hedge funds . . .”).
261

262

Id. at *12.

263

Id. at *12-13.

264

Citizen VC, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 4699193 (Aug. 6, 2015). Citizen VC, Inc. and
its affiliates (collectively, Citizen VC) intended to “offer and sell from time to time [through a website
operated by Citizen VC, Inc.], without registration, limited liability company interests of special purpose
vehicles (“SPVs”) established and managed by a wholly owned subsidiary of Citizen VC, Inc.” The SPVs
would invest in various private companies and would offer interests of SPVs to qualified investors through
Rule 506(b) offerings. Id. at *2.
265

Id. at *3.
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is the most important factor and “specific duration of time” (e.g., minimum waiting period)
is not necessary to create a substantive relationship. 266

(2) General advertising
(a) In general
Rule 502(c) prohibits the issuer or its agent from making use of mass media with
respect to private offering in reliance of Rule 506(b). 267 However, the ban on general
advertising does not prohibit an issuer or its agent from disseminating the “factual business
information that does not condition the public mind or arouse public interest in a securities
offering.” 268 For example, though advertising new products is not deemed as general
advertising simply because it is made during the time that the issuer is engaged in the
private offering, it may violate Rule 502(c) if such advertising is used to condition the
market with respect to the securities offering of the issuer. 269

(b) Communications by third parties
Many of no-action letters related to general advertising involve situations where
communications are effectuated by persons other than the issuer. In Remco Securities Co.,

266

Id. at *1.

267

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c).

268

C&DIs, supra note 49, Question 256.24. As to what constitutes factual business information, the
SEC staff explains as follows:
What constitutes factual business information depends on the facts and circumstances. Factual
business information typically is limited to information about the issuer, its business, financial
condition, products, services, or advertisement of such products or services, provided the
information is not presented in such a manner as to constitute an offer of the issuer’s securities.
Factual business information does not include predictions, projections, forecasts or opinions . . .
Id. at Question 256.25.
269
7B Hicks, supra note 227, § 11:152 (citing the Printing Enterprises Management Science, Inc. noaction letter).
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the SEC staff took the position that “publication of a press release by an affiliate of an
issuer would, in the absence of unusual circumstances, be considered made on behalf of
the issuer.” 270 The SEC staff also viewed that the “institutional advertising” by a
syndicator, though it does not contain any particular offering, would violate Rule 502(c)
“if the advertisement is used while the syndicator is in the process of offering and selling
securities,” or “expects in the near future to offer and sell securities.” 271
The publication relating to the private offering by non-affiliates was viewed as a
general advertising in contravention of Rule 506c(c) of Regulation D in most no-action
letters. 272

In J.D. Manning, the SEC staff rejected no-action relief for a Florida

corporation’s proposal to “publish a periodic newsletter containing a list and description of
closely held businesses which were expected to raise capital in future [exempted]
transactions.” 273 Based on the facts that (1) a newsletter would include “the estimated
amount of capital” to be raised within one year, as well as solely factual information, (2)
“[p]articipating businesses would prepare materials for inclusion in the newsletter,” and (3)
they “would pay for its publication,” the SEC staff viewed the publisher was not completely
independent from the prospective issuers, and reached a conclusion that the proposed
publication would “constitute a general solicitation on behalf of the participating
businesses.”274

270

Remco Securities Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55621, at *1 (July 22, 1985).

271

Gerald F. Gerstenfeld, SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55681, at *1 (Nov. 3, 1985).

272

See generally 7B Hicks, supra note 227, § 11:138-139.

273

J.D. Manning, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 65354, at *6 (Feb. 28, 1986).

274

Id. at *6; 7B Hicks, supra note 227, § 11:138 n1.
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In Tax Investment,275 however, the SEC staff did not grant no-action relief, even in a
situation where the publisher that intended to analyze randomly selected private placement
offerings was “independent from the issuers and the offerings being analyzed.” 276 Though
the SEC staff admitted that “Regulation D does not directly prohibit such a third party
publication,” it did not allow the publication to circulate due to “its susceptibility to use by
participants in an offering.”277 Furthermore, the SEC staff expressed no opinion in Oil and
Gas Investor where the company intended to publish a magazine providing purely factual
information on available public and private offerings related to oil and drilling programs,
“through its own reporting activities,” without analyzing the offerings as in Tax
Investment. 278 According to the letter, the company intended to interview oil and gas
program sponsors and review SEC filings to collect available information, but would not
receive, directly or indirectly, any consideration from program sponsors.279 In the letter,
the SEC staff pointed out that issuer’s role in the publication of the offering may affect the
availability of the exemption. 280

275

Tax Investment Information Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 29834 (Jan. 7, 1983).

276

1983 Interpretive Release, supra note 231, Part III.C.

277

Id.

278

Oil and Gas Investor, SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 28633, at *1-2 (Aug. 11, 1983).

279

Id. at *1.

280

Id. Deciding to express no opinion on the issue, the SEC staff added as follows:
The Division is of the view that the questions you have raised involve significant factual issues.
These issues include not only the exact language of particular published material but also the
issuer’s role, if any, regarding the publication of information concerning the offering of its
securities. If an issuer is involved in publicizing its offering, that involvement and such publicity
must be measured against . . . any exemptions from registration, with respect to an unregistered
offering.

Id.
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1.3. LIFTING THE BAN: JOBS ACT AND 506(C) SAFE HARBOR

The SEC staff interpretations on Rule 502(c) of the Regulation D, which requires a
pre-existing, substantive relationship between the issuer and potential offerees, placed
substantial restriction on the availability of the private placement, particularly for small
businesses.281 Since small businesses generally had to hire investment banking firms to
satisfy the pre-existing requirement, the SEC staff guidelines brought an effect to channel
Rule 506 offerings into the broker-dealers’ intermediation. 282 The real consequence of the
general solicitation ban was substantial fees paid to investment banking firms, 283 and
economies of scale made private placements relatively disadvantageous to small
companies.284 In the committee report on H.R. 2940 (later replaced by H.R. 3606) which
was one of several JOBS Act-related bills, Congress also expressed the concerns that
“[r]equiring potential investors to have an existing relationship with the company
significantly limits the pool of potential investors and severely hampers the ability of small

William K. Jr. Sjostrom, Relaxing the Ban: It’s Time to Allow General Solicitation and Advertising
in Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004) (arguing that "the ban to have a negative impact on
the capital-raising efforts of emerging companies"); Stuart R. Cohn, Securities Markets for Small Issuers:
The Barrier of Federal Solicitation and Advertising Prohibitions, 38 UNIV. FLA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1986) (arguing
that "[s]mall, developing companies are severely handicapped by the non-solicitation rules").
281

282

Langevoort, supra note 84, at 7.

283

According to the SEC analysis on Form D filings submitted between 2009 and 2012, the average
commission was 5.9% of the offering price. See Rule 506(c) Adopting Release, supra note 53. See also
Sjostrom, supra note 281, at 15 (stating that “an investment banking firm charges a commission of up to ten
percent of the gross offering proceeds plus expenses” and it “may also command common stock warrants
and the contractual right to participate in future company offering”).
Daugherty, supra note 212, at 70-71 (pointing out that the “average cost of funds” is relatively higher
for small business than big business which “tends to raise more money in a typical transaction and can spread
its costs over a broader base of income, assets, and shareholders”). The SEC reported that “issuers raising
up to $1 million in capital paid on average a 6.5% commission, whereas issuers raising over $50 million in
capital paid on average a 1.9% commission.” See Rule 506(c) Adopting Release, supra note 53, at 84-85.
284
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companies to raise capital and create jobs.”285 In March 2012, Congress finally passed the
JOBS Act and Section 201(a) of Tile II of the Act directed the SEC to provide a new
exemption under Rule 506 which is free from prohibition against general solicitation. 286
Pursuant to the JOBS Act mandate, the SEC revised Rule 506 to provide new Rule 506(c)
safe harbor in July 2013. Instead of excluding the anti-solicitation rule, new Rule 506(c)
safe harbor requires two additional conditions, (i) all purchasers of securities must be
accredited investors, and (ii) the issuer must take reasonable steps to verify that the
purchasers of the securities are accredited investors.287
At first glance, Rule 506(c) safe harbor seems to be more attractive than the Rule
506(b) safe harbor to the issuers. However, this is not necessarily the case. In the Rule
506(b) offerings, failure to comply with conditions of Rule 506(b) does not exclude the
availability of Section 4(a)(2) exemption. 288 On the contrary, when an issuer chooses to
conduct an offering in reliance on Rule 506(c), the issuer runs a risk of losing the
availability of Section 4(a)(2) exemption in case the conditions of Rule 506(c) are not met.
The SEC made clear that “[t]he use of general solicitation continues to be incompatible
with a claim of exemption under Section 4(a)(2).” 289

285
H.R. REP. NO. 112-263, at 2 (2011). In the report, Congress particularly paid attention to the
exacerbated financing conditions of small businesses in the aftermath of the economic crisis:

Because banks have tightened their lending standards in the wake of the economic crisis, there
is less credit available to fund growth. Accordingly, equity financing, in which investors
purchase ownership stakes in a company in exchange for a share of the company’s future
profits, is an increasingly essential means of providing small companies with the capital they
need to grow and create jobs.
286

JOBS Act, Title II, § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 313-14 (2012).
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17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2).

288

Id. § 230.500(c).

C&DIs, supra note 49, Question 260.13 (also stating that “the mandate in the JOBS Act to permit
general solicitation for a subset of Rule 506 offerings affects only Rule 506 and not Section 4(a)(2) offerings
in general”).
289
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1.4. ASSESSMENT FOR THE CURRENT REGULATION

As explained above, two SEC safe harbors for the non-public offering exemption of
Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act take opposite positions in the manner of offering. Rule
506(b) unduly restricted an issuer’s communication with potential investors by adopting a
“pre-existing substantive relationship” doctrine. On the other hand, Rule 506(c) boldly
liberalized the issuer’s communication activity by permitting public solicitation just like
the registered offering. However, neither of the two approaches appears to maintain a
balance between two conflicting goals of capital formation and investor protection.

1.4.1. IS A “PRE-EXISTING” CONDITION NECESSARY TO THE PRIVATE PLACEMENT?
When the SEC originally adopted Rule 506 under Regulation D, it removed “nature
of offerees” requirements which existed in Rule 146(d). 290 The SEC also revised the
manner of offering requirements of Rule 146(c) to this change. Previously, paragraphs (2)
and (3) of Rule 146(c) provided the exceptions that certain communications (e.g., seminar
or meeting, letter, circular, notice or other written communication) were “deemed not to be
a form of general solicitation or general advertising” when such communications were
made only to qualified offerees under Rule 146(d)(1). 291 The SEC eliminated these
exceptions in Rule 502(c). 292 On the surface, it appears that Rule 502(c) does not regulate
any substance with respect to offerees. In fact, the SEC staff also commented that “Rule

290

17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d) (repealed); see Chapter III.A.3.

291

17 C.F.R. § 230.146(c) (repealed).

292

Id. § 230.502(c).
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502(c) relates to the nature of the offering, not the nature of the offerees.” 293 Contrary to
such comment, the SEC’s pre-existing, substantive relationship doctrine seems to relate
Rule 502(c) to the nature of offerees. The staff interpretations limited a private offering in
reliance on Rule 506(b) to qualified offerees who are known to the issuer or its agents prior
to commencing the offering. As one letter of the American Bar Association (ABA)
indicated, the SEC, in effect, “reintroduced the need to inquire into the nature of the
offerees and the extent and quality of their prior relationships with the issuer or its agents”
through its staff interpretations. 294
Some policy considerations may be posited to explain why the SEC staff has imposed
a pre-existing, substantive relationship doctrine with respect to the Rule 502(b) offering. 295
First, the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Ralston Purina appears to affect the SEC’s
interpretations. In Ralston Purina, the Court emphasized that “the exemption question
turns on the knowledge of the offerees.”296 The SEC might fear that the ignorance of the
offeree sophistication would result in a bigger discrepancy between the judicial
interpretation on Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act and SEC Rule 506 safe harbor. 297
Second, the SEC might be concerned about the possibility that private offerings would be
“directed in a ‘shotgun’ fashion through the use of mailing lists or ‘cold calls’ to unknown

1983 Interpretive Release, supra note 231, Part III.C. (stating that “[t]he mere fact that a solicitation
is directed only to accredited investors will not mean that the solicitation is in compliance with Rule 502(c)”).
293

7B Hicks, supra note 227, § 11:150 (citing letter of ABA Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts
and Unincorporated Associations of the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, dated April 11, 1985,
to Ms. Mary E.T. Beach, Associate Director, Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, at 3).
294

Id. 11:150 (stating that “[t]he SEC staff never explained why it has superimposed the pre-existing
relationship condition upon rule 502(c)”).
295
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SEC v. Ralston Purina. Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953).
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7B Hicks, supra note 227, § 11:157.
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prospects.” 298 Third, the SEC might intend to “channel” private offerings through
securities market intermediaries, such as broker-dealers and investment advisers, to give
investors more protection from risky securities. 299 Fourth, one might interpret that the SEC
has a vested interest in ensuring the continuity of business by regulated entities, and
imposing a pre-existing condition would be a way of bolstering business for
intermediaries.299.5
However, the SEC’s construction on the general solicitation requiring a “pre-existing”
relationship between the issuer and offerees seems to demand an unnecessarily rigorous
condition. Neither the Securities Act nor the Supreme Court’s decision imposed such
condition with respect to Section 4(a)(2) exemption. 300 Commentators criticized that the
SEC “adopted safe harbor rules that are rather more intrusive than the Supreme Court
would mandate.”301 In Ralston Purina, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant’s preexisting relationship with its “key employees” did not save the defendant. 302 The Court
also rejected the SEC’s claim that “an offering to a substantial number of the public is not

298

Id. § 11:150.

Cable, supra note 82, at 109-110 (“The ban on general solicitation is designed to channel sales efforts
through regulated intermediaries, such as broker-dealers or investment advisers.”); Langevoort, supra note
84, at 7.
299

299.5
See Jonathan Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case
Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 948 (1994) (criticizing that “[t]he SEC’s major litigation
efforts and regulatory initiatives have been designed to protect the Commission’s regulatory turf, rather than
to further important areas of public policy”); see also Nagy, supra note 208.5, at 959 (pointing out the
substantial “likelihood of agency capture and special interest decisionmaking” in the no-action letter process).

Daugherty, supra note 212, at 75 (arguing that “Ralston Purina did not hold that the seller must use
some particular means to assure itself of its offerees' abilities to fend for themselves, nor did the Court “even
impose requirements about the seller's state of mind”).
300

301
E.g., id. at 75; Cable, supra note 82, at 133 (stating that “[t]he SEC's ban on general solicitation is
more restrictive, or at least different in focus, than the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 4(2) of
the Securities Act requires”).
302
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (“The exemption, as we construe it, does not
deprive corporate employees, as a class, of the safeguards of the Act.”).
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exempt under § 4[(a)(2)].”303 Rather, the Court’s focus of inquiry was whether or not the
employees were “shown to have access to the kind of information which registration would
disclose.”304 Accordingly, all that matters is “the need of the offerees for the protections
afforded by registration.”305 In situations where such need is nonexistent, the issuer should
be allowed to offer securities to prospective investors regardless of the presence of a preexisting relationship. In this respect, there seems to be no valid reason from prohibiting
small companies to directly negotiate with large institutional investors or other highlysophisticated investors about securities offerings merely because they had no prior
knowledge of such investors. 306

If an issuer has a pre-existing relationship with

prospective offerees, it can help the issuer determine whether such offerees have requisite
qualification.307 However, it does not necessarily mean that an issuer is unable to make
such judgment without a prior relationship with prospective investors. 308 The SEC is
bound to consider the public interest of capital formation and market efficiency, in addition
to investor protection, in its rulemaking. 309 A negative impact on the small businesses
affected by a pre-existing relationship requirement may far outweigh the positive impact

303

Id.

304

Id. at 126.

305

Id. at 127.

Cable, supra note 82, at 134 n157 (stating that “a startup company should, under SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., be able to offer its stock to the fifty largest venture capital funds in the United States even without
any personal connections to those funds”); Daugherty, supra note 212, at 75 (metaphorically stating that “an
offering ‘to all red-headed Price Waterhouse partners residing in Chicago’ should pass muster under Ralston
Purina”).
306

307

Daugherty, supra note 212, at 80.

308

Id. at 82.

309

15 U.S.C. § 77b(b).
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on investor protection. A pre-existing relationship should not be a required condition of
the safe harbor for Section 4(a)(2) exemption.

1.4.2. ARE INVESTOR SAFEGUARDS SUFFICIENT IN RULE 506(C) OFFERINGS?
Congress and the SEC relieved the business community’s concern for capital raising
under Rule 506(b) of Regulation D by permitting public solicitation on the condition that
all purchasers are limited to accredited investors. The proponents for lifting the ban in
Rule 506 offerings argued that “no offeree has ever lost any money unless he or she became
a purchaser.”310 They also argued “if securities buyers are sophisticated enough, then a
public offering, even without the usual protections of the Securities Act, would not be
especially problematic.”311 Thus, under the Rule 506(c) regime, it appears that neither an
“offer” nor “offeree” have independent significance.
However, departure from the “offeree” regulation in Rule 506(c) is not consistent with
the seminal decision of the Supreme Court in Ralston Purina.312 In this case, the Supreme
Court held that “the exemption question turns on the knowledge of the offerees,” not the
purchasers.313 The Court’s focus on the offerees was not something it just blurted out. The
Court consistently emphasized “the need of the offerees” for the registration protection in

310

Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, at 78 (April 23, 2006), available at https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspcfinalreport.pdf.
311

Michael D. Guttentag, Protection from What? Investor Protection and the JOBS Act (2013), 13 UC
Davis Business L.J. 207, 245 (2013) (citing Linda C. Quinn, Reforming the Securities Act of 1933: A
Conceptual Framework, 10 INSIGHT 25 (1996)).
312

Warren, supra note 98, at 7-8.

313

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953) (emphasis added in text).
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its ruling.314 Under the U.S. securities law regime, regulating an “offer” of securities has
been viewed critical as much as regulating a sale itself. Professor Warren explanation for
the reason is as follows:

At the heart of both federal and state registration requirements covering offers as well as
sales of securities was the public policy concern over bait and switch techniques, through
which issuers would sinisterly time positive and negative disclosure to maximize sales.
Positive marketing hyperbole obviously could be used to condition the market prior to
disclosure of the more complete picture replete with negative information. In other words,
once investors were conditioned by misleading positive information, issuers could then
undertake to sanitize the resultant transactions at the point of sale with prolix disclosure
documents providing, in the best case, a more balanced presentation of positive and
negative attributes of the issuer and its securities. Congress sought to foreclose these
outcomes by placing offers and sales on the same statutory footing by requiring both to
be registered absent an applicable exemption. 315

However, Congress drastically shifted the focus of investor protection from offerees
to purchasers in the JOBS Act reform. Such a shift can be viewed as a significant retreat
from investor protection because most of the investor protection schemes (e.g., SEC staff
review, mandatory disclosure) that apply to transactions involving a “public solicitation”
of securities are not available with respect to Rule 506(c) offerings. All that Congress
invented as a safeguard for investor protection to lift the solicitation ban was limiting the
sale of securities to accredited investors. The SEC also did not provide additional investor
safeguards in implementing the JOBS Act’s directive other than adopting bad actor
disqualifications for Rule 506 offerings, which had been mandated by Section 926 of the

314

Id. at 127. See also Warren, supra note 98, at 8 (pointing out that the Supreme Court in Ralston
Purina “repeatedly emphasized that the focus of the registration requirement and the private placement
exemption was on the access of the offerees and not the ultimate purchasers”).
315

Warren, supra note 98, at 7.
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Dodd-Frank Act in a separate release. 316 The SEC might hope that the accredited investors’
sophistication and the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws would be sufficient
to prevent the potential of fraudulent or abusive schemes in connection with Rule 506(c)
offerings.317
Unlike the SEC’s expectation, existing investor safeguards seem to be insufficient to
address the concern for investor protection in Rule 506(c) offerings. The antifraud
provisions and civil liability are remedial measures that could be found throughout the
federal securities laws.

Those measures cannot prevent fraudulent schemes from

penetrating innocent investors in advance.

In addition, deterrence effect on future

securities law violations by such remedies would depend on whether or not fraudulent
activities can be effectively detected and enforced by public or private actions. However,
detection of frauds in connection with Rule 506(c) offerings would be much more difficult
than those in registered offerings. This is mainly because only a handful amount of
information on unregistered offerings is filed with the SEC, and the SEC’s resources to
devote its staff to monitor and detect fraudulent activities in such offerings are limited
compared to the number of unregistered offerings filed with the agency. 318 In addition, the
heightened pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)

316

Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, Title IX, § 926, 124 Stat. 1376, 1851 (2010); Disqualification
of Felons and Other “Bad Actors” from Rule 506 Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-9414 (July 10,
2013).
317

Rule 506(c) Adopting Release, supra note 53, at 93 (stating that factors such as the sale of securities
limited to accredited investors, the antifraud provisions under the federal securities laws, and the public nature
of solicitations which facilitates detection of frauds would mitigate the risk of frauds in Rule 506 offerings).
318

During the period between September 23, 2013 and December 31, 2014, a total of 26,617 new Rule
506 offerings were filed with the SEC. Among those filings, 2,117 offerings were made in reliance on new
Rule 506(c). See Scott Bauguess, Rachita Gullapalli, and Vladimir Ivanov, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Div.
of Econ. & Risk Analysis, Capital Raising in the U.S.: An Analysis of the Market for Unregistered Securities
Offerings, 2009-2014, at 12-14 (Oct. 29, 2015).
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also make private enforcement actions less effective as a means of deterring fraud. 319
Although the SEC emphasized that the public nature in Rule 506(c) offerings would
increase the possibility of detecting indications of fraud, 320 this view may be overly
optimistic. The public nature in Rule 506(c) offerings is likely to be more relevant to the
fact that the issuers can target persons whom they previously could not. On the contrary,
skillful fraudsters are likely to keep the “fraudulent nature” of the offerings in private to
themselves.
A concern for new Rule 506(c) exemption was also raised by former SEC
Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar who cast the dissenting vote on the final rules permitting
general solicitation in Rule 506 offerings.320.1 He objected to the new Rule 506(c) of
Regulation D as adopted in several grounds. First, Aguilar did not agree with the argument
that “the Commission’s hands . . . [were] tied” in implementing Section 201 of the JOBS
Act.320.2

He argued that the SEC should exercise its broad rulemaking authority

empowered by the Securities Act to carry out its responsibility of protecting investors.
Second, Aguilar emphasized that “without additional protections, permitting general

319

Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23
J. LAW ECON. ORGAN. 598, 622-23 (2007) (reporting that "companies engaged in smaller offerings or with a
lower secondary market turnover . . . are significantly less likely to find themselves the target of a securities
class action in the post-PSLRA period"); Joel Seligman, The Seventeenth Annual Corporate Law Symposium:
Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 95, 113 (2004) (stating that “the diminution
in the effectiveness of private federal securities litigation was one of several factors that contributed to a
reduction in fraud deterrence”).
Rule 506(c) Adopting Release, supra note 53, at 93 (stating that “the public nature of these
solicitations may also facilitate detection of fraudulent activity in that the fraudulent nature of some offerings
may be inferred from particular statements contained in solicitation materials, for example, representations
of guaranteed high rates of return”).
320

U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Comm’r, Luis A. Aguilar, Public statement: Facilitating General
Solicitation at the Expense of Investors (July 10, 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/open-meeting-statement-laa-3.
320.1

320.2

Id.
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solicitation . . . [would] put investors at risk.”320.3 He was particularly concerned that the
current accredited investor definition would not be sufficient to give confidence on
financial expertise of certain accredited investors.320.4 Thus, he anticipated that without
additional investor safeguards, general solicitation would “prove be a great boon to the
fraudster.”320.5 Third, Aguilar argued that additional investor safeguards “should have been
considered as part of the amendments to allow general solicitation” in adopting the new
rules.320.6 Such argument came from his concern that “the protections . . . [would] simply
come too late, if they . . . [came] at all, for many investors.”320.7 Lastly, Aguilar criticized
the Commission’s rulemaking process for the adoption of Rule 506(c), noting that the
Commission adequately considered neither “any alternatives to the version of the rule
adopted” nor “economic effects of the new rule.”320.8
The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) also voiced a
concern for the “Wild West” of Rule 506(c) of Regulation D.320.9 The NASAA blamed the
SEC for “fail[ing] to implement any protections for investors” despite concerns for the
increase of fraud and abuse in connection with Rule 506(c) offerings.320.10 It also suggested

320.3

Id.

Id. (emphasizing that “only a small percentage of U.S. households meeting the definition of
accredited investor have substantial direct holdings of individual securities”).
320.4

320.5

Id.

320.6

Id.

Id. (also stating that “[i]t is reckless to create a known risk today, with just the hope of a speculative
remedy tomorrow”).
320.7

320.8

Id. See also Donna M. Nagy, The Costs of Mandatory Cost-Benefit Analysis in SEC Rulemaking,
57 ARIZ. L. REV. 129, 151-53 (2015) (addressing the possibility that recent deregulatory rules adopted to
implement the mandate of the JOBS Act would be challenged by “investor- or consumer-protection groups”
as to the adequacy of the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis).
320.9

NASAA Comments in Response to Release No. 33-9354 (File No. S7-07-12) (Oct. 3, 2012),
available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-12/s70712-92.pdf.
320.10

Id. (emphasis in original).
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several specific measures that the SEC should take into consideration in order to strengthen
regulatory oversight of the market and give sufficient guidance to issuers in Rule 506(c)
offerings.320.11
The SEC, on the same day when it adopted the final rules eliminating the ban on
general solicitation, proposed new rules in the separate release, to address concerns for new
Rule 506(c) offerings.320.12 Additional measures considered in this proposal include,230.13
(1) the filing of a Form D at least 15 days prior to the first use of general solicitation;230.14
(2) the filing of a closing amendment to Form D within 30 days after the termination of
any Rule 506(c) offering; (3) inclusion of certain legends and other disclosures in written
solicitation materials in connection with a Rule 506(c) offering; (4) submission to the SEC
of any written general solicitation materials used in a Rule 506(c) offering prior to the first
use of such materials; (5) automatic disqualification of an issuer in connection with any
new Rule 506 offering for one year if the issuer, or any predecessor or affiliate of the issuer,
did not comply, within the last five years, with Form D filing requirements in a Rule 506
offering; (6) revisions to Form D to provide additional information primarily for Rule 506
offering; (7) application of interpretive guidance of Rule 156 under the Securities Act to
the sales literatures of private funds.

Id. The NASAA’s suggestions include: (i) requiring an issuer to file Form D prior to the use of
general solicitation, (ii) establishing non-exclusive safe harbors for the verification of accredited investors,
(iii) providing issuer disqualification provisions, (iv) placing reasonable restrictions on the advertising, (v)
clarifying the permissible activities (ancillary services) of platforms that are not registered broker-dealers.
320.11

320.12

Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act Release No. 9416 (July 10,

2013).
230.13

Id.

230.14
The current Rule 503 of Regulation D requires that Form D be filed with the SEC no later than 15
days after the first sale of securities in the offering.
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These measures, if adopted, would mitigate the concerns for frauds by enabling the
SEC to more effectively monitor and detect fraudulent activities in Rule 506(c) offerings
involving general solicitation, and making it more difficult for fraudsters to mislead
investors. However, just as Aguilar was concerned, these measures have not been adopted
until now.

Considering U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s emphasis on financial

deregulation and change in the SEC leadership, additional investor protections are not
likely to be considered under the Trump administration.320.15 The “Wild West” of Rule
506(c) seems to be inevitable for future years.
Since additional measures are not available to relieve the investor protection concern,
the accredited investor definition is the only ex ante regulation which is meaningful to
protect investors from fraudulent Rule 506(c) offerings. However, as discussed above, 321
the current “wealth-based” accredited investor definition with relatively low thresholds,
and disintermediation in the private placement markets, leave much room for fraudulent
schemes to easily penetrate certain accredited investor groups (e.g., the elderly). Admitting
to the fact that any kind of a “proxy” cannot perfectly measure an investor’s sophistication,
limiting the purchasers to accredited investors alone can never be a sufficient investor
safeguard in return for allowing public solicitation to promote capital formation.

320.15

For example, in nominating Jay Clayton Chairman of the SEC, then-President-elect Donald J.
Trump stated that “[w]e need to undo many regulations which have stifled investment in American businesses,
and restore oversight of the financial industry in a way that does not harm American workers.” The Transition
Team, Release, President-Elect Donald J. Trump Nominates Jay Clayton Chairman of the SEC (Jan. 4, 2017),
available at https://greatagain.gov/sec-a8dde99d867d. See also Dave Michaels, Trump’s Man for the SEC:
Time to Ease Regulation, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2017 12:55 p.m. ET) (reporting that the SEC Chairman
Clayton who was a partner in a Wall Street law firm, in the course of giving advice to his long-term client,
“dashed off an email explaining how government could promote growth by easing what he considered
unnecessary regulations on raising capital”), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-man-for-the-sec-time-toease-regulation-1487505602?mod=djem_jiewr_AC_domainid.
321

See supra Chapter IV.A.1.2.
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2. SOUTH KOREA
2.1. OVERVIEW

Unlike the United States, Korean securities regulation does not directly specify the
manner of offering in the private placement. Instead, the way that an issuer solicits
investors in private offerings is affected by the definition of the term “offer” and the
limitation on the number of offerees under the FSCMA. 322 As explained below, the
definition of the term “offer” enumerates a laundry list of communication means. 323
Concerning the limitation on the number of offerees, the issuer cannot make a solicitation
of securities to 50 or more persons, excluding professionals and related persons, to qualify
for the private placement. 324 In determining the number of offerees, it is irrelevant how
many persons actually purchase the securities offered by the issuer. 325 As a natural
consequence of this numerical limitation, public advertising is prohibited in the private
placement. However, unlike exempt offerings under Rule 506(b) of Regulation D in the
United States, a specific relationship between the issuer and offerees is not a prerequisite
to solicitation of the private securities. The issuer can reach investors with whom it does
not have a pre-existing relationship or who lack financial sophistication to solicit the
offering, only if limitation on the number of offerees is met.

Unlike the current regulation, the term “public offering” affected to the manner of offering in the
exempt offerings under the old securities laws. For example, the definition of the term “public offering”
under the former Securities and Exchange Act as amended in 1972 required securities to be offered “to many
and unspecified persons.” See supra Chapter III.B.2.1.
322

323

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 2 subpar. 2.

324

For the calculation of the number of offerees, see supra Chapter III.B.2.2.

325

Corporate Disclosure Handbook, supra note 140, at 269.
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2.2. ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT REGULATION
2.2.1. AMBIGUITIES IN THE TERM “OFFER”
Unlike the U.S. securities regulation which broadly defines the term “offer” to include
“every attempt” to condition the public mind in order to sell its securities, 326 the Korean
securities regulation defines the term “offer” (officially translated into “invitation to
subscribe”) in a quite different manner. Subparagraph 2 of Article 2 of the FSCMA
Enforcement Decree defines the term “offer” as the following:
The term “invitation to subscribe” means activities, conducted in order to invite a
certain person to acquire securities, of notifying that securities are to issued or sold, or
providing information on the procedures for acquisition of such securities by placing
an advertisement in a newspaper, a broadcasting medium, or a magazine; distributing
printed matters, such as informative material or leaflets; holding a presentation session
for inducing investments; or using an electronic communication means, etc. . . .327

The statutory language of the definition seems to relate the term “offer” to activities that
announce procedures of the securities offering to the public rather than the issuer’s direct
or indirect efforts to solicit investors to purchase its securities. Thus, the current definition
does not give a clear answer for whether or not the term “offer” can regulate indirect
activities which “contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest” in
the proposed securities offering,

326

328

such as press releases, press interviews, or

15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3).

327

Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 2 subpar. 2 (emphasis added) (English
translation of this provision used in the text is provided by the Legislative Translation Center which officially
services translation of Korean statutes).
328

Publication of Information Prior to or After the Effective Date of a Registration Statement, Securities
Act Release No. 3844, 1957 WL 3605, at *2 (Oct. 8, 1957) (stating that “the publication of information and
statements, and publicity efforts, generally, made in advance of a proposed financing . . . may in fact
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communications on social media, published immediately prior to commencement of the
offering.
The definition of the term “offer” also enumerates a variety of means to announce a
proposed offering to the public; in contrast with the U.S. securities regulation that such
means are listed in the Rule 502(c) of Regulation D as examples of general solicitation and
general advertising, not in the definition of the term “offer” in Section 2(a)(3) of the
Securities Act.329 Though the definition of the term “offer” provides a laundry list, it does
not specifically mention oral communications. The FSS staff nonetheless interpreted that
the term “offer” would include oral communications since an “offer” means a variety of
activities of announcing that securities are to be issued or sold, or providing information
on the offering procedures. 330 The FSS staff opinion further emphasized that it would
constitute a public offering or public sale if the number of offerees as to the issuer’s
securities are 50 or more even for oral offers.331 Thus, it seems that the FSS staff took a
position to construct the term “offer” broadly without being bound by specific means
enumerated in the statutory definition from the perspective of investor protection.
However, such construction was not accepted by the Supreme Court in 2003Do7554
case.332 The defendant in the case was charged with securities law violation by having
offered securities of the company in which he had served as a CEO to at least 55 investors
between March and June 2000 without filing a registration statement. The defendant

contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest in the issuer or in the securities of an
issuer”).
329

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c); 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3).

330

Corporate Disclosure Handbook, supra note 140, at 268.

331

Id.

332

Supreme Court, 2003Do7554, Feb. 13, 2004 (S. Kor.).
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argued that he offered the company’s stock only to 39 investors, but it was found that the
stock was sold to at least 55 investors through the other company which was named
Venture Business. 333 The appellate court ruled against the defendant by stating that the
term “offer” should apply to not only where the issuer directly solicits the purchase of
securities, but also where investors are sequentially or indirectly solicited through the
issuer.334 It concluded that the defendant directly or sequentially offered securities to 55
persons from evidence adopted by the lower court. 335
The case was reversed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court specifically stated
that no evidence was submitted that the defendant offered securities to 55 persons or other
persons by using means specified in the definition of the term “offer” or other means
equivalent or similar to the foregoing.336 The Court further stated the conclusion that the
public offering was made in these transactions could not be drawn solely from the fact that
the defendant directly or sequentially solicited the purchase of stock to 55 investors who
paid contribution and became owners of stock. 337 To reach such conclusion, the Supreme
Court required that the prosecution should prove that Venture Business offered stock on
the issuer’s behalf. Venture Business employed solicitation means specified by the
definition of the term “offer” to solicit investors and the defendant actually knew such

333
According to the interrogation of the defendant, the defendant testified that the company agreed to
issue 1.2 million shares to the company named “Venture Business.” He also testified that the company agreed
to transfer stock to the accounts of persons who Venture Business designated if Venture Business failed to
pay contributions and such persons paid instead. The defendant stated that the number of shareholders
reached approximately two thousands at the end of 2002 since the company sold stock in this way. Id.
334

Seoul District Court, 2003No6440, Nov. 19, 2003 (S. Kor.).

335

Id.

336

Supreme Court, 2003Do7554, Feb. 13, 2004 (S. Kor.) (emphasis added).

337

Id.
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facts. 338

The Supreme Court clearly expressed its restricted view with respect to

interpretation of the term “offer” by adding the phrase “other means equivalent or similar
to the foregoing” that does not appear in the statutory definition of the term “offer.”339
Since the Supreme Court’s decision does not have any binding effect in future cases
under the Korean legal system, financial regulatory agencies and lower courts (even the
Supreme Court itself) do not necessarily follow the Supreme Court’s decision.340 However,
it is still less than ideal to acquiesce in the discrepancy between administrative and judicial
interpretations. On the other hand, the problem essentially stems from the carelessly
drafted definition of the term “offer.” The specific language of the definition seems to
have been written with registered offerings in mind by encompassing typical solicitation
means employed in such offerings. However, the term “offer” is used in both registered
offerings and exempt offerings. More importantly, it determines the scope of investor
protection afforded by the securities laws with respect to solicitation of securities. The
current definition of the term “offer” does not appear to have been drafted well enough to
relieve these concerns.

2.2.2. RESTRICTION OF THE NUMBER OF OFFERS
The current approach that regulates the manner of offering in private placements by
placing a limitation on the number of offerees could compromise the goals of the securities

338

Id.

339
DONG HEON CHAE, SECURITIES AND LAW, at 98-101 (1st ed. 2006) (stating that the Supreme Court’s
narrow construction of the term “offer” was based on the “principle of legality” governing the Korean
criminal law system).

Article 8 of the Court Organization Act provides that “[a]ny decision made in a judgment of a higher
court shall bind the court of lower instance with respect to the case in question.” (Emphasis added).
Beobwonjojikbeop [Court Organization Act], Act. No. 14470, Dec. 27, 2016, Art. 8.
340
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laws. First, it may unnecessarily impede the issuer’s efforts to make a personal contact
with potential investors to raise capital in certain circumstances. Small businesses and
startups may need to contact many angel investors (or angel groups) and other potential
investors to seek capital in its early business stage since institutional investors generally
would not be interested in the capital raising at this stage. In addition, investors whom
entrepreneurs solicit to raise capital generally would not be professional investors because
professional investors’ standard is relatively rigorous and also the status can be obtained
only after vexing registration process.341 For example, a hypothetical company already
offered securities to 49 investors (except “professionals” and “related persons”) through
several meetings or presentations to such investors. 342 It is also assumed that most of these
investors previously offered by the company decided not to participate in the proposed
offering. In this situation, the company is likely to be in a tight squeeze. If the company
chooses to stop locating possible investors (and waits another six months), its business or
investment project could be at risk. 343 On the other hand, if the company nevertheless
continues to make offers to new investors without filing a registration statement, it would

341

To qualify for the professional investor, natural persons must own at least 500 million won
(approximately $414,000 as of December 31, 2016) of financial investment instruments and satisfy certain
wealth or income requirements as well. Legal entities or organizations which fall into other categories of
professional investors must own at least 10 billion won, which is approximately $8.28 million as of December
31, 2016 (5 billion won for corporations whose financial statements are audited by the independent auditor)
of financial investment instruments. See supra Chapter IV.A.2.4.3.
As explained earlier, the term “professional” is different from the term “professional investor.” The
term “professional” is used in connection with the calculation of the number of offerees to determine whether
certain securities transactions constitute a public offering. It includes all categories of “professional investors”
and some other categories of investors. In calculating the number of offerees involved in the offering,
professionals and related persons are not counted. See supra Chapter IV.A.2.
342

343

In calculating the number of offerees, persons (except professionals and related persons) who are
offered within six months before current offers are made are aggregated. Thus, if the issuer made offers of
securities to 49 investors at the same time, it could not make any offer of securities to investors (except
professionals and related persons) within 6 months unless a registration statement is filed. See supra Chapter
III.2.2.
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result in a violation of the FSCMA and the company should assume the risk to face
enforcement actions brought by the financial regulators or the prosecution.
Second, the current regulatory scheme also reveals weakness in terms of securities
law enforcement. Although law enforcement agencies must prove that 50 or more persons
were offered by the defendant in order to seek an enforcement action, it would be a difficult
task to secure reliable sources on the number of offerees, unless the shareholder registry or
other documents show the number of purchasers in the offering exceeded forty-nine. In
reality, no case has been reported that the FSS brought an enforcement action solely by
reason that the number of offerees exceeded the numerical threshold without proof of
public advertising or 50 or more purchasers. In spite that some private offerings are often
reported to involve even 49 purchasers, the FSS rarely questioned or scrutinized the
possibility that more offerees could have been involved in the private placement. 344 The
inability to gather relevant evidence to ascertain securities law violations reduces the
effectiveness of enforcement actions and send a wrong signal to the market participants.
In reality, there exists a widespread misconception that it is legitimate to “recruit” up to 49
investors in the private placement as reiterated in the news articles. 345 Thus, the statutory
focus of offerees is virtually discarded and replaced with purchasers in practice.

344

As previously explained, a reporting company is required to file a current report with the FSC
immediately after the company decides to issue new stock or certain types of bonds regardless of whether
the issuance of such securities involves public offering or not. The filing form contains the name of each
purchaser and other relevant information. See supra note 185. It is often found that the current report for the
issuer’s private offering lists forty-nine purchasers who are not professionals or related persons. However,
the FSS staff generally does not take any further action to examine a possible violation of the securities laws.
345

It is easily found that most news articles strongly implicate the private placement is related to the
number of purchasers, not the number of offerees. For example, one news article compared the public
offering and the private placement as follows: “Unlike the public fund which is publicly sold to an unspecified,
large number of investors, the private fund is managed by receiving contributions from forty-nine or fewer
investors” (emphasis added). Minjung Cho, The Private Funds Market Soars: 3.5 Times Faster Than the
Public Funds Market in Growth, Yonhap News (Nov. 20, 2016).
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Lastly, the current manner of offering also can be called into question in terms of
investor protection. Since the current scheme does not place any restriction on the selection
of offerees, the issuer does not have to target particular investors or a group of investors
who are most likely to understand its business and financials. The issuer can simply choose
any person from the whole world to solicit the purchase of its securities. The issuer is also
not required to ask whether or not offerees have the sufficient knowledge or experience to
understand its business, securities, and various risks associated with the investment.
Although a broker-dealer may play a role of assuring that offerees are suitable for the
investment to some degree, the use of the intermediary in a private placement is not
required either. Therefore, the current regulation seems to fall short of investor safeguards
to curb the issuer’s insensible solicitations, rendering offerees unprotected.
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C. INFORMATION TO INVESTORS
1. UNITED STATES
1.1. INTRODUCTION
This section reviews the manner and content of disclosure required in the private
placement under the U.S. securities regulation. The information requirement is particularly
important in the private placement regulation, recalling that exempt offerings are primarily
intended to reduce extensive disclosure of information required in the registered offering
under the Securities Act “where there is no practical need for [the Act’s] application or
where the public benefits are too remote.” 346 The U.S. securities regulation has been
particularly focused on an investor’s ability to “access” the information to balance
conflicting interests between the issuer and investors with respect to information
requirements. If investors can “have access to the kind of information which registration
would disclose” without legal compulsion, mandated disclosure would not be needed. 347
On the contrary, if the investors lack such quality, the issuer would be forced to make
information similar to the items contained in the registration statement available to
investors. Thus, the nature of investors participating in the private offering has been
considered relevant for information requirements. This section briefly reviews information
requirements of Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act, as set forth in former Rule 146 and
current Rule 502(b) of Regulation D, and points out problems under the current regulatory
scheme.

346

H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong. 1st Sess. 5 (1933).

347

E.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953).
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1. 2. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER SECTION 4(a)(2) OF THE SECURITIES ACT
The availability of information has been considered important to claim Section 4(a)(2)
of the Securities Act. 348 According to the courts, each offeree in a non-public offering must
possess or “have access to the kind of information which registration would disclose.” 349
The courts reasoned that investors “could not bring their sophisticated knowledge” in their
investment decision without possession of or access to information.350 Access can exist
when an offeree has a special relationship with the issuer such as “executive personnel.” 351
In Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., the court also viewed access to information as
“a relationship based on factors such as employment, family, or economic bargaining
power that enables the offeree effectively to obtain such information.” 352 Concerning the
adequacy of disclosure required in Section 4(a)(2) offerings, disclosure of the items
contained in Schedule A of the Securities Act, which applies to registered offerings, has
been often referred to as an appropriate standard. 353 However, the courts have considered
“the circumstances of a particular transaction and the nature of the offerees” in determining

348
7B Hicks, supra note 227, § 11:107 n.7 (citing Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d
893, 904 (5th Cir. 1977) (“it cannot be doubted that . . . the policies of the Securities Act mandate that the
courts focus on the information available to the offerees of a security”)).
349
E.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953). See also Hill York Corp. v. American
International Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 690 (5th Cir. 1971).
350

E.g., Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 690 (5th Cir. 1971).
See also Anastasi v. American Petroleum. Inc., 579 F. Supp. 273, 275 (D. Colo. 1984).
351

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953).

352
Doran v. v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing Rule 146(e),
17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)).

7B Hicks, supra note 227, § 11:108 (stating that “[j]udicial and administrative statements about the
information requirements of Section 4(a)(2) have traditionally equated the contents of disclosure with the
items included in Schedule A of the Act”).
353
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whether or not information requirements are met. 354 In some cases, failure to provide
offerees with financial information did not deprive the issuer of the availability of the
exemption.355
Unlike the current Regulation D as discussed below, the courts have required the
issuer to satisfy information requirements with respect to each offeree, not an ultimate
purchaser.356 Thus, the issue must make all material information, in connection with the
proposed offering, “available to an offeree prior to the time of sale.” 357 However, the issuer
is not required to provide offerees with such information in the written form, and allowed
to furnish in an “oral presentation” or other forms.358

354

Id. A report of the ABA Business Law Section Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities also
indicated that the “courts have used different formulations” with respect to adequacy of information in a nonpublic offering:
For example, one court has referred to “material information of the scope and character
contemplated by the Securities Act.” Another has referred to a “sufficient basis of accurate
information upon which the sophisticated investor may exercise his skills.” Another has said
that an issuer must show that offerees had access to the “kind of information that a registration
statement would disclose so that an offeree can make an informed investment decision” and
approved a jury instruction that the “ultimate test is did the offerees know or have a realistic
opportunity to learn the facts essential to an investment judgment.” Some courts have taken
the Supreme Court literally and referred to the need to receive the same information that is
contemplated by Schedule A to the Securities Act. Two courts have referred to the “same sort
of information” as under Schedule A. On the other hand, two courts have said the absence of
financial statements does not undermine the exemption.
Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec., ABA Section of Bus. Law, Law of Private Placements (Non-Public
Offerings) Not Entitled to Benefits of Safe Harbors-A Report, 66 BUS. LAW. 85, 103 (2010) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter Law of Private Placements].
355

E.g., Livens v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104, 1110-11 (D. Mass. 1974) (stating that
“the offerees’ lack of access to the particular kind of information which registration would have disclosed in
this case is not per se fatal to the defendants’ claim of exemption but is only one of the many attendant
circumstances which must be assessed in applying the Ralston Purina test”). See also 7B Hicks, supra note
227, § 11:108.
356

Law of Private Placements, supra note 354, at 100-101.

357

7B Hicks, supra note 227, § 11:111.

Id. § 11:110 (stating that “[n]either the courts nor the Commission have insisted that an issuer
produce a document similar to a Section 10(a) prospectus”). See also ABA Positioning Paper, supra note 1,
at 496-97.
358
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1.3. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER RULE 146
Paragraph (e) of Rule 146, the first safe harbor for Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities
Act, provided information requirements to qualify for the exemption. 359 In brief, Rule
146(e) required that each offeree should either have access to or have been furnished “the
same kind of information that is specified in Schedule A of the Act, to the extent that the
issuer possesses such information or can acquire it without unreasonable effort or
expense.”360 The access test could be satisfied only when the offeree has an “employment
or family relationship or economic bargaining power that enables the offeree to obtain
information from the issuer in order to evaluate the merits and risks of the prospective
investment.”361 If absent of such relationship, the issuer was actually required to furnish
information to each offeree prior to sale. Although types of information required to be
furnished were different, depending on whether or not the issuer is subject to the reporting
requirements under Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, both reporting and nonreporting issuers were basically required to furnish information contained in a registration
statement. 362 However, for non-reporting issuers, the obligation to furnish audited
financial statements could be waived under certain circumstances. 363 The issuer was also
required to provide each offeree or his or her representatives with “the opportunity to ask
questions of, and receive answers from, the issuer” or its agent for them “to verify the

359

17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e) (1974) (repealed).

360

Id. § 230.146(e)(1)(i)-(ii).

Id. § 230.146(e) note (providing that “[a]ccess can only exist by reason of the offeree’s position with
respect to the issuer”).
361

362

Id. § 230.146(e)(1)(ii)(a)-(b).

Id. § 230.146(e)(1)(ii)(b) (providing that “if the issuer does not have the audited financial statements
required by such form and cannot obtain them without unreasonable effort or expense, such financial
statements may be provided on an unaudited basis”).
363
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accuracy of the information obtained.”364 The SEC explained that the “opportunity for
communication are appropriate in view of the absence of the statutory safeguards and
sanctions attendant to the registration process, as well as the absence of traditional
underwriter’s due diligence.”365

1.4. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER RULE 502(b) OF REGULATION D
Rule 502(b) of Regulation D provides information requirements with respect to
exempt offerings in reliance on Rule 506(b). As explained earlier, Rule 506(c) offering is
not subject to information requirements of Rule 502(b).366 Rule 502(b) revised information
requirements in several aspects compared to those of the former Rule 146. 367 First, unlike
Rule 146(e), Rule 502(b) requires the issuer to furnish information only to purchasers, not
all offerees. Thus, if a prospective investor, who is offered by the issuer in Rule 506(b)
offering does not have an intention to purchase securities offered, the issuer does not have
to provide such investor with written offering materials required in Rule 502(b).368 The
issuer can satisfy information requirements, whenever required, only by providing
purchasers with written disclosure “a reasonable time prior to sale.” 369 Second, no specific
information is required to be furnished in cases where securities are sold to accredited

364

Id. § 230.146(e)(2).

365
Rule 146 Adopting Release, supra note 61, at *9 (explaining that “[s]uch restriction and opportunity
for communication are appropriate in view of the absence of the statutory safeguards and sanctions attendant
to the registration process, as well as the absence of traditional underwriter’s due diligence”).
366

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(1).

367

Id. § 230.502(b).

368

Law of Private Placements, supra note 354, at 102

369

Id. § 230.502(b)(1). See also Johnson v. Bumba, 764 F.Supp. 1263, 1273 (N.D. III. 1991) (stating
that “with respect to the three Bliss offerings subject to Regulation D, where relevant, the plaintiffs must
show only that the criteria were met with respect to each purchaser”).
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investors in Rule 506(b) offerings.370 This is based on the theory that accredited investors
can have access to the necessary information without mandatory disclosure in light of their
position with respect to the issuer. 371 However, the issuer may have to furnish accredited
investors with information that it furnishes to non-accredited investors “in view of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.” 372 Third, the level of information to be
furnished to investors is different depending on the offering size in case of the offerings by
non-reporting issuers, as well as, the issuer’s reporting status. 373 In other words, nonreporting issuers’ disclosure burden with respect to financial information increases as the
amount of offering increases. Specific types of information required to be furnished to
non-accredited investors are summarized in Table 7. However, the determination of
whether or not specific information required in Rule 506(b)(2) should be furnished in
particular circumstances depends on whether such information is “material to an
understanding of the issuer, its business, and the securities being offered.” 374 Thus, the
SEC staff interpreted that “if an audited balance sheet is not material to the investor’s

370

Id. § 230.502(b)(1).

7B Hicks, supra note 227, § 11:113 (pointing out that “[i]n theory . . . mandated disclosure to
accredited investors in . . . Rule 506 transactions serves no useful purpose because all of the purchasers are
in a position to acquire the information on their own”).
371

372

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) note.

373

Id. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)-(ii).

Having not adopted, the SEC originally proposed to adopt the so-called “60% test” which was suggested
by the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), in cases “where 60% or more of the total offering is
purchased by one or more accredited institutions.” Under this 60% test, “the issuer, in lieu of providing the
information called for by paragraph (b)(2) of Rule 502 to all purchasers, may elect to provide individual nonaccredited investors upon their written request with the same written information provided to such
institutions.” The test was based on the theory that “the accredited investors, negotiating in their own interest,
could be relied upon to assure the fairness of the transaction to remaining investors.” However, the 60% test
was eliminated in final rule adoption. See Regulation D Proposing Release, supra note 61, at *12-13;
Regulation D Adopting Release, supra note 22, at *11.
374

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i).
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understanding, then the issuer may elect to present an alternative to its audited balance
sheet.”375
To help non-accredited investors “to verify the accuracy of information furnished,”
Rule 502(b) also requires the issuer to provide “the opportunity to ask questions and receive
answers concerning the terms and conditions of the offering and to obtain any additional
information.” 376 Rule 502(b) also provides a special provision to prevent “selective
disclosure” to accredited investors in the Rule 506(b) offering, which includes both
accredited and non-accredited investors.377 When the issuer has provided any accredited
investor with “any material written information concerning the offering” that has not been
furnished to unaccredited investors, it is required to “furnish to the purchaser a brief
description in writing of” such information “[a]t a reasonable time prior to the sale.” 378

375

C&DIs, supra note 49, Question 256.13.

376

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(v).

377

7B Hicks, supra note 227, § 11:125.

378

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(iv).
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TABLE 7. TYPES OF INFORMATION REQUIRED TO BE FURNISHED379
Non-reporting company

Offerings
up to $2M

Offerings
up to $7.5M

Offerings
over $7.5M

379

1) Non-financial: Information required in
Regulation A offerings
2) Financial: Audited balance sheet dated
within 120 days of the commencement of the
offering
1) Non-financial: Information required in
Regulation A offerings
2) Financial: Financial statement information
required in Form S-1 for smaller reporting
companies (audited balance sheets as of the end
of each of the latest two fiscal years and audited
statements of income, cash flow, and changes in
stockholders’ equity for each of the latest two
fiscal years)
(1) Exception: If an issuer cannot obtain
audited
financial
statements
without
unreasonable effort or expense,
(a) Issuers other than limited partnership:
Audited balance sheet dated within 120 days of
the commencement of the offering
(b) Limited partnerships: Financial statements
that have been prepared on the basis of Federal
income tax requirements and examined and
reported on in accordance with generally
accepted accounting standards by an
independent public or certified accountant

1) Non-financial: Information required in
Regulation A offerings
2) Financial: Financial statement required in a
registration statement filed under the Act on the
Form that the issuer would be entitled to use
(audited balance sheets as of the end of each of
the two latest fiscal years, and audited
statements of income and cash flows for each of
the latest three physical years)
(1) Exception: Same as offerings up to $7.5M

Reporting company

Regardless of the size of the offering,
the reporting company must furnish
information in either (A) or (B) and
information specified in (C):
(A) The issuer's annual report to
shareholders for the most recent fiscal
year, the definitive proxy statement
filed in connection with that annual
report, and a copy of the issuer's most
recent Form 10-K (if requested by the
purchaser in writing)
(B) The information contained in an
annual report on Form 10-K, or in a
registration statement on Form S-1 or
S-11, or on Form 10, whichever filing
is the most recent required to be filed
(C) The information contained in any
reports or documents required to be
filed by the issuer under sections 13(a),
14(a), 14(c), and 15(d) of the Exchange
Act since the distribution or filing of
the report or registration statement
specified in (A) or (B), and a brief
description of the securities being
offered, the use of the proceeds from
the offering, and any material changes
in the issuer's affairs that are not
disclosed in the documents furnished.

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)-(ii); 7B Hicks, supra note 227, §§ 11:117-120.
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1.5. ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT REGULATION

As explained above, information requirements of Rule 502(b) of Regulation D do
not have application to accredited investors based on the theory that they can “access” the
information necessary to make an investment decision without mandated disclosure. This
notion can be easily accepted where institutional accredited investors are involved in the
offering, since they generally have the economic bargaining power to demand and obtain
information, and so do they. 380
However, the appropriateness of such notion is called into question when it comes
to individual accredited investors. It should be noted that institutional investors have
greater bargaining power than individual investors in negotiating disclosure of information,
as well as, terms and conditions of investment. 381 The relative disadvantage of individual
accredited investors in the bargaining power would not be a serious problem if they can
obtain information they want. However, the current accredited investor standard for the
natural person does not appear to assure individual investors’ access to the information.
As discussed above, the current financial thresholds for the accredited natural person have
been attenuated over time to the extent that they qualify over one tenth of the U.S.

380
R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 730 (1986) (“Institutional investors are usually sophisticated and
powerful enough to demand and get the information they need before committing their money. The legal
system does not have to protect them with a superimposed mandatory disclosure system.”); ABA Positioning
Paper, supra note 1, at 495 (“Clearly supplying the information is a generally accepted practice where
institutional type offerees are involved. Institutions normally are presumed to have “access” to the
information by virtue of their economic bargaining power.”).
381

The greater bargaining power of the institutional investors can be explained in several respects. First,
institutional investors, on average, can invest a larger amount of money in the target company than individual
investors. They often participate in several investment rounds of the startups. Thus, the issuer can reduce
time and costs to attract individual investors by retaining institutional investors. Second, for small businesses,
receiving funds from institutional investors is more than simply satisfying their capital need. Participation
of institutional investors would be perceived as a positive signal for the company’s prospect by market
participants. Third, the issuer also would expect to take advantage of the institutional investor’s network to
facilitate its business or future financing.
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households as accredited investors. 382 Moreover, there is currently no minimum purchase
requirement which might help an investor to negotiate for disclosure. 383 Although financial
sophistication alone does not directly enable an investor to access the information, an
investor’s knowledge or experience on the financial and business matters can certainly help
to obtain relevant information from the issuer. However, the current wealth-based standard
does not correctly measure an investor’s sophistication as already discussed.

384

Consequently, the current accredited investor standard for the natural person does not
sufficiently reflect the investor’s ability to access to the information.385
On the other hand, the current information requirements, coupled with the current
accredited investor standard, may bring an unintended result in terms of investor protection.
Since a non-accredited investor in the Rule 506(b) offering, “either alone or with his
purchaser representative(s),” is required to have financial sophistication based on the
issuer’s subjective determination, 386 certain instances can exist where non-accredited
investors are superior to accredited individuals in actual qualifications. Under such
circumstance, sophisticated, non-accredited investors can enjoy the benefit of the mandated
disclosure, but unsophisticated, accredited investors cannot. By relying too much on the
controversial definition of the term “accredited investor” to determine an investor’s ability

382

See supra note 100 and accompanying text.

Prior to revisions of Regulation D in 1988, the definition of the term “accredited investor” under
Rule 501(a) of Regulation D contained a category of persons who purchase at least $150,000 of the issuer’s
securities, where the total purchase price does not exceed 20 percent of the purchaser’s joint net worth.
However, the SEC removed this category in 1988. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
383

384

See supra Chapter IV.A.1.2.1.b(2).

385
See Friedman, supra note 6, at 299 (arguing that the rational that accredited investors “have the
bargaining power and sophistication to demand and obtain this information without legal compulsion . . .
breaks down for one significant class of accredited investors-those whose accredited status stems from their
income level or net worth”).
386

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
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to access to the information, the current regulatory scheme appears to miss a class of
investors whom the Securities Act intends to protect.

2. SOUTH KOREA
2.1. OVERVIEW
Under the current securities regulation in Korea, the issuer does not bear any legal
obligation to provide investors with relevant information in the private placement. It does
not matter whether or not the investors are professionals, or whether or not they are
purchasers or offerees. The FSCMA and subordinate statutes simply do not have any
provision concerning the information requirement of the private placement. This laissezfaire approach appears to be grounded on the theory that the manner and extent of
disclosure of information in the private placement can be privately negotiated between the
issuer and investors due to a limitation on the number of offerees. 387 Despite the absence
of the information requirement, institutional investors, such as venture capital firms,
typically receive a variety of information necessary to make an investment decision from
the issuers.388 For other types of investors (e.g., individual investors), very little is known

Corporate Disclosure Handbook, supra note 140, at 281 (“The private offering of securities is made
on the basis of agreement between parties and does not necessitate disclosure of information, thus is exempt
from registration.”).
387

388

A typical checklist used by venture capital firms consists of three parts-investment plan (investment
terms, use of proceeds, financial status and prospect, investment profitability, post-investment management),
company information (company overview and history, major financial transactions, changes in equity,
financial statement analysis), and business analysis (business performance and strategy, market environment,
competitor analysis, customer analysis, human resources analysis, risk analysis). To review items contained
in the checklist, venture capital firms receive relevant information from the company. See Kyunghan Na,
Venture Capital ABC: From Review To Investment, VENTURE DIGEST VOL. 105 (April 2007).
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if there is any typical practice concerning the manner and extent of disclosure of
information in the private placement. However, in any case, there is no current practice in
Korea for the issuers to prepare and provide to investors offering documents such as a
private placement memorandum (PPM), which is widely used by issuers to protect
themselves from potential liability under anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws
in the U.S. private placement market.

2.2. ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT REGULATION

Since the current private placement regime does not provide any information
requirement at all, it may give rise to a misconception that nonexistence of mandatory
disclosure of information is an element inherent to the private placement. Thus, if the
issuer in the private offering is compelled to provide investors with information the
registration would disclose, one might ask what makes a private placement different from
a registered offering, and what benefits could the issuer expect by relying on the private
placement. The SEC’s arguments, in its brief to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Continental Tobacco, seem to properly answer these questions. 389 In the brief, the SEC
pointed out the following “three vital protections,” which are found in the registration
regime of the Securities Act (and also found in the FSCMA): Compliance with “the Act
and to the Commission’s rules, regulations and forms adopted thereunder” in preparing a

389

SEC brief, SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co. of South Carolina, Inc., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
See generally 7B Hicks, supra note 227, § 11:107 (criticizing “the myopic view” that “so long as the issuer
provides all offerees with the same information they would find in a registration statement, the disclosure
objectives of the Act will have been served and, . . . Section 4(a)(2) should apply”).
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registration statement, 390 review of a registration statement by the SEC staff and
administrative actions against noncompliance, and civil liability provisions of Section 11
of the Act.391 The SEC argued that these protections would be “a stimulus to meaningful
disclosure.”392
Unlike the registered offering, such vital protections are not present in the private
offering under the current regulation. Instead, the burden to induce the issuer to provide a
full and faithful disclosure of information primarily remains in the hands of investors
participating in the private offering. In conclusion, the question of whether or not the
mandatory disclosure of information by itself does not properly draw a line between the
registered offering and the private placement.
However, the current regulation does not give any consideration to mandatory
disclosure of information to investors as a condition of the private placement. The current
scheme, ignoring the information element, brings about a serious concern to investor
protection. The Korean private placement regulation allows participation of limited
number of investors whose nature needs not represent knowledge or expertise of the
business or financial matters. These investors, by nature, do not differ from the public to
whom the registered offering is targeted. Nonetheless, the issuer is currently not compelled
to provide these investors with information to assist their investment decision. Justification
for the current regime that investors can obtain relevant information through private
negotiations with the issuer lacks a valid ground. The nature of participation of limited

SEC brief, at 27-28 (“Compliance with these requirements tends to ensure uniformity of disclosures
and comparability among prospectuses, thereby facilitating investment decision-making.”).
390

391

SEC brief, at 27-28.

392

Id.
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number of offerees may facilitate personal contacts with the issuer in the private offering,
but this aspect alone does not assure investors’ access to the information. Without
sufficient bargaining power and sophistication, a private negotiation would not be an
appropriate means to obtain necessary information, leaving investors outside the protection
of the securities laws.

D. SUMMARY
This chapter reviewed and criticized the current private placement regulations of the
United States and South Korea and focused on the three key factors characterizing the
private offering—investor qualifications, the manner of offering and information
requirements. This section gives a brief summary on discussions in this chapter.

(1) Investor qualifications
The U.S. securities laws define the term “accredited investor” to identify investors
who can evaluate the merits and risks of the prospective investment without mandatory
disclosure. However, the current accredited investor definition has been criticized for
relying solely on an investor’s wealth to accredit natural persons. In particular, financial
thresholds used to accredit natural persons in the United States remain unadjusted since the
1980s, resulting in the sharp increase of the number of persons who qualify for accredited
investors. Similarly, Korean securities laws also use the wealth test (i.e., financial assets)
to qualify natural persons as “professional investor.” Therefore, both definitions contain a
risk of misclassifying the unsophisticated, wealthy investors as eligible investors.
Despite this similarity, South Korea takes a more flexible approach to the investor
qualifications by permitting certain professional investors to be treated as an ordinary
235

investor on request. However, the real problem with the Korean private placement
regulation is that the current regulation does not provide any qualification requirement for
investors who do not qualify for a non-professional investor or a related person, while the
current regulation allows those investors’ participation in the private offering. This
contrasts with the U.S. approach that requires financial sophistication of non-accredited
investors who participate in the Rule 506(b) offering. Thus, it seems that the current
Korean private placement regulation also spark a serious concern for investor protection.

(2) Manner of offering
The U.S. private placement regulation takes two opposite approaches to the manner
of offering. On one hand, Regulation D has prohibited an issuer from engaging in general
solicitation and general advertising in the private offering. The ban on general solicitation
has significantly restricted the small businesses’ effort to communicate with potential
investors by a series of the SEC staff interpretations which unnecessarily required a “preexisting” relationship between an issuer and offerees in the Rule 506(b) offering. On the
other hand, adoption of a new Regulation D exemption permitting general solicitation in
Rule 506 offerings has raised the concerns for the increase of frauds and the SEC’s ability
to police the market due to the absence of adequate regulatory measures.
Unlike the U.S. regulation, the Korean regulation does not expressly provide the
manner of offering in the private placement. Instead, it regulates the manner of offering
by limiting the number of offerees whom an issuer can solicit. However, the current
scheme neither facilitates capital formation nor promotes investor protection. It also casts
a doubt in terms of securities law enforcement.
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(3) Information requirements
In the United States, Regulation D requires an issuer to provide a registration
statement-like information to non-accredited investors in the private offering. Regulation
D excludes accredited investors from the benefit of mandatory disclosure based on the
assumption that accredited investors can have “access” to the information sufficient to
make an investment decision without mandatory disclosure.

However, the current

regulation does not consider substantial difference in the economic bargaining power
between institutional investors and individual investors. Thus, a question might arise as to
whether or not individual investors who qualify for accredited investors have sufficient
ability to access information on the issuer and its securities, considering the current
accredited investor standard for the natural person.
The Korean securities regulation currently does not set forth any information
requirement as to the private placement. The current approach is based on the belief that
the level of disclosure of information can be determined by a private negotiation between
the issuer and investors due to the limited nature of the offering. However, without being
supported by other regulatory protections, a private negation between parties alone is not
likely to assure meaningful disclosure of information, considering the fact that the current
regulation does not exclude participation of ordinary investors in the private offering.
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CHAPTER V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the discussions in previous chapters, this chapter suggests recommendations
to better private placement regulation in both United States and South Korea. Although
this chapter contains several specific recommendations for both countries, this does not
mean that all the measures suggested should be taken to improve private placement
regulation. An enhanced balance between two regulatory goals of investor protection and
capital formation may be achieved by implementing or combining some of the
recommendations.

A. UNITED STATES
1. INVESTOR QUALIFICATION
1.1. CHANGING THE CURRENT ACCREDITED INVESTOR DEFINITION

The current accredited investor definition must be changed to better represent an
investor’s sophistication. As discussed in Chapter IV, the current definition relies solely
on a natural person’s wealth and does not correctly measure an investor’s financial
sophistication.1 In addition, the thresholds of net worth and individual income have never
been adjusted since 1982 when Regulation D was adopted.2 As a result of inflation, the

1

See supra Chapter IV.A.1.2.1.

2

The joint income threshold has not been adjusted since it was set at $300,000 in 1988. See Regulation
D Revisions, Securities Act Release No. 6758, 1988 WL 237022 (March 3, 1988). The net worth standard
was revised in 2011 to exclude a natural person’s primary residence from the calculation. See Net Worth
Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 9287 (Dec. 21, 2011).
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number of U.S. households qualifying as accredited investors has significantly increased.3
The concern for increasing the number of accredited investors was intensified by the JOBS
Act’s removal of the general solicitation ban which enables unscrupulous persons to target
a larger pool of investors.
Many commentators have recommended various approaches to improve the current
accredited investor standards. These approaches include but are not limited to, (i) adjusting
the current net worth and income thresholds for inflation and indexing to inflation
thereafter;4 (ii) excluding illiquid assets from net worth calculation; 5 (iii) replacing annual
income with discretionary income; 6 (iv) imposing an investment cap not exceeding a
certain percentage of an investor’s assets or annual income or limiting leveraged
investments; 7 (v) accrediting persons who have certain professional credentials (e.g.,
CPAs, CFAs) or who have passed the qualification test;8 (vi) accrediting persons who are

U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Report on the Review of the Definition of “Accredited Investor,” at 48
(Dec. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Accredited Investor Study] (reporting that the percentage of U.S. households
satisfying net worth or income threshold increased from 1.8% to 10.1% between 1983 and 2013).
3

4

Greg Oguss, Should Sizes or Wealth Equal Sophistication in Federal Securities Laws?, 107 NW. U.
L. REV. 285, 312-13 (2012).
5
Larissa Lee, The Ban Has Lifted: Now Is the Time to Change the Accredited-Investor Standard, 2014
Utah L. Rev. 369, 992-94 (2014); Syed Haq, Revisiting the Accredited Investor Standard, 5 MICH. BUS. &
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 59, 78 (2015).
6

Lee, supra note 5, at 994-95.

7

Abraham J.B. Cable, Mad Money: Rethinking Private Placements, 71 Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 2253,
2305-08 (2014) (suggesting an investment cap to assure diversification and liquidity); Oguss, supra note 4,
at 314 (suggesting the investment limit of up to 25% of net worth); Haq, supra note 5, at 78-79 (suggesting
limitation of an investor's ability to leverage their assets).
8

Haq, supra note 5, at 77-78; Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based
Proposal, 88 C AL. L. REV. 279, 310 (2000) (proposing the investor classification based on the information
sources and a licensing system qualifying investors as “issuer-, intermediary-, or aggregate-level investors”);
Wallis K. Finger, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited Investor” definition Under
the 1933 Act, 86 W ASH. U. L. REV. 733, 758-66 (2009) (proposing a “hybrid licensing scheme” consisting of
two licensing exams—unaccredited investor licensing exam and accredited investor licensing exam).
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represented by qualified persons;9 and (vii) qualifying based on a hybrid model combining
multi-factors.10 Similarly, the SEC staff report on the accredited investor definition which
was published in 2015 also includes a number of recommendations to revise the current
accredited investor definition with respect to natural persons and entities 11 or adopt new
accredited investor standards based on other measures of sophistication.12
It is not an easy task to determine which approaches should be taken since each
approach has its own advantages and disadvantages to others.13 However, as a general
9
Haq, supra note 5, at 77-78 (stating that “those individuals who are not able to pass the investor
sophistication test should be required to seek representation from a qualified individual”).
10

C. Edward Fletcher III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J.
1081, 1149-53 (1988) (categorizing investor sophistication as three factors—“(1) financial and business
acumen, (2) individual characteristics of sophistication, and (3) investment-specific behavior,” and proposing
a checklist for each factor); Lee, supra note 5, at (proposing a hybrid model combining four factors—“an
inquiry into financial sophistication, a lower floor requirement for wealth, a diversification requirement, and
upfront disclosures”).
11

Accredited Investor Study, supra note 3, at 88-93. The staff recommendations include the following:
(i) Leave the current income and net worth thresholds in place, subject to investment limitations;
(ii) Create new, additional inflation-adjusted income and net worth thresholds that are not subject
to investment limitations;
(iii) Index all financial thresholds for inflation on a going-forward basis;
(iv) Permit spousal equivalents to pool their finances for purposes of qualifying as accredited
investors;
(v) Revise the definition as it applies to entities by replacing the $5 million assets test with a $5
million investments test and including all entities rather than specifically enumerated types of
entities;
(vi) Grandfather issuers’ existing investors that are accredited investors under the current
definition with respect to future offerings of their securities.

12

Accredited Investor Study, supra note 3, at 93-96. The staff recommendations are as follows:
(i) Permit individuals with a minimum amount of investments to qualify as accredited investors;
(ii) Permit individuals with certain professional credentials to qualify as accredited investors;
(iii) Permit individuals with experience investing in exempt offerings to qualify as accredited
investors;
(iv) Permit knowledgeable employees of private funds to qualify as accredited investors for
investments in their employer’s funds;
(v) Permit individuals who pass an accredited investor examination to qualify as accredited
investors.

13

For the assessment of potential new criteria, see Accredited Investor Study, supra note 3, at 57-67.
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directive, some recommendations can be made to improve the current accredited investor
definition. First, the SEC should consider an increase of the current net worth threshold if
it chooses to retain the current wealth test. Although the current wealth test has been
heavily criticized, it certainly has some advantages to other proxies. It corresponds to the
purpose of Regulation D which provides issuers with objective standards for the statutory
exemption. Though wealth is flawed in measuring sophistication, it can be “suggestive of
sophistication” and “indicative of an investor's ability to absorb financial risk.” 14
Furthermore, it is widely adopted in other jurisdictions as seen in Table 8. However, the
current U.S. net worth threshold of $1 million is significantly lower than thresholds adopted
in other major countries. The validity of the wealth test would be improved by adjusting
the current net worth threshold for inflation.15
TABLE 8. INTERNATIONAL INCOME/NET WORTH APPROACHES16
Jurisdiction
Australia

Income
AU$250,000

U.S.$ Equivalent*
$179,598

Net Worth
AU$2.5 million
Net Assets

U.S.$ Equivalent*
$1.8 million

Canada

C$200,000
Individual

$149,622

C$5 million
Net Asset

$3.74 million

$224,433
N/A

C$1 million
Financial Assets
€500,000

$748,111

European Union

C$300,000 Joint
Net Income
N/A

Israel

N/A

N/A

NIS 12 million

$3.09 million

Singapore

S$300,000

$212,307

S$2 million Net
Personal Assets
£250,000
Net Assets

$1.42 million

United
£100,000
$150,390
Kingdom
* Based on November 30, 2015, exchange rates.
14

$529,151

$375,974

Finger, supra note 8, at 761.

15
Adjusted for inflation, $1,000,000 of net worth is equivalent to $2,454,093 (Consumer Price Index,
CPI) and $2,161,326 (Personal Consumption Expenditure, PCE) as of August 31, 2015. Using CPI and PCI,
the percentage of qualifying households based on the net worth would fall to 3.1% and 3.7% respectively,
from 7.1% which is not adjusted for inflation. Accredited Investor Study, supra note 3, at 46-48.
16

Accredited Investor Study, supra note 3, at 35, Table 3.2 (footnote omitted).
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Second, the SEC should consider adoption of the “investments-owned” test as a
replacement of, or an additional requirement to, the net-worth test. 17 The amount of
investment assets an individual investor owns would measure, more accurately, the
investor’s knowledge and experience in investment than net worth which can be
accumulated through various economic activities other than investments. To increase the
validity of the investments-owned test, it can also be taken into consideration to exclude
certain investments which are directed and managed by securities professionals (e.g.,
brokers, investment advisors) in calculating the threshold.
Third, the SEC should consider the “multi-factor” approaches to the accredited
investor definition. As the SEC noted, some commentators objected to the increase of the
current net worth or income threshold, arguing that “decreasing the size of the accredited
investor pool by raising the thresholds would adversely affect the market and small
businesses seeking capital.” 18 The negative impact on the capital formation of small
businesses can be minimized by expanding the accredited investor definition based on the
multiple attributes.

The commentators and the SEC have recommended various

alternatives to the current net worth or income standard. These alternatives can help the
accredited investor definition encompass sophisticated investors who have not been
accredited under the current wealth test. The multi-factor approaches are used in other
regulatory regimes.

For example, the European Union regime adopts a three-factor

approach in defining the professional clients. To qualify as professional clients, individual

17
The SEC proposed an “investments-owned” standard of $750,000 as an alternative to the net worth
or income test in 2007, but it was not finally adopted. See Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in
Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 8828, at 31-35 (Aug. 3, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Regulation D
Revisions Proposal].
18

Accredited Investor Study, supra note 3, at 49.
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investors must satisfy at least two of the following three factors: (i) past financial market
transactions, (ii) financial asset holdings, and (iii) work experience in the financial sector. 19
Israel also employs the same three-factor approach in defining a “qualified client.”20 It is
worth noting that the EU approach requires an investor to have two or more attributes of
sophistication, and thus, it appears to increase the reliability of the professional client
definition. Finally, the SEC could revise the accredited investor definition so that it can
accredit investors who satisfy at least two among several factors (e.g., net worth/income,
financial asset holdings, professional credentials, relevant work experience).
Fourth, the SEC should reconsider the adoption of the “large accredited investor”
definition which it proposed in 2007, but did not adopt. In 2007, the SEC proposed a new
Rule 507 exemption which would permit an issuer to engage in “limited advertising” if the
sale of securities is limited to newly defined “large accredited investors.”21 The proposed
definition of the term “large accredited investor” included the same categories of persons
that qualify for accredited investors, but “with significantly higher dollar-amount
thresholds for investors subject to such thresholds.” 22 Under the proposed definition,

19
According to the EU’s Markets in Financial Instrument Directive (MiFID II), individual investors
satisfy at least two of the following criteria to be treated as professional clients:

(i) the client has carried out transactions, in significant size, on the relevant market at an average
frequency of 10 per quarter over the previous four quarters;
(ii) the size of the client’s financial instrument portfolio, defined as including cash deposits and
financial instruments exceeds EUR 500,000;
(iii) the client works or has worked in the financial sector for at least one year in a professional
position, which requires knowledge of the transactions or services envisaged.
Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in
financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (“MiFID II”), Annex
II, II.1.
20

Accredited Investor Study, supra note 3, at 39.

21

2007 Regulation D Revisions Proposal, supra note 17, at 9-27.

22

2007 Regulation D Revisions Proposal, supra note 17, at 9.
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natural persons were required to have at least $2.5 million in investments or annual income
of $400,000 (or joint income of $600,000) to qualify for large accredited investors. 23 The
current accredited investor definition encompasses a disparate class of investors from large
institutional investors such as investment banks and pension funds to individual investors
such as senior retirees. Despite a great disparity in financial resources and sophistication
among investors, they are equally treated in the current private placement regime. The
breadth of the accredited investor definition makes it difficult to determine the adequate
level of protection that should be afforded to accredited investors. The “large accredited
investor” definition would enable the SEC to differentiate exemption conditions (e.g.,
manner of offering, information requirements, and others discussed in detail below)
depending if the purchasers of securities are accredited investors or large accredited
investors.

1.2. RECLASSIFICATION OF INVESTOR STATUS

The SEC should allow accredited natural persons to be reclassified as unaccredited
investors on request. The current accredited investor definition has a general application
to Regulation D offerings regardless of the types of securities. Once qualifying for an
accredited investor, an investor is deemed to have a requisite sophistication in any private
securities offering. However, the universality of the accredited investor definition does not
sufficiently consider modern financial innovation. As discussed in Chapter IV, investing
in the derivatives and structured financial products would require a different level of

23
Legal entities generally were required to have at least $10 million in investments to qualify for large
accredited investors. 2007 Regulation D Revisions Proposal, supra note 17, at 15-17.
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qualifications compared to those required for investing in the traditional instruments such
as stocks and bonds.24 In addition, the current accredited investor definition necessarily
involves the possibility that it misclassifies unsophisticated investors into accredited
investors because it measures an investor’s sophistication by using a proxy.25 To overcome
inherent limitations of the current accredited investor definition, an investor should be able
to remain as an unaccredited investor when the investor determines that he is not capable
of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment. The approach that
provides an investor with the opportunity to choose investor status is adopted in the
European Union and South Korea. 26 However, the reclassification system of the two
countries is different in that Korea does not permit ordinary investors to request
reclassification to an accredited investor (“opt-in”), while the EU allows both “opt-in” and
“opt-out.” In considering adoption of the investor reclassification system within the U.S.
regulatory regime, reclassification should be limited to “opt-out” in light of the potential
for abuse of an “opt-in” reclassification.

24

See supra Chapter IV.A.1.2.3.

25

See supra Chapter IV.A.1.2.2.

26

See supra Chapter IV.A.1.2.2.d., 2.4.3.d.
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2. MANNER OF OFFERING
2.1. RELAXING THE PRE-EXISTING, SUBSTANTIVE RELATIONSHIP REQUIREMENT

The SEC should relax the pre-existing, substantive relationship requirement with
respect to the interpretation of Rule 502(c) of Regulation D. As discussed in Chapter IV,
the pre-existing, substantive relationship requirement has placed a significant burden on
small businesses seeking capital. 27 Although the new Rule 506(c) of Regulation D
provides a new avenue for issuers to make use of an exempt offering without being
restricted by such requirement, the predominance of Rule 506(b) offerings in the
unregistered offerings market remains unchanged even after the adoption of the Rule 506(c)
exemption.28 The Rule 506(b) offering has an advantage over the Rule 506(c) offering in
that unlike the latter, the former leaves room for the availability of the statutory exemption
in the event of a noncompliance with the conditions of Regulation D. 29 From a regulatory
perspective, the SEC may prefer the predominance of Rule 506(b) offerings because the
rapid growth of Rule 506(c) offerings market would increase the regulatory concern due to
the public nature of the Rule 506(c) offering and the potential for fraud. However, a preexisting relationship requirement would continue to hinder small businesses’ ability to rely
on Rule 506(b) offerings. Therefore, the SEC should consider the relaxation of the current

27

H.R. REP. No. 112-263, at 2 (2011).

28

Between September 23, 2013, when the Rule 506(c) exemption became effective and December 31,
2014, the amount of capital raised through Rule 506(c) offerings was $33 billion, in stark contrast to $1,520
billion (97.7% of total amount raised in Regulation D offerings) raised through Rule 506(b) offerings. See
Scott Bauguess, Rachita Gullapalli, and Vladimir Ivanov, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Div. of Econ. & Risk
Analysis, Capital Raising in the U.S.: An Analysis of the Market for Unregistered Securities Offerings, 20092014, at 14 (Oct. 29, 2015).
29

See supra Chapter IV.B.1.3 notes 288-289 and accompanying text.
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pre-existing, substantive relationship requirement to balance the capital need of small
issuers and investor protection. Such a requirement would not be necessary where an issuer
makes offers of securities to institutional investors and other highly-sophisticated investors
(e.g., “large accredited investor” if the SEC adopts such definition). Issuers do not have
difficulty in reaching a conclusion that such investors are suitable for the private offering
without a pre-existing relationship.

2.2. ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS FOR RULE 506(C) OFFERINGS

The SEC should provide additional safeguards for investor protection with respect to
Rule 506(c) offerings. The current regulatory scheme which limits purchasers of securities
to accredited investors in return for general solicitation would not serve as a sufficient
safeguard to address the concern for fraud in Rule 506(c) offerings in light of low net worth
or income thresholds of the current accredited investor definition.30
The starting point for discussions on the additional investor safeguards for Rule 506(c)
should be the SEC’s own initiatives that were proposed in the separate release at the time
when the SEC eliminated the general solicitation ban in Rule 506 offerings.30.A This
proposal, though not adopted, covered important regulatory measures that could mitigate
concerns for fraud and abuse in connection with the use of public solicitation in the Rule
506 offerings.30.B Thus, this proposal would serve as useful guidelines at the time when
the SEC reconsiders additional investor protections for Rule 506(c).

30

See supra Chapter IV.B.1.4.2.

30.A

Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act Release No. 9416 (July 10,

2013).
30.B

See supra Chapter IV.B.1.4.2., notes 232.12-232.14 and accompanying text.
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In addition, commentators expressed concerns that retirees and senior citizens who
qualify for accredited investors, mainly due to their retirement funds, would be “prime
targets for companies looking for investors.”31 To relieve such concern, retirement assets
should be excluded from the net worth calculation. 32 The SEC also needs to consider
limiting purchasers in Rule 506(c) offerings to “large accredited investors” in a similar way
to which the SEC proposed in 2007 that the sale of securities would be limited to “large
accredited investors” where an issuer engages in “limited advertising.”33
Instead of affecting the potential investor pool issuers can target, the SEC may
consider tightening the ways in which they make offers of securities to investors. Since
Rule 506(c) does not restrict any form of publication, the Internet is likely to be the most
common means that unscrupulous issuers employ to lure innocent investors. Thus, for
example, the SEC may impose the requirement that an issuer must use registered brokerdealers to engage in online solicitation or advertising for the first time. This requirement
can not only help screen fraudulent schemes on the Internet in connection with private
offerings, but also ensure an issuer’s compliance of securities laws and regulations in the
future offerings.

31

E.g., Hugo Gallegos, The JOBS Act and Lifting the Ban on General Solicitation and Advertising: Is
the U.S. Ready for Investment Opportunity Infomercials?, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 448, 460 (2013); Luis
A. Aguilar, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Facilitating General Solicitation at the Expense of Investors
(July 10, 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/open-meeting-statement-laa-3; Lee,
supra note 5, at 385-86.
32

Recommendation of the Investor Advisory Committee: Accredited Investor Definition (Oct. 9,
2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/investment-advisoraccredited-definition.pdf.
The proposed Rule 507 allowed an issuer to “publish a limited announcement of an offering” if all
the purchasers were limited to “large accredited investors.” Publication of such an announcement was not
construed as general solicitation and advertising. The publication should be “in written form.” To “limit
aggressive selling efforts made through the announcement,” certain media such as radio or television was
prohibited. See 2007 Regulation D Revisions Proposal, supra note 17, at 19-21.
33
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3. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

The SEC should improve information requirements to assure accredited natural
persons’ accessibility to relevant information with respect to the private offerings.
Although the current private placement regulation protects non-accredited investors
through registration statement-like disclosure and other safeguards, such protections do not
apply to accredited investors based on the belief that their bargaining power would enable
investors to access relevant information without mandatory disclosure. 34 However, as
discussed earlier, the current accredited investor definition casts serious doubt on
accredited natural persons’ ability to obtain relevant information from the issuer. 35
To ensure that accredited natural persons make an investment decision with the
sufficient information relating to the offering, some of the information requirements that
apply to non-accredited investors should be extended to accredited natural persons. First,
the SEC may require an issuer to provide accredited natural persons the opportunity to
request and receive information that would be furnished if the purchaser were a nonaccredited investor pursuant to Rule 502(b)(2) of Regulation D. 36 In addition, the SEC
may consider, in a similar way to which it is provide in subparagraph (iv) of Rule 502(b)(2),
requiring an issuer to furnish to the purchaser who is an accredited natural person “a brief
description in writing of any material written information concerning the offering that has
been provided by the issuer to” any institutional accredited investor (or “large accredited

34

See supra Chapter IV.C.1.4.

35

See supra Chapter IV.C.1.5.

36

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i)-(ii).
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investor” if the SEC adopts such definition) “but not previously delivered to such”
accredited purchaser. 37 In this case, the issuer must “furnish any portion or all of this
information to the purchaser, upon his written request a reasonable time prior to his
purchase.”38

37

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(iv).

38

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(iv).
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B. SOUTH KOREA

1. INVESTOR QUALIFICATIONS
1.1. REEXAMINATION OF THE CATEGORIES OF PROFESSIONALS AND RELATED PERSONS
First of all, the current categories of professionals and related persons should be
reexamined whether or not they appropriately represent the class of persons whose
qualifications are deemed to render investor protections afforded in the registered offering
unnecessary. The current securities regulation recognizes the various types of related
persons and professionals who are not counted toward the 50-person test. However,
adequacy of some categories of investors are called into question. For example, employees
of the Employee Stock Ownership Association (ESOA) are classified as related persons,
but employees generally are not in a position to have access to the information which
registration would disclose. 39 The scope of persons that qualify for professionals was
significantly expanded in June 2016 by embracing the term “professional investor” that
had been used in connection with the securities business regulation. 40 Due to the
conceptual similarities between two investor concepts, each category of investors defined
in the term “professional investor” was recognized as professionals without any
modification. However, some categories of professional investors seem to be inappropriate
to qualify for professional. As discussed in Chapter IV, the category of stock-listed
companies is one example. 41 The mere fact that securities of a company are listed in the

39

See supra Chapter IV.A.2.5.2.a.

40

See supra Chapter IV.A.2.3.

41

See supra Chapter IV.A.2.5.3.b(1).
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exchange does not sufficiently show that the company can dispense with protections
afforded by the securities laws in the securities offering. Instead, stock-listed companies
should be accredited based on the size of the company or the balance of financial
investment instruments which is a professional investor standard applicable to legal
entities.42

1.2. CHANGING THE PROFESSIONAL INVESTOR DEFINITION
The current professional investor definition with respect to natural person and legal
entities should be changed to better represent an investor’s ability to evaluate merits and
risks involved in the private placement. Despite the difference in criteria adopted in both
definitions, some of the recommendations offered with respect to the accredited investor
definition are also applicable to the professional investor definition.43 For example, the
scope of “financial investment instruments” should be defined more carefully so that the
criteria can have a stronger correlation with investor sophistication. To achieve this
purpose, certain investments that are directed and managed by securities professionals
should be excluded in calculating the amount of financial investment instruments an
investor owns. The FSC should also consider a multi-factor approach to encompass
sophisticated investors who are recognized under the current definition. In addition, it
should be noted that the U.S. accredited investor standard has been eroded over time since

42

Choi, Young-Joo, A Study on the Classification of Investors, 61 DONGA BUBHAK [DONGA JOURNAL
LAW] 375, 391-92 (2013) (recommending that the current standard based on the stock-listing should be
replaced with the company size).
OF

43

See supra Chapter V.A.1.1.
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it has not been adjusted for inflation for decades.43A To ensure the validity of current
investor standards, it is advisable to mandate the FSC to undertake a periodic review of the
term “professional investor.”44

1.3. VERIFICATION OF PROFESSIONAL INVESTOR STATUS
The current process of verifying professional investor status needs to be modified to
the private placement setting. Under the current regulation, satisfying the standards
specified in the definition of the term “professional investor” by itself does not grant natural
persons or legal entities professional investor status. An investor can only be accredited
as a professional investor through a formal registration process.45 The current verification
process was also designed in the financial investment business regulation setting. 46
However, in adopting the “professional investor” concept into the scope of the professional,
neither the FSCMA nor FSC rules provide the method that the issuer should follow to verify
the professional investor status in the private offering. In setting forth verification methods
of the issuer of securities in the private placement, flexible approach should be considered.
Some investors may be reluctant to register with the KOFIA since sensitive personal
information is required to be submitted to the authorities. Thus, the issuer or any person
acting on behalf of the issuer should be allowed to verify the qualification of the investor

43A

One million dollar of net worth and $200,000 of income thresholds for natural persons have never
been adjusted since they were adopted in 1982. In addition, $300,000 of joint-income threshold has never
been adopted since adopted in 1988. See, e.g., Regulation D Revisions, Securities Act Release No. 6758
(March 3, 1988), 1988 WL 237022, at *3.
44

Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §413(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577-1578 (2010) (mandating the
SEC to undertake a review of the definition of the term “accredited investor” at least once every four years).
45

See supra Chapter IV.A.2.4.3.c.

46

See supra Chapter IV.A.2.5.3.a.
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by means other than a professional investor certificate in a case where the investor is not
willing to go through the registration process.

1.4. NATURE OF INVESTORS
The private placement regulation should take into account the nature of investors
participating in the offering. The current regulation does not require investors who are not
professionals or related persons to have such knowledge and experience that is sufficient
to understand risks involved in the offering. As discussed in Chapter IV, absence of a
sophistication standard raises concerns for investor protection. 47 Thus, it is advisable to
require investors who are not professionals or related persons to satisfy the sophistication
standard. In the United States, Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) of Regulation D requires an issuer to
make a subjective determination about the sophistication of non-accredited investors. 48
However, the problem arises from the fact that it would be very difficult to clearly define
an investor’s sophistication in the statute. An approach that requires an issuer to make a
subjective determination on an investor’s sophistication as in SEC Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) seems
to be at odds with the Korean legislative system that places emphasis on the clarity of the
statutory language.49 Therefore, instead of defining a level of sophistication required in

47

See supra Chapter IV.A.2.5.1.

17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) of Regulation D provides that “[e]ach purchaser
who is not an accredited investor either alone or with his purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and
experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the
prospective investment, or the issuer reasonably believes immediately prior to making any sale that such
purchaser comes within this description.”
48

49

E.g., Criminal Penalty on False Communication, 22-2(B) KCCR 684, 2008Hun-Ba157, 2009HunBa88 (Consolidated) (December 28, 2010) (stating that “law regulating the freedom of expression shall
prescribe the concept of expression to be restricted by the law in a concrete and a clear manner which is the
constitutional requirement. . . . The Instant Provision is the law to restrict the freedom of expression with
criminal penalties and thus is subject to the rule of clarity in a strict level.”).
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the private placement, it would be desirable to require an issuer to take a reasonable step
to verify an investor’s sophistication as discussed below. 50

2. MANNER OF OFFERING
2.1. REDEFINING THE TERM “OFFER”
As prerequisite to discussion on the manner of offering in the private placement, the
redefinition of the term “offer” should be taken into consideration. As discussed in Chapter
IV, the current definition of the term “offer” is too narrow to effectively regulate an issuer’s
selling efforts which “contribute to conditioning the public mind or arousing public interest
in the issuer or in the securities of an issuer.”51 In particular, the South Korean Supreme
Court’s narrow reading of the current definition of the term “offer” reconfirmed the need
to revise the current definition. 52 Defining the term “offer” more broadly would inevitably
increase the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of an “offer” in securities
transactions. However, such concern can be relieved by providing exceptions which are
not deemed an “offer” in the FSC rules as the U.S. SEC did through the Securities Offering
Reform in 2005.53 The current definition of the term “offer” enumerates various offering
methods (e.g., placing an advertisement in a newspaper, a broadcasting medium, or a
magazine) which are typically used in the public offering.

50

However, it would be

See infra Chapter V.B.2.2.3.

51

Publication of Information Prior to or After the Effective Date of a Registration Statement, Securities
Act Release No. 3844, 1957 WL 3605, at *2 (Oct. 8, 1957). See supra Chapter IV.B.2.2.1.
52

See supra Chapter IV.B.2.2.1.

53

Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591 (July 19, 2005).
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unnecessary to include such a list in the definition of the term “offer.” It may also create a
loophole in the investor protection under the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of an
“offer.” The limitation of the communication methods can be considered as one of the
conditions of the private placement just as Rule 502(c) of Regulation D in the United States.

2.2. RENEWING THE MANNER OF OFFERING SCHEMES
2.2.1. LIMITING THE NUMBER OF PURCHASERS
The current regulation which limits the “number of offerees” should be replaced with
the “number of purchasers” regulation. As outlined in Chapter IV, the current regulation
indirectly restricts the manner of offering in the private placement by limiting the number
offerees to 49 persons, except professionals and related persons. 54 However, limiting the
number of offerees can have an effect to excessively restrain small businesses’ activities to
locate and communicate with potential investors in reliance on the private placement. It
also exposes the difficulty in evidence gathering of violation of securities laws. As the
United States has done in the content of Rule 506 of Regulation D, limiting the number of
purchasers, not the number of offerees, would resolve these problems.
2.2.2. BAN ON GENERAL SOLICITATION
However, a shift to the “purchaser” regulation should be followed by an imposition
of new requirements to regulate the manner in which an issuer solicits the purchase of
securities and protects “offerees” in the private placement. At least two requirements can

54

See supra Chapter IV.B.2.2.2.
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be taken into consideration. First, an issuer should be prevented from engaging in general
solicitation or general advertising in the private placement. The specific communication
means to be prohibited can be specified with reference to those enumerated in Rule 502(c)
of Regulation D in the United States or the current definition of the term “offer” under the
FSCMA. On the other hand, one may argue that Korea should allow an issuer to engage
in general solicitation or general advertising when all purchasers are professionals or
related persons just as an exempt offering under Rule 506(c) of Regulation D in the United
States. However, this view appears to overlook a substantive difference in the meaning of
the ban on general solicitation between the two countries.

Unlike Rule 502(c) of

Regulation D in the United States, the ban on general solicitation under Korean regulation
would not mean that an issue should have a pre-existing, substantive relationship with the
offerees.55 The impact on the issuer’s offering activities caused by the ban on general
solicitation would not be so broad as those in Rule 502(c) of Regulation D. Therefore,
there is no urgent need to permit general solicitation and general advertising in the private
placement regime, taking a risk of compromising investor protection.
2.2.3. INVESTOR SUITABILITY
An issuer (or any person acting on its behalf) making offers of securities in reliance
on the private placement should be require to take relevant measures to determine that an
offeree has sufficient knowledge and experience to understand risks associated with the
investment. However, as stated earlier, an approach that requires an issuer to make a
subjective determination on an investor’s sophistication as in SEC Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) may

55

See supra Chapter IV.B.1.2.2.b.

257

be proved difficult to implement under the Korean legislative system.55A To give an issuer
a clear guidance with respect to the compliance of this requirement, the FSC rules need to
provide specific measures that the issuer should follow. One example of such measures
would include relying on the investor suitability questionnaires. To provide objective
standards for the suitability test, standardized procedures and questionnaires need to be
developed.
2.2.4. USE OF ONLINE OFFERING PLATFORMS
On the other hand, The FSC should address regulatory issues with respect to the use
of online offering platforms in the private placement. As outlined in Chapter IV, online
private offering platforms have been used in the United States by using a passwordprotected website that can limit its access to certain qualified investors after IPONET.56
For startups and small companies that do not have sufficient investor contacts, the online
offering platform can serve as an efficient means to increase the opportunity to find
investors. However, the Korean securities market has not yet utilized such electronic media
with respect to private placements. The reason may be found from the fact that the private
placement regulation limits the number of “offerees” and also did not recognize natural
persons who are professional investors as professionals prior to the amendment to the
Enforcement Decree of the FSCMA in June 2016. 57
However, the transition to the number of purchaser regulation, coupled with the

55A

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.

56

IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 431821 (July 26, 1996).
IV.B.1.2.2.b(1)(d).
57

See supra Chapter IV.A.2.3.
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See supra Chapter

amendment to the Enforcement Decree of the FSCMA, can expedite the use of online
offering platforms within the private placement market. In anticipation of the emergence
of the online private offering platform, certain investor protection schemes should be
considered to prevent the misuse of electronic media in the private placement. First,
operation of the online offering platform should be limited to financial investment
companies such as broker-dealers. Some issuers may be eager to use their websites or other
electronic media to prospect for investors in a current or future offering. However,
considering the vulnerability to fraudulent schemes, an issuer’s use of electronic media
should be prohibited. Second, terms and arrangements related to the private offering
should be agreed on through direct negotiation between an issuer and investors. Direct
negotiation between an issuer and investors has been recognized as a characteristic of the
private placement. 58 However, use of online offering platforms involves a risk that terms
and arrangements of the offering are decided unilaterally by an issuer without being fully
negotiated with the investors. Therefore, the private placement regulation must require
platform operators to establish specific procedures to assure direct negotiation between an
issuer and investors.

3. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

The FSC should establish information requirements as a condition of the private
placement. To date, the Korean securities regulation entirely ignores the information

58

E.g., Letter of General Counsel Discussing Factors to be Considered in Determining the Availability
of the Exemption From Registration Provided by the Second Clause of Section 4(1), Securities Act Release
No. 285, 1935 WL 27785 (Jan. 24, 1935) (stating that “transactions which are effected by direct negotiation
by the issuer are much more likely to be non-public than those effected through the use of the machinery of
public distribution”).
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requirement in the context of the private placement regardless of the nature of investors.
The absence of adequate disclosure of information in the private placement can not only
compromise investor protection, but also hinder capital formation of small businesses by
increasing information asymmetry between issuers and investors.

Therefore, several

requirements can be taken into consideration with respect to disclosure of information to
assure the accessibility of information. First of all, an issuer making the sale of securities
in reliance on the private placement to investors who are not professionals or related
persons should be required to furnish such investors with certain information in a written
form. In a similar way to which it is provided in Rule 502(b), the FSC may specify the
type of information that the issuer should furnish to investors differently to the issuer’s
reporting status and the offering size. Second, as recommended with respect to information
requirements of Regulation D in the United States, The FSC also should require an issuer
to make available to individual professional investors the opportunity to request and
receive relevant information.59 Third, the FSC should develop a model private placement
memorandum to encourage companies making offers of securities in the private placement
to provide investors with relevant information irrespective of the regulatory obligation, and
to increase the comparability of information disclosed by different issuers.

59

See supra Chapter V.A.3.
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4. OTHER ISSUES
4.1. DISQUALIFICATION OF ISSUERS
The private placement regulation should adopt the disqualification provisions that
prevent an issuer from relying on the exemption where an issuer or any person affiliated
with the issuer is linked to prior bad acts that can affect the issuer’s trustworthiness. Since
the private placement lacks statutory safeguards that can lead issuers to make a full and
true disclosure of information, it can be easily involved in fraudulent activities as explained
in the previous chapter. 60

Thus, assessing the issuer’s trustworthiness to disclose

information faithfully and comply with securities laws and regulations is particularly
important to protect investors from fraud and maintain investor confidence in the private
placement market. However, the current private placement regulation does not provide
any regulatory safeguard to screen unworthy issuers from the private placement. The
disqualification provisions can benefit both investors and issuers by reducing the potential
for fraud in the private placement.61

60

See supra Chapter VI.A.2.5.1.b-c.

In adopting “bad actor” disqualification provisions under Rule 506(d) of Regulation D, the SEC
explained the benefits of new provisions as follows:
61

To the extent the new disqualification provisions result in a reduction of fraud in the Rule 506
offering market, investor losses to fraud will be reduced and investor willingness to participate
in the Rule 506 market could increase. This should lower the issuance costs for Rule 506
offerings to the extent that new disqualification standards lower the risk premium associated
with the presence of bad actors in securities offerings. . . . The new disqualification provisions
may also benefit investors by reducing the burden of the “due diligence” investigation they
conduct on persons and entities involved in the offerings in which they invest.
Disqualification of Felons and Other Bad Actors From Rule 506 Offerings, Securities Act Release No.
9414 (July 10, 2013), at 113-14. See also Securities Act Release No. 10238 (Oct. 26, 2016), 2016 WL
6872611, at *37 and *99 [amendments to Rule 504 of Regulation D, effective January 20, 2017].
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4.2. FILING REQUIREMENT
One of the important missing aspects of the current private placement regulation is
the filing requirement. The current regulation does not impose any filing requirement upon
an issuer making sales of securities in reliance on the private placement. Thus, an overall
market data concerning the private placement is not readily available to the authorities,
though private placement data for reporting companies can be partially obtained from
current reports and periodic reports that the companies file with the FSC. 62 Lack of
empirical data makes it difficult for the authorities to analyze the private placement markets
or assess the effectiveness of private placement regulation, and take relevant actions to
improve the current regulation.
On the contrary, the U.S. SEC imposed on an issuer the requirement to file a notice of
sales on Form D with the SEC when it adopted Regulation D. 63 In the proposing release
of Regulation D, the SEC stated that the important purpose of the filing requirement would
be “to collect empirical data which will provide a basis for further action by the
Commission either in terms of amending existing rules and regulations or proposing new
ones.”64 The SEC once considered to eliminate the Form D filing requirement as a part of

62
For example, a reporting company is required to file a current report with the FSC immediately after
the company decides (generally by approval of the board of directors) to increase or decrease capital, or
increase liability by issuing contingent capital (e.g., convertible bond, bond with warrant), except the
company files a registration statement in connection with foregoing change of capital or liability. Capital
Market Act, Art. 161(1) subpar. 5; Enforcement Decree of the Capital Market Act, Art. 171(1) subpars. 1-2.
63

Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and
Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 1982 WL 35662 (Mar. 8, 1982). However, Form D is no longer a
condition for an exemption under Regulation D. Securities Act Release No. 6285 (March 14, 1989), 1989
WL 1093485. For the brief history of the requirement for filing of Form D under Rule 503 of Regulation D,
see generally 7A J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 § 7:168
(2016).
64

Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of
1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6339 (Aug. 7, 1981),
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its efforts to simplify the disclosure process. 65 However, after reviewing public comments,
it decided to retain the filing of Form D in light of its usefulness in the analysis of
Regulation D. 66 The SEC actually makes use of Form D to analyze the market for
unregistered securities offerings67 and conduct the economic analysis on proposed rules
and regulations.68
The filing requirement can also provide useful means to monitor in the private
placement transactions. Unlike the United States where both federal and state regulators
have authority to investigate and bring enforcement actions against fraudulent activities in
connection with Rule 506 offerings, Korea does not have such dual regulatory system. This
would mean that the FSS’ role of overseeing the private placement market is particularly
important. However, the FSS does not retain basic information necessary to monitor
private placement transactions. Thus, data collected from the filings of a notice of sales
can be used to monitor the private placement market and selectively examine transactions
that are very likely to violate the securities laws (e.g., private offerings involving a
relatively large number of individual investors).
With respect to the timing of the filing, The FSC needs to consider requiring the file

1981 WL 31063, at *17 (also stating that Form D would “allow the Commission to elicit information
necessary in assessing the effectiveness of Regulation D as a capital raising device for small businesses”).
65

Phase Two Recommendations of Task Force on Disclosure Simplification (proposed rules),
Securities Act Release No. 7301 (May 31, 1996), 1996 WL 293568, at *2-4.
66
Phase Two Recommendations of Task Force on Disclosure Simplification (final rules), Securities
Act Release No. 7431 (July 18, 1997), 1997 WL 401054, at *2 (stating that “the information contained in
Form D is still useful to the Commission in conducting economic and other analyses of the private placement
market”).
67
E.g., Scott Bauguess, Rachita Gullapalli, and Vladimir Ivanov, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Div. of
Econ. & Risk Analysis, Capital Raising in the U.S.: An Analysis of the Market for Unregistered Securities
Offerings, 2009-2014 (Oct. 29, 2015).
68
E.g., Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, Part V. Economic
Analysis, at 86-164, Securities Act Release No. 10238 (Oct. 26, 2016).
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in advance of any private offering as proposed (but not finally adopted) by the U.S. SEC.68A
Advance filing can enable regulators to oversee private offerings more effectively, as well
as more easily determine an issuer’s compliance of the private placement regulation.

4.3. DISCIPLINARY POWER
Disciplinary power should be vested to Korean financial regulators to assure effective
deterrence of misconducts relating to the private placement.

Despite having broad

investigative power, Korean financial regulators only have limited disciplinary power to
enforce the securities law violations. 69 In particular, the FSC is not authorized to sanction
a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with a private placement.
Such violation is only subject to criminal or civil liability. 70 In contrast, the FSC is
authorized to impose a monetary penalty on any untrue statement or omission of a material
fact on the registration statement or the prospectus. 71 Lack of the disciplinary power of
financial regulators makes it difficult to respond to fraudulent activities in the private
placement market in the timely and effective manner. The civil proceedings can consume
considerable time and costs, and may not be effective when defendants dissipate ill-gotten
profits.72 It also takes a long time to rely on the criminal proceedings to hold defendants

68A
Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act Release No. 9416 (July 10,
2013). In this release, the SEC proposed to require an issuer to file a Form D in Rule 506 offerings at least
15 days before it engages in general solicitation. See supra Chapter IV.B.1.4.2., notes 232.12-232.14 and
accompanying text.
69

See supra Chapter II.C.3.3.

70

Capital Market Act, Arts. 178, 179, 444.

71

Capital Market Act, Arts. 125(1), 429(1).

72

Byoung Youn Kim, Introduction of Financial Penalty against Unfair Transaction under Capital
Market and Financial Investment Services Act, KOREAN COMMERCIAL LAW ASSOCIATION, VOL. 32-4, 72,
76-80 (2014) (pointing out limitations of civil and criminal proceedings in unfair trading cases).
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liable, and the prosecution should sustain the highest level of burden of proof. 73 Without
being supported by their own disciplinary power, financial regulators’ investigative power
alone can never be an efficient means to achieve deterrence on frauds in the private
placement market.

73

Id.
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION
This study broadly reviewed the private placement regulations of the United States
and South Korea, and discussed the problems of the current regulatory regimes in terms of
essential factors defining the private placement. Based on the discussions, it proposed
several recommendations to achieve an enhanced balance of investor protection and capital
formation in each private placement regime.
In the United States, problems of the current private placement regulation primarily
stem from the troubled “accredited investor” definition which represents an investor’s
wealth rather than financial sophistication or expertise, and has been eroded to qualify more
than 10% U.S. households.

Accredited investors are excluded from the benefit of

mandatory disclosure afforded to non-accredited investors regardless of their actual
sophistication or ability to access to information, casting doubt on certain individual
accredited investors’ ability to make an informed decision in the private offering. The
concern about the current accredited investor definition is even growing after the adoption
of Rule 506(c) of Regulation D which allows fraudsters to target unsophisticated accredited
investors more easily by using general solicitation. Despite the increase of potential for
fraud, additional investor protections have not yet been adopted under new Rule 506(c)
regime. To ameliorate the U.S. private placement regulation, this study recommended that
the U.S. SEC should, (i) heighten the accredited investor standard; (ii) increase the
flexibility of the accredited investor definition by permitting reclassification of investor
status; (iii) relax the pre-existing relationship requirement in connection with Rule 506(b)
offerings; (iv) establish additional investor safeguards for Rule 506(c) offerings; and (v)
extend certain information requirements related to non-accredited investors to accredited

266

natural persons.
In South Korea, besides problems associated with definition of the terms “professional
investor” and “related person” (e.g., wealth-based definition, validity of certain categories
of professional investors or related persons), the current private placement regulation
causes serious concerns about investor protection by permitting ordinary investors to
participate in the private offering without any qualification requirement. Other than
limiting the number of offerees through the “50-person test,” the current private placement
regulation does not provide any investor protection scheme. Due to the lack of filing
requirement with respect to the private placement, the oversight of the private placement
market by financial regulators is not workable either. To reform the current private
placement regime, this study proposed various recommendations, (i) reexamine the validity
of the current definition of the terms “professional investor” and “related person”; (ii) shift
from the number of offeree regulation to the number of purchaser regulation; (iii) redefine
the term “offer” and specify the manner of offering in the private placement; (iv) require
an issuer to conduct investor suitability test; (v) develop investor protection schemes with
respect to the use of online private offering platforms; (vi) require an issuer to provide
relevant information with investors; (vii) impose additional requirements such as issuer
disqualifications and the filing requirement; and (viii) strengthen the FSC’s disciplinary
power over violations of securities laws.
As seen from this study, two countries’ private placement regimes have stark
differences. The U.S. securities law regime has developed judicial and administrative
interpretations with respect to the meaning of Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act.
Regulation D also sets forth specific terms and conditions to claim the private offering
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exemption. On the contrary, in South Korea, the private placement regulation has received
little attention from regulators, law practitioners, and legal scholars. Most of the regulatory
requirements for the private placement, which are provided under Regulation D in the
United States (e.g., manner of offering, information requirements, Form D requirement,
issuer disqualification), are not found under the Korean private placement regulation.
What caused such differences with respect to the private placement regulation? The
answer may be explained by different views of investor protection in the private placement
between two countries. As emphasized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ralston Purina Co.,
the availability of the private offering exemption “turn[s] on whether the particular class
of persons affected need the protection of the Act” in the U.S. securities laws context.1 The
need for investor protection does not differ depending on whether a particular transaction
involves public offering or not. In other words, the private placement is exempted from
registration, but not from the need for protection of the Securities Act. Accordingly, the
SEC has made efforts to develop detailed regulation to justify the exemption without
compromising the investor protection.
On the contrary, the Korean securities law regime appears to take a dichotomous
approach to investor protection in securities offerings. Unlike the public offering, the need
for protection of the securities laws is simply disregarded in the private offering. Lack of
regulatory protection in the private placement tend to be taken for granted since the private
placement is exempted from registration. However, it overlooks the fact that registration
of securities is a means, not an end to achieve the important objective of securities laws,
investor protection. Even in securities transactions where registration is exempted due to

1

SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
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the nature of the offering or policy consideration, regulatory protections would be
necessary to protect investors from frauds and other potential harms. The adequate investor
protections in the private placement market, in turn, would help promote capital formation
by increasing investor confidence. Korean securities laws should reconsider the current
private placement regulation in terms of investor protection.
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